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                                             ABSTRACT 
 
The intention of this dissertation is to expose the gendered experiences of rape 
victims, based on the notion that while it should be the purpose of rape laws to protect 
victims of rape, in many circumstances the legal process results in disempowering 
experiences for victims, particularly women. Therefore, I suggest that the courtroom, 
a supposedly just space, is one which is laced with patriarchal undercurrents that work 
specifically against women. Rape is a complex and multi-faceted subject that is fast 
becoming an epidemic. In relation to HIV/AIDS and sexuality, the issue of rape 
certainly becomes compounded. Deconstructing the historical and cultural 
experiences of women is not only necessary in attempting to understand rape, but also 
the reasons why the justice system, which is dominantly a male domain, may still 
cling to patriarchal principles. One reason for the marginalization of rape victims may 
be the continued regard of women as second class citizens. The rape trial, in which 
Jacob Zuma was the alleged rapist, is a starting point, and by referring to this case, I 






















                                ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank Professor Thenjiwe Meyiwa, who has walked with me 
throughout this journey and who undoubtedly made me feel as though her door was 
always open if ever I needed assistance. I would also like to thank Professor Vasu 
Reddy who introduced me to Gender Studies, thus allowing me the opportunity to 
open my mind in unexpected and exciting ways.  
 
I am thankful and truly grateful to my partner, McDonald Kambuwa and my special 
friends Angela Zeleza, Faith Kachimera, George Naphambo, Veronica Fletcher, 
Thenjiwe Mbayiwa, Ongezwa Mbele, Tapiwa Nkhoma and Ethel Kansawa who 
encouraged and stood by me throughout this whole process and always offered their 

























                                        DEDICATION 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Christine and Samson Kakhobwe, who 
gave me the opportunity to study and who I know went out of their way to make this 
process as easy as possible, and to my siblings, Nthanda, Penelope, Gregory, Eugenia, 










                                              CONTENTS                  
 
Declaration                                                                                                              i 
 
 
Abstract                                                                                                                   ii                         
 
 
Acknowledgements                                                                                                 iii 
 
 




INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION      1 
 
 
CHAPTER 2  


















CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION         78 
 
 
REFERENCES         82 
 
 
APPENDIX   
JUDGEMENT OF JUDGE WILLEM J VAN DER MERWE: THE STATE VS 












The rape trial involving Jacob Zuma during the year 2006 was one that evoked a 
series of emotions and debate. Feminist and human rights groups appealed to the 
justice system for greater sensitivity and consideration for the alleged victim who was 
believed to have undergone a traumatizing ordeal. On the other hand, certain sectors 
of the community insisted that the whole case was a politically motivated hoax, 
orchestrated by the enemies of the then Deputy-President of the African National 
Congress (ANC) and Republic of South Africa, Jacob Zuma in order to taint his 
image, and decrease his chances of acquiring the ANC presidential seat and ultimately 
a possibility of being head of state.  
 
Two years later, the very same echoes of a conspiracy continue, with a strong 
emphasis on a power struggle between Xhosa and Zulu factions within the ANC, in 
the form of Jacob Zuma who was said to represent Zulu interests, while then President 
Thabo Mbeki supposedly represented Xhosa interests. In the year 2008 we saw that 
this tension probably resulted in the ousting of Thabo Mbeki as President of the 
Republic of South Africa, but also in the manifestation of the breakaway party, named 
Congress of the People (COPE). Although not led by former President Thabo Mbeki, 
there has been a strong suggestion of his affiliation to this breakaway party. However, 
politics aside, what I concern myself with within this dissertation is really the process 
of justice, and whether or not the court, using all available resources indeed managed 
to adequately prove whether or not the crime of rape had indeed been committed 
against Jacob Zuma’s accuser.  
 
Although I have made reference to various kinds of literature, the main feature of this 
dissertation is the statement of Judge WJ van der Merwe, who presided over this 
matter. In his statement, he makes various points that may suggest a limited capacity 





Merwe said “he allowed evidence to be led about the complainant’s past sexual 
history because he wanted to explore evidence related to the complainant’s mindset in 
terms of sexual matters. However, Zuma’s mindset regarding the alleged political 
conspiracy plot against him was never questioned” (Motsei, 2007: 147). I am 
compelled to consider whether he allowed himself to become swayed by various 
outdated cultural notions with regard to women as well as rape. Subsequently, I have 
chosen to map out what I regard as the serious implications of this case, for victims of 
rape, mainly which stem from the inability of women to access and claim their 
democratic and human rights.  
 
The following information was taken from the judgment of Judge W J van der 
Merwe: 
 
The main parties involved in this case were the accused, Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma, 
born on the 12th of April 1942 and the complainant who at the time was a 31 year old 
female, named Ms K or Khwezi for the purpose of the trial, after an application to 
conceal her identity for the sake of her security, considering the high profile nature of 
the case. The complainant claims to have become familiar with the accused in the 
early 1980s as both her father and the accused served together in the freedom struggle 
and it is common knowledge that they were friends.  
 
The complainant’s father has since passed away, as he died in a car accident in 1985 
on his way from Harare to Lusaka. The accused admits to visiting the complainant’s 
father on a number of occasions at the complainant’s family home, while based in 
Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Swaziland in the early part of the 1980s. He would most 
likely have seen the complainant and he even kept in contact with the family after the 
death of his friend.  
 
After her return from Swaziland to South Africa the complainant sparsely resumed 
contact with the accused during the period 1998 to the time of the alleged rape. 
During the year 2001, she informed Mr. Zuma of her HIV status as she regarded him 
as a “father”. Ms K even claimed that she referred to the accused as “father”, a charge 






The incident in question is said to have occurred on the night of the 2nd of November 
2005 at the home of the accused in Johannesburg. According to Mr. Zuma a meeting 
was initiated by Ms K as she said she had some matters to discuss. Ms K however, 
stated that she arrived at the home of Mr. Zuma at his invitation. In fact, she was 
meant to be on her way to Swaziland due to the fact that her niece’s son had been 
bitten by a snake. Both the accused and the complainant agree to the fact that the 
accused had suggested that Ms K not be too hasty, but postpone her travel 
arrangements.  
 
It is a known fact that Ms K had made a request for financial assistance as she wanted 
to further her studies and was due to go to a college in Australia in February 2005, but 
Mr. Zuma was unable to provide funding. Another opportunity to study in the United 
Kingdom emerged and it was hoped that possible funding would be discussed on the 
night in question. Due to a series of other meetings which occurred on the same night 
the accused was unable to immediately attend to Ms K. Later that night, the daughter 
of Mr. Zuma, named Duduzile and Ms. K went to the accused’s study to say 
goodnight. While Duduzile went to bed, Ms. K remained, apparently only wearing a 
kanga, which is a cloth commonly used by women to wrap around their body. The 
complainant wore the kanga by wrapping it around her body, under her arm pits, over 
her breasts and it was long enough to reach her knees.  
 
After a short meeting between the two, the complainant proceeded to bed, in a spare 
room within the house, while the accused continued to work. Mr. Zuma maintains that 
Ms. K asked him to wake her up, if at all she was asleep by the time he had completed 
his business, on the other hand Ms. K holds that Mr. Zuma said that she must make 
use of the double bed and even offered to “tuck” her in. The accused claims to have 
woken the victim as per her request, and both parties eventually retreated to the 
bedroom of the accused where they had “consensual sex”.  
 
In the version of the complainant, the accused entered her room. The light was still 
on, however she was indeed asleep. Mr. Zuma asked Ms. K if she was asleep and she 
mumbled in the affirmative. The accused again offered to not only tuck her in, but 
also to massage her whilst she slept, to which the complainant declined as she was 





her eyes to find that he was naked. He opened her kanga, and according to the 
complainant the accused using his right knee pushed her legs apart, at the same time 
holding her hands above her head and proceeded to rape her. When the accused was 
done, he got up and left the room.  
 
During the period of the alleged rape, the complainant neither screamed nor fought off 
the accused as she is said to have frozen due to shock. The complainant also had 
access to a cell phone and there was also a Telkom land line in her room, none of 
which she used to call for help. Although the incident is said to have occurred on the 
night of the 2nd of November 2005 it was only reported on the 4th of November 2005. 
 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Although this case was quite a dramatic incident, due to the immense amount of 
publicity it received, the public were given the opportunity to see how rape cases are 
processed within the South African context. How rape was defined or not defined is 
an important feature of this dissertation and even became relevant in the manner 
evidence was gathered or deemed relevant. Insight is given into the laws governing 
the crime of rape and how this may ultimately affect the possible conviction of an 
alleged rapist and even some of the issues that would stand in the way of a conviction. 
 
Much effort will go towards understanding whether the manner in which rape is 
processed is linked to traditional and cultural perceptions of women. The status of 
women in our society is an issue that has been widely debated, but with many positive 
outcomes that are undoubtedly deserving of acknowledgement, the struggle for 
further progress continues. The phallocentric (male-centred) nature of the state has 
proven to be a hindrance in women’s quest for autonomy, as it greatly affects the 
manner in which women access the various resources within society, particularly the 
law.  
 
The continued disregard for women, makes one wonder whether within our 
socialization, there are subliminal undertones that endorse the hate of women, and 





Understanding the vulnerability of women, and their gendered experiences, even at 
the hands of the law, it is argued that the law is not always necessarily a just and 
gender-sensitive institution. As a society that consists of cultures that are generally 
bound by patriarchal mores, I wonder if it would be too optimistic if I were to believe 
that law enforcers were not somewhat influenced in some way or another, particularly 
due to the place of privilege which it affords to male folk, especially as they tend to 
dominate most institutions.  
 
The concept of rape is tainted, not only due to the horrendousness of the crime, but 
also because it is a crime whose definition has been limited and contained to suit 
patriarchal interests. The result has been that women have not been able to seek 
justice, in terms that actually acknowledge the physical and emotionally penetrative 
violence related to this act. In this particular case, the expectations and many of the 
statements made will certainly give an indication of what rape is understood to be, as 
well as what it is not understood to be.  
 
 
1.3 STUDY OBJECTIVES 
 
Understanding the way the South African law comes to its definition of rape is a 
poignant aspect to this case. The court in the rape case against Jacob Zuma, not only 
deemed certain evidence as permissible, but other kinds of evidence as unnecessary, 
although it may have certainly been beneficial to the alleged victim, for example, the 
complainant claimed to be a lesbian, yet when delving into her sexual history the 
evidence gathering basically did not acknowledge this part of her identity. In fact the 
judge even called her “bisexual”.  
 
It is my intention to investigate the relationship between rape and patriarchy and to 
consider whether the justice system is an area that allows such a crime to thrive by not 
having laws that necessarily protect the interests of female rape victims, as well as not 
being sensitive to the cultural and historical realities of women in general. The alleged 
victim in this particular case was HIV positive, and this gave me the opportunity to 
view how patriarchy also filters into the field of HIV, especially in relation to rape. 





condom. Although there has been an attempt by the law to consider scenarios related 
to “harmful sexual conduct” (Chisala, 2008) much concentration has been on those 
not infected at all, through the provision of Post-Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) a drug 
which if taken early, may prevent HIV infection. As in the case of the complainant, 
there seems to have been little consideration for the plight of the already infected.  
 
Sexual history played a major role within the dissertation’s analysis of the case that is 
made reference to, and which contributed immensely to the outcome of the case. 
Through the use of sexual history it is implied that the character or credibility of the 
complainant was being questioned. The process of “victim-blaming” occurs, with the 
victim becoming the perpetrator and vice versa (Ehrlich, 2001, Gobodo-Madikizela, 
2006). Reporting a rape case rather than an act of courage is viewed as an act of 
insubordination, defiance and irrationality worthy of ostracization as the case 
displayed. The possibility of secondary victimization cannot be underestimated, as I 
have already suggested that the justice system may be patriarchal in nature, thus 
systematically dismissing in particular, women unworthy of accessing the law due to 
certain traits. In this case not only was the alleged victim an unmarried woman in her 
thirties, she was HIV positive and a lesbian. One can only see this as a defiance of the 
patriarchal standard with regard to women.  
 
The question of consent again compels me to question what the law sees as a true 
definition of rape. Although the complainant claims to have said no to the accused, 
this was countered by the fact that the victim did not scream, considering the 
accused’s daughter was in the house and a guard was on site. Much was also made 
about the attire worn by the victim, in this case a kanga which was worn without 
underwear. It was implied that the alleged victim may have even been trying to 
provoke Mr. Zuma. The use of such evidence suggests that at times a lack of consent 
may be justified or at least permissible, since clearly a lack of verbal consent is not 










1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
Although rape is said to be a serious crime, the statistics display that compared to 
other crimes it ranks quite low in terms of convictions with only 7% of cases leading 
to convictions (www.mg.co.za, accessed: 06. 06. 09). Strangely it is also the only 
crime in which legally the character and history of the victims can be called into 
question in order to refute a claim of wrongdoing. Since rape is a crime dominantly 
experienced by women, therefore the social and historical reality of this marginalized 
group, as second class citizens and in some cases even property, means the possibility 
of their marginalization within the law today is not such a far-fetched suggestion. The 
mere use of sexual history tells of the continued struggle of rape laws to manifest in a 
manner that truly embraces the democratic citizenship of women.   
 
A process of de-phalloncentrism (or rather a less male-centred view in the 
construction of meaning) is imperative in order to allow a more inclusive society, in 
which women’s significance is acknowledged. It needs to be made clear that this short 
dissertation does not seek to contest the verdict of the case, but rather as a qualitative 
study I aim to assess the process that led to its conclusion.  
 
A most poignant point made throughout this dissertation is the fact that rape is a crime 
that comes with certain expected characteristics, and any exclusion of these 
characteristics tends to work against alleged victims. Not only do women’s vulnerable 
status lead to rape, through this particular case I intend to show how even in a court of 
law, that vulnerability can be increased, as I ask that the court be considered a 
patriarchal domain. I explore the possibility of prejudice, the propriety of the use of 
sexual history and the court’s perception of consent, all of which become significant 
factors for victims of rape.  
 
History has shown that women’s bodies can become sites of power and resistance, as 
long argued by feminists. However, the fact is, these bodies remain political and 
social texts that reek of suppression through abuse and domination which in my 
opinion has been subtly, yet socially endorsed. Efforts that strive for the full 
emancipation of women are still at work, against a force that for centuries has 





ever watchful paternalistic figure. Any hope of eradicating our “rape culture”, may 
mean the termination of patriarchy (hooks, 1994).  
 
The description of rape according to the law, is not only narrow, but does not live up 
to the experiences of most victims. In some sense it is misleading, and does not take 
into account that very few boundaries exist with regards to who can rape, who can be 
raped, or even where and when rape can occur. In attempting to conceptualize rape, it 
is necessary to include a variety of scenarios, however as Gobodo-Madikizela (2006: 
22) points out “[i]f they did not scream, shout and scratch their assailant they are 
blamed for having ‘consented’. This view ignores the fact that not all rape is 
violent…” 
 
Are these issues an indication that we indeed dwell in a misogynist society? Moss 
(2003: 229) describes the misogyny that takes form in our society as being “in brutal 
and unremitting ways: women believed to be the rightful property of a man and as 
such tortured and raped…defiled and ravaged if found to be sexual, unchaste beings.” 
These are not images that are far-fetched and exaggerated and the possibility of their 
realization loom over all women.  
 
 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY   
 
In order to tackle the subject of this dissertation, apart from questioning aspects of this 
case that could be described as suspect in terms of their inability to preserve the 
dignity of the victim, it was also imperative to introduce the cultural and historical 
context which women have inhabited. In relation to men and patriarchy, including the 
various attitudes, belief systems, perceptions that would make a victim worthy of 
accessing the law, particularly within a patriarchal context. Chapter 1 introduces the 
dissertation and identifies the different branches of this dissertation, as well as 
contextualizing the dissertation. Subsequently, Chapter 2 consists of a literature 
review. Chapter 3 highlights the theories that will be referred and applied to 
throughout this dissertation. Chapter 4 will provide a brief description of the research 





the above topic. Chapter 6 revisits the topic of this dissertation, justifying its 
significance, as well as pointing out different aspects that are worthy of consideration. 








































To suggest that the justice system is an unjust institution for any reason is a delicate 
matter. After all, it partakes in our lives on a daily basis and we rely greatly on its 
ability to be fair. Having read the judge’s statement, however, I dare consider the idea 
that the justice system is indeed not all that it is meant to be, and may even have a 
hand in the perpetuation of the cycle of abuse which for the most part women bear the 
burden. I refer mainly to the case of rape, and it is known that it is dominantly women 
who suffer because of the existence of this horrific phenomena. 
 
Eagleton (1991: 40) makes a very relevant point when he states that a particular 
tradition of “ideology critique assumes that social practices are real, but that the 
beliefs used to justify them are false or illusory”. Patriarchy exists, and to propose that 
it participates in the dealings of the justice system, in my opinion is not inconceivable. 
The unequal conditions that patriarchy has brought about between men and women 
are evident, yet based on unfounded concepts and constructions, that may certainly be 
dismantled. I believe it would be unrealistic to assume that those who administer 
justice are totally immune to the temptation to sink back into outdated mores as the 
justice system has clearly not been fully revolutionized as displayed by the 
shortcomings of rape laws. Butler (1990: 129), refers to the body as “a passive 
medium that is signified by an inscription from a cultural source figured as ‘external’ 
to that body”, in the case of rape, women’s bodies in particular are laced with much 
doubt and suspicion. Bassadien and Hochfeld (2005: 9) illustrate how culture has 
been instrumental in affecting women’s lives: 
 
Culture is an effective tool for affirming and maintaining male authority, across all races and ethnic 
groups in South Africa (Ramphele and Boonzaier, 1988), and strongly permeates social discourses on 
domestic violence in ways that are harmful to women.  
 
The design of society that deliberately places women in vulnerable circumstances, and 
the determination to define masculinity as the complete opposite to all that is 





always the possibility that the indoctrination of ideas can go horribly wrong, 
especially when these ideas are extreme in nature. The continued violence against 
women proves this. According to Connell (1995: 77), it is hegemonic masculinity that 
controls the definition and construction of gender practices and maintains the 
“legitimacy of patriarchy”. This narrowly defined and limiting masculinity allows 
men to detach themselves from women’s experience of rape (Sikeyiya, Jewkes and 
Morrell, 2007). Morrell (2001: 26) describes responses to gender change as being 
overlapping, perhaps then always leaving the possibility of a degree of bias towards 
women. He refers to responses that are “reactive or defensive, accommodating and 
responsive or progressive”.  
 
Thompson (2001: 632) takes account of not only misogyny which he describes as the 
“hatred of feminine qualities in women” and homophobia as the “hatred of feminine 
qualities in men”, both of which he regards as the “flip sides of the same coin”. It is 
for this reason that women’s rights are continuously side-lined. These manifestations 
of prejudice unfortunately find their way in the formation of rape laws, although it is 
always claimed that the rights of all individuals are said to be important. Fried (2003: 
100) is clearly in agreement, by writing that: 
 
All too often, however, these human rights standards remain only words on a page, never being 
effectively implemented. States remain vastly unaccountable for following through on their 
commitments – whether they involve developing policy, legislation, or programming.  
 
Many aspects of culture continue to harbor and shield perceptions and practices that 
mainly endanger the lives of women, polygamy and circumcision being two 
examples. However, there is a growing, though unspoken “rape culture” that 
continues to be concealed, all in the name of culture. The marginalization of women, 
it seems is embedded in the very structures of society and Weedon (1987: 35) clarifies 
this by suggesting that: 
 
Discursive fields consist of competing ways of giving meaning to the world and of organizing social 






I do not dismiss the fact that many admirable changes have been made with regard to 
rape laws, but I do maintain that more needs to be done, in order for rape victims to 
know and never be in a position to ever question that the law is truly on their side. 
During the rape trial of Jacob Zuma, it was implied that this case may have the effect 
of discouraging women from coming forward when they have been raped, particularly 
due to the use of sexual history; this was however dismissed by the judge. Whether 
this is the intention of the justice system will never be known. But, admittedly, the use 
of sexual history mainly in the case of women, in a domain that is dominantly male 
could be considered as embarrassing for rape victims, as well as confusing, for most 
victims expect the focus to be on the incident in question and not their past sexual 
experiences. More often than not, there seems to be a greater concern for the 
possibility of a false allegation against a person accused of rape, than the fact that a 
heinous crime may have taken place (Gavey: 2005). 
 
Whether inadvertently or not, it is as though the court is suggesting that based on 
character, certain claims of rape many be deemed as not needing any attention and I 
question whether this is really justice. Frankly speaking, it seems like the quickest 
way to strike a case off the roll.  In this case much attention was paid to what the 
victim wore, which seems quite insignificant compared to the act of sexual assault. 
According to the accused, he found the complainant’s attire inappropriate and perhaps 
an indication that the victim was interested in him sexually even though the victim’s 
body was covered. Commenting on this, Gordin (2006: 4) states that “…our mores 
and laws are supposed to have evolved to a level where a woman’s mode of dress and 
behavior may not be used as a reason to rape.” 
  
Victims of rape need to be taken seriously, as well as whatever claims they make, no 
matter how their moral character is viewed. A less than desirable moral character 
should under no circumstances result in an acquittal. That the possibility of using 
sexual history exists only further overwhelms victims who have already been through 
a traumatizing ordeal. As Artz and Smyhte (2007), point out, it is imperative that 
rather than simply define rape in legal terms, a further step needs to be taken to give 






Understandably, rape victims wary of the possibility that their sexual history will be 
exposed feel that they will be judged, misunderstood and condemned especially those 
whose sexual history may not be regarded as conservative enough, or pertaining to the 
humility and sexual inexperience required according to patriarchal standards, mainly 
in the case of unmarried women. It is for this reason that I refuse to believe that 
although the court is regarded as a supposedly objective space, one cannot confidently 
say that culture, particularly culture that for decades has been heavily influenced and 
defined by patriarchy can truly separate its influence from the court. Einstein (1983: 
32-33) proposes that women are significant in changing the manner in which society 
chooses to define them, by stating that: 
 
[T]he only way to deny rape its future was to increase the power of women to the point where it was 
equal to that of men. To the extent that women were trained by their upbringing to be victims, women, 
too, participated in rape culture. If rape was the secret of patriarchy, then women must demystify it, by 
naming it, describing how it operated, and above all, by fighting it openly, individually and 
collectively. 
 
Certainly there has been a shift in mindset, but that shift has not been great enough in 
some cases to exclude a woman’s sexual history from being such a central feature in 
determining the overall outcome of a rape case. In dealing with the violation of rape, 
the court needs to assess whether in any way through the manner in which rape is 
processed, it subtly endorses the very myths and notions about women, that contribute 
if not exacerbate such extreme cases of sexual violence. It is enough that women are 
terribly stereotyped, but it is even more disheartening to see victims of rape become 
stigmatized due to the violence they experienced, mainly because it is thought that 
they attracted this violence.  Hall (1997: 258) is of the opinion that:  
 
[S]tereotyping deploys a strategy of ‘splitting’. It divides the normal and the acceptable from the 
abnormal and the unacceptable. It then excludes or expels everything which does not fit, which is 
different.  
 
The tendency to “other” and the reluctance to perceive women as equals, makes the 
court’s wisdom and moral essence questionable and places a dent in its ability to 
adequately administer justice. An individual’s experience within a court should not be 





historical realities of women within rape law is necessary, including an increased 
level of sensitivity towards victims of rape. In order to supplement these ideas, 
Young-Jahangeer (2004: 142) highlights that: 
 
Violence against women stems from a need to exert power over the less powerful, in a racist/classist 
society such as South Africa. It is black women who are the most disempowered and fall prey to the 
most abuse, privately and institutionally. We therefore cannot isolate gender or racial issues, when 
attempting to understand the interplay of oppression within a society and within an individual. 
 
I am of the opinion that rather than acknowledge how the system continues to fail 
victims of rape by not adequately protecting them, processing them in a manner which 
is blatantly prejudicial, or providing means by which they can easily seek justice, the 
patriarchal state would rather criminalize these women. These women then become 
scapegoats for an obviously dysfunctional system. The perversity of this system 
should be noted, yet is ignored, for it is a system that seems to deliberately breed 
victims.  
 
The humanity of victims is being compromised and as much as I do agree that culture 
is important, the tendency to treat society as a hegemonic whole, a collective, under 
the pretence that we all subscribe to a specific culture must certainly change. This is 
common, particularly within the black community, which constantly refers to an 
“African culture” in order to avoid conversation on reforming what is considered to 
be the dominant ideology. By doing so we deny the natural dynamism that ideology 
and even a seemingly rigid culture may have. Issues related to HIV/AIDS and 
homosexuality became a part of this case, which are traditionally regarded as taboo, 
however at no point did I feel that the court truly acknowledged or accommodated 
these very real aspects of the alleged victim’s life. 
 
An attempt has been made to contain the description of HIV/AIDS. Although we 
should be alarmed by the fact that in South Africa alone an estimated 5.6 million 
people were found to be HIV positive in the year 2008 (www.statssa.gov.za, accessed: 
06. 06. 09). HIV/AIDS is complex and does not affect its victims in one way. The 
different ways and reasons HIV/AIDS continues to fester within our communities 
have neither been adequately explored nor exposed resulting in continued ignorance. 





some logical manner for it affects people differently and in unique circumstances. 
Even within the realm of HIV/AIDS women suffer due to prejudice. Socially, they are 
regarded as wild, and in need of taming, and at the same time women are regarded as 
“dirty” due to their reproductive system, this perception of women as “dirty” is 
amplified with the addition of HIV/AIDS and in order to illustrate this point, Leclerc-
Madlala (2001: 6) maintains that: 
 
A woman’s ‘dirty’ reproductive anatomy and its related secretions (menstrual blood, vaginal discharges 
and lubrication in general) are viewed as reservoirs of HIV ‘germs’. 
 
We are hardly shown the many faces of HIV/AIDS, denying the extremely and 
harshly multi-faceted characteristics of this epidemic. It is clear that even courts are 
unaware of this, as in the rape trial the court never considered the threat of re-
infection for the complainant, but the possibility of infection of the accused. 
HIV/AIDS like other forms of abuse cannot only be a human rights violation but may 
also be the result of very violent circumstances at the same time.  
 
Individually, HIV/AIDS and gender-based violence are overwhelming in themselves, 
yet not mutually exclusive. The convergence of these fast spreading epidemics calls 
for more aggressive social intervention. Muthien (2004: 93) therefore is of the view 
that: 
 
Given the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, it can be assumed that women who are subjected 
to coercive sexual intercourse, from stranger rape to sexual intercourse in relationships subject to 
domestic violence, are at greatest risk of being infected with HIV, in part due to their lack of power to 
negotiate safer sex practices. 
 
In relation to legal processes, it is not enough for courts to just be spaces where cases 
are assessed and tried. They need to become sites were activism is present and 
practiced through a visible awareness of marginalization. 
 
Women clearly hold a very unique position in society. Although they are the most 
vulnerable, they are also the most exposed, especially within the media. Their bodies 
are exploited relentlessly on screen and in publications revealing their very inferior 





female body which led to the erotic exposure of women by a society that can only be 
described as the ultimate phallus, “a paternal and patriarchal power”. Boswell (2003: 
3) reports that: 
 
In a study examining the coverage of rape in South African newspapers, Omarjee (2001)…found that 
rape was not seen as a ‘serious’ crime by newspapers, and was relegated to inferior status as a subject 
for news; that newspaper reporting does not sufficiently question the motives for rape and contexts 
which allow rape to be prevalent; and that reporting on rape is often sensationalized. 
 
On the one hand you have the media sending messages that encourage people to 
protect themselves from HIV/AIDS or circumstances that may expose them to the 
disease and on the other hand you have women scantily clad with the intention of 
attracting for the most part male attention in order to sell products and services. The 
commoditization of the female body is merely an interpretation of how society views 
women and particularly their worth. Unfortunately, it is still reflective of how many 
women believe they ought to be therefore putting themselves at risk and this too 
makes tackling rape together with HIV/AIDS even more challenging. Magwaza 
(2006) speaks of the “myth” of women’s emancipation, suggesting that overall 
political change, for example as that which South Africa experienced, from the 
apartheid regime to democracy, does not imply an improved situation for women.   
The complex nature of rape should therefore, not only be a social worry, but one 





















The dissertation makes use of Michel Foucault’s post-structuralist theory of resistance 
in order to arrive at a greater understanding of the gendered reality of women in 
relation to gender-based violence in South African society. I am of the opinion that 
this case will allow us the opportunity to explore the possibility of intolerance by 
challenging prevailing notions of dominance and suppression particularly within the 
legal system; by offering alternative views in relation to the power and possibilities 
that lay open to women in order to allow them to fully access their basic human 
rights. 
 
Foucault offers revolutionary ideas, in relation to patriarchal systems, in his 
recognition of the unequal distribution of power among the citizen body, this unequal 
distribution made possible by governing institutions (Foucault, 1976, Foucault 2003). 
His theory of resistance ties in well with feminist principles due to the fact that it 
acknowledges the power within all individuals and even dismisses the notion of a 
sovereign and undisruptive power, particularly in relation to the state (Diamond and 
Quinby, 1988). Thompson (1998) cited in Mullaly (2002: 21) proposes that: 
 
Foucault saw power not as something that people either did or did not possess, but as an aspect of all 
social relations, a feature of the interactions between individuals, groups, and organizations. It is a fluid 
phenomenon open to constant influence and change.  
 
He points out struggle as being an important aspect of change, for in that struggle 
proof of alternative ways of existing are made apparent. In the Jacob Zuma trial, and 
through the alleged victim, we recognize the struggle faced by women who have 
experienced gender-based violence. This experience is not only due to the fact that 
women are regarded as second class citizens, but when affected by abuse accessing 
quality service from the state is not guaranteed.  
 
Foucault’s theory of post-structuralism is a theory that places much emphasis on the 





make redefinition possible. Foucault (2003: 130) points out that discourses will 
always remain fields of not only power used to curb and control, but also of struggle, 
struggle that inevitably may lead to change by stating that:  
 
Generally, it can be said that there are three types of struggles: against forms of domination (ethnic, 
social, religious); against forms of exploitation that separate individuals from what they produce; or 
against that which ties the individual to himself and submits him to others in this way (struggles against 
subjection [assujettissement], against forms of subjectivity and submission).  
 
It is against struggles of “domination” and “subjectivity” that women mainly face, and 
only which greater agency can eradicate. Resistance, according to Foucault, is the 
process that gives us the opportunity to analyze and question the discourses that we 
engage with and ultimately affect the manner in which we define ourselves, but most 
of all our purpose and function in society, “the first stage in the production of 
alternative forms of knowledge” (Weedon, 1987: 111).  
 
There are many points in this dissertation that display, in particular women’s struggles 
to re-define their purpose in society and the unfortunate, suppressive opposition that 
they face. Foucault (2003: 140) suggests that it is politically necessary to analyze 
power relations, “their historical formation”, in order for transformation to become 
possible, by becoming aware of their strengths and weaknesses.  
 
Foucault speaks of a resistance and power dichotomy, and interestingly enough Reitan 
(2001) introduces the idea of rape as being “an essentially contested concept”. Both 
theories challenge the rigidity of any notion of sovereignty, with the opportunity to 
consider alternative truths.  
 
The law’s resistance to expand and extend its definition of rape to make it more 
relevant, allowing it to include the vast possibilities in which rape does and can occur 
places women at a disadvantage, when their particular scenario of rape does not fit 
well enough with what the law expects.  
 
In Foucauldian terms, Reitan’s disapproval of the system’s deliberate omission of 





and even create new “knowledges”. Reitan (2001: 43) makes a bold point when he 
illuminates that:  
 
[F]eminist redefinitions of ‘rape’ have met with varying degrees of resistance, especially from men 
who recognize that, under these new definitions, their own sexual behaviours might qualify as rape. 
 
Based on certain meanings that are revealed within rape cases, I dare suggest that rape 
laws leave room for very destructive and disempowering experiences for victims, as I 
claim that patriarchy may certainly be embedded within the justice system that 






























           
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This dissertation is qualitative in nature, employing content analysis. Language is an 
important aspect of this body of work, drawing not only from the judgment of Judge 
van der Merwe, but the language and utterances used in other literary works including 
the media, in order to come to a better understanding of the nature of rape. The 
purpose is therefore to comprehend where the South African society stands in terms 
of dealing with gender-based violence. Added to that, the detrimental effects this 
phenomenon has on women and the legacy of violation through violence which they 
continue to carry must not be dismissed. Based on much literature, it became clear 
that many aspects within this matter occur quite commonly with regards to rape cases 
and were worth highlighting.  
 
Although a quantitative study may have been useful in pointing out the frequency of 
certain phenomena, for example the number of rape cases that result in an acquittal, 
this work is mostly descriptive. By doing so, I attempt to expose the link between rape 
laws, legal procedure and real lives.  
 
Due to the nature of qualitative methods, we are forced to locate ourselves as 
researchers within the narratives of the subjects that are dealt with in a way that 
quantitative methods may not allow. “For perspectives and understandings to be 
communicated, and formulated as public knowledge, they first have to be articulated 
in a personal voice” (Ribbens, 1998: 24). A quantitative study would have fallen short 
within this dissertation. Patriarchy for example, has been named as a significant 
factor. It is a complex matter, from the idea of woman as the property of her father or 
husband, to the idea that certain “kinds” of women actually “deserve” to be raped, 






Van Maanen (1983) points out that qualitative methods are significant in that they 
cover a diverse range of interpretive and information gathering techniques. Most 
importantly and most imperative to this dissertation is the stress placed on “meaning” 
rather than frequency “of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the 
social world” (Van Maanen, 1983: 9).  
 
Attempting to not only describe phenomena, but to hopefully come closer to finding 
reasons for its existence in more relatable and less scientific terms has had much 
impact in the social sciences, acknowledging to a large degree the complexity related 
to being human and the diverse range of challenges faced in the social world. “To 
operate in a qualitative mode is to trade in linguistic symbols and, by so doing, 
attempt to reduce the distance between theory and data, between context and action” 
(Van Maanen, 1983: 9). Van Maanen (1983) also notes the importance of intuition 
and that the research process must also encompass the experiences of the researcher.  
 
It is hoped that the method used gives victims of rape integrity, revealing their 
humanity and reducing the gap in terms of creating greater understanding, particularly 
for those unaware of the debilitating effects on the human spirit, thereby not reducing 
victims to numbers and statistics. Morse and Richards (2002: 2) thus describe 
qualitative research as “a wide range of ways to explore and understand data that 
would be wasted and their meaning lost if they were preemptively reduced to 
numbers”.  
 
Like quantitative research, however, qualitative research is not an exact science, and 
anomalies can be expected. This dissertation acknowledges such anomalies by 
pointing out for example that there are not only different scenarios in which rape can 
occur, but also response to rape by victims may vary. While some women may in fear 
for their lives fight back in order to have a better chance at survival, for the very same 
reason a victim may choose not to fight back at all.  
 
The complainant in the Jacob Zuma rape case claimed that she was in shock and thus 
froze during her alleged rape. Furthermore, she did not leave immediately after the 
alleged incident, but spent the night at the home of the accused. It is my belief that 





Morse and Richards (2002: 5) suggest that qualitative research in certain instances is 
useful “in organizing the undisciplined confusion of events and the experiences of 
those who participate in those events”. The chaos that is sifted through within a 
research project and made more meaningful for general consumption, whether within 
academic, government or the general society may bring us closer to a less bemusing 
conclusion and result in a more orderly society. 
 
Qualitative methods should not be sidelined, or underestimated, but exploited to the 
extent that they better aid researchers in describing both positive and negative human 
experiences. According to Smith (2000: 13):   
 
[E]ntry into personal, sensitive topics has gained greater acceptance – partly because of human studies’ 
efforts to more fully understand the complexities of human subjectivity and agency, but also as part of 
an expanding social dialogue in which previously invisible or politically marginalized voices are now 
claiming credibility as part of the normative human center.  
 
Showing the human aspect of rape, the effects, experiences and implications, 
particularly in the case of rape victims was essential for this dissertation. The 
descriptive quality of a qualitative study allows us to place ourselves or to relate to 
victims in a way that a quantitative study cannot and it is my belief that this is an 
element within the Human Sciences that inspires not only agency, but political 
activism. Qualitative methods uniquely fit with feminist discourse (Birch, 1998) and 
therefore with this dissertation, particularly due to the feminist initiative to listen, 
observe, and describe social phenomena outside socially constructed ideals and 
interpretations, with an emphasis on the oppressed. It has “prioritized listening to 
people’s accounts and has attempted to present any interpretation as closely as 
possible to the original meaning” (Birch, 1998: 178).  
 
Drawing from various historical and cultural contexts is also imperative in order to 
make apparent the continuity that exists in terms of this violence in spite of time or 
location. As much as I will draw specific aspects from the judge’s statement, I feel it 
is essential to take note of the underlying, unspoken issues that continue to be 
subdued by talk of arguably more significant issues such as clothing worn by victims 





Considering that many might understand justice as being a quest for truth, I argue that 
although the courtroom is meant to be a space in which balanced views are 
accommodated, prejudicial notions may still find their way into this so-called 
objective space. Finding correlations and relationships through language is therefore 
essential in order to understand exactly what ways of existing are being shunned or 
supported. Ms K’s plight, although made complex by her HIV status and sexuality, 
brings to light many of the problems related to women who have suffered in this way.  
 
Although no interviews were done to compile this dissertation, much literature helped 
in the interpretation of my findings and particularly useful was Rape Law Reform in 
South Africa by Artz and Smythe (2008) which gave me a better outlook in terms of 
the manner in which rape is situated legally. The main influence, however, was a 
gender-sensitive view point that relied very much on feminist principles. While of 
course employing Foucault’s theory of resistance, both theories, however, are rooted 
in the possibility of autonomy and the realization that all individuals have power and 

























DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In the matter, “The State versus Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma”, we were given the 
opportunity to view first-hand the manner in which rape cases are processed and the 
challenges that alleged victims face. Are women as citizens who for centuries have 
been marginalized able to access the law with a lack of bias or prejudice due to their 
status as second class citizens? In a society that should only be too aware of the ache 
of injustice, having once been most hopeful of some social renovation following the 
apartheid regime, it is surprising that within this fifteen year democracy, atrocities, 
particularly against women are still permissible and may possibly find room for 
justification in a court of law.  
 
By including aspects of the judgment of W J van der Merwe, alongside other 
literature, it is my intention to weed out evidence of any prejudice that may have been 
allowed to corrupt the possibility of a just South African legal system, in order to 
prevent women from having a greater awareness of their democratic citizenship, and 
not allowing them to access basic civil rights.  
 
Using content analysis I hope to describe attitudinal as well as behavioral responses to 
rape, which may reflect cultural patterns of groups, institutions or even societies. 
Using cultural indicators such as media texts, and other texts by experts in the field of 
gender and rape law, I have attempted to assess and describe social, cultural and 
political trends. Many texts have come to certain conclusions concerning the reason 
for women’s subordination as well as the reasons for the law’s choice of response.  
 
I have shown aspects of Judge van der Merwe’s statement, that in my opinion reveal 
his lack of sympathy and sensitivity towards the victim, but most of all question the 
judge’s ability to conceptualize what rape really is. The following are poignant 
aspects of the case which became paramount in refuting the complainant’s claim, and 






IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE: 
 
5.1 UNDERSTANDING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE: BEYOND 
PATRIARCHY 
 
With regard to gender-based violence, rape in particular continues to not just be a 
word. It is the ever active verb that continues to stain society with its persistent 
violation. Its effect is one of horror and its reasoning, so senseless it keeps us 
perplexed, the word uncivilized comes to mind. As society evolves ever so rapidly, it 
is a wonder that we are unable to root out or even punish this epidemic and even 
Reitan (2001: 43) highlights that: 
 
In recent years there has been considerable public controversy over how ‘rape’ ought to be defined, a 
controversy that cannot be reduced to a mere difference of terminological preferences. ‘Rape’ is a 
potent word, a word laden with emotive and evaluative significance. To call a sexual act ‘rape’ is to 
attach to it the harshest sort of condemnation. In the wake of sustained critiques of a patriarchal system 
that has understood rape primarily as a violation of the property rights of men, feminist scholars have 
proposed alternative definitions that reconceive rape according to the experience of women (who are 
after all, its chief victims). 
 
For the extension of rights towards women to have meaning the appraisal of rape as 
well as the possibility of its re-definition is necessary to ensure the safety of women. 
It is necessary that the coercive, manipulative power, associated with patriarchy no 
longer dictate, control in particular, women’s right to sexual autonomy, even in the 
most subtle ways. As Reitan (2001: 47) declares, the necessity of seeing rape as an 
essentially contested concept can only be beneficial to victims, as this would result in 
the expansion of its definition and that: 
 
[O]nce we see ‘rape’ as essentially contested, we will see the fluctuations in the grey area – are to be 
expected, and may even be required, when the new voices enter the moral discourse which the concept 
helps to frame.  
 
Foucault suggests that the body is “an historical and cultural entity” the 
deconstruction of the female body could therefore explain why it is women who 





Foucault invites us into a discussion of the many facets of power, and his analysis of 
power has had much attention from political scientists as well as feminists, as he 
disputes the idea of the state being the locus of power (Buker, 1990). This notion is 
certainly useful if there is at all any hope of changing the manner in which not only 
gender-based violence is perceived, but also the manner in which women are 
perceived in general.  
 
Foucault does not dispute the power of the state, although he is aware of its 
prohibitive nature, in a bid to construct society and the role of citizens in specific 
ways. In his interpretation of Foucault, Martin (1982: 5) explores the idea of 
liberation through transgression, as he holds that:  
 
Subjectivity and sexuality are conceived as secondary effects of an essentially negative, repressive 
exercise of power from above. Liberation, then, is articulated in terms of the demand for transgression 
of or end to external prohibitions – an essentially liberal line of thinking. 
 
Gender-based violence and the fact that it is mostly women who bear the brunt of this 
burden is proof of women’s marginal position in society, and the lack of responsive 
legislature suggests that this is no accident. However, following Foucault’s 
arguments, our ability to transgress from the status quo and to achieve revolutionary 
change within legislation is certainly conceivable. 
 
Gender-based violence remains a concept that the South African society continues to 
grapple with. It is not something that has truly come to the fore in terms of debate or 
even as an ongoing discourse among major influential institutions, even those that 
prescribe to particular moral codes that claim to value and respect life. Further 
participation in law reform endeavors particularly through the application of “feminist 
jurisprudence” could “expose the state and the criminal justice system as systems 
which uphold largely masculinist interpretations of justice” (Artz and Smythe, 2008: 
14). In his analysis of Foucault, Weedon (1987) maintains that institutions that 
exclude certain values and practices are in fact promoting the opposite of those 
interests. In order to become aware of the true interests of our society, greater scrutiny 
is required. What is even more worrying however is that ordinary citizens seem to not 





It has been left to major institutions, such as the non-governmental organizations to 
deal with this problem, as such; ineffective endeavors through legislation formed by 
government go unchallenged. Foucault claims that we participate in our own 
“subjectification” by society’s normalizing and hegemonic processes. Our 
cooperation is an act of power, however by the same token, we have the capacity to 
re-direct that power (Simons, 1995).  It is my belief that rape is the result of a 
diseased society, one that is ethically and morally degenerate. Rooting out this 
sickness, whether through more punitive measures for perpetrators or better services 
from protective forces are major concerns that continue to remain unaddressed. In the 
meantime, women in particular remain at the mercy of sadistic predators.  
 
More specifically, within many African cultures, there is no language that honestly 
conceptualizes or even accommodates the concept of rape, what it involves, its 
implications and consequences. Foucault pin points language as a place where society 
and its social functions are formed and defined, and therefore the lack of a language 
that encompasses and acknowledges the reality of gender-based violence should not 
really be surprising as such an alternative would challenge, and threaten to pollute the 
established social and patriarchal order as a result even our “subjectivity is 
constructed” (Weedon, 1987: 21). Speaking on the position of men and women in the 
African context, Ramphele and Boonzaier (1998: 166) conclude that:  
 
Black women present the only cushion against their complete powerlessness, and any suggestion of 
equality between the sexes is a real threat to their egos. The oppression they suffer in the wider society 
acts as a paradigm for their domination of women, which is reinforced by an appeal to ‘tradition’ to 
justify practices that are said to be central to African culture.  
 
Rabinow and Rose (2003) writing on Foucault, cite “violence” as well as “consent” as 
both being “instruments” and “results” of power relations. Violence not only seems to 
be part of our cultural makeup, violence against women to some degree seems to be 
permissible figuratively speaking,  in order to control, to discipline, to make clear the 







Power is a relation. It inheres in difference and is a dynamic of control and lack of control between 
discourses and the subjects, constituted by discourses, who are their agents. Power is exercised within 
discourses in the ways in which they constitute and govern individual subjects. 
 
Naming violations, whether it be sexual harassment or rape has certainly been a step 
forward in exposing the atrocities that women face on a daily basis. But, when law 
providers fail to provide a description that adequately encompasses the violation and 
the horror faced by victims, it becomes clear that we have a long way to go until the 
question of gender-based violence is adequately tackled. In support of this, Fried 
(2003: 105) proposes that: 
 
More attention to contentious issues that involve definitions and concepts can help to clarify the goals, 
purpose, and appropriate targets and audiences for various efforts that work to end violence against 
women. The goal is not to reach universal agreement, but to build consensus on the lexicon, thus 
enabling conversations that use a common terminology.  
 
Although considering reactions towards incidents of rape, and the lack of compassion 
for victims, there seems to be a belief that there is something within women that 
attracts such violence. The truth is however, that being a woman is simply enough. 
Mason (2002: 38) testifies to the lack of selection involved in violent crimes toward 
women, and that any woman could be considered fair game, and makes clear that: 
 
Instead, they are long-standing problems of massive cross-national proportions, intricately linked to 
each other through culturally specific patterns of female subjugation and male hegemony.  
 
As seen in the rape trial involving Mr. Zuma, circumstances surrounding rape are 
another point of contention, with much attention being focused on the demeanor of 
the complainant during the “alleged” rape. Certain details are given greater 
significance, than whether or not a rape actually took place, such as the clothes that 
were worn by the complainant. The existence of other people at the location where the 
incident was said to have occurred, whether or not anything was said that had sexual 
connotations, whether or not the complainant said “no”, and whether or not the 
complainant screamed were also thought to be more important. The above list include 
the many details that law providers concern themselves with, while investigating rape, 





According to Foucault, an awareness of history gives one insight into social patterns 
and arrangements, those of which have had a positive as well as negative effect on 
society. “It follows that we have the possibility to either oppose or promote these 
arrangements” (Flyvbjerg, 1998: 223). The case of rape is no different, and although 
there certainly has been much improvement, much still needs to be done in order to 
create a process that does not increase the vulnerability of victims, by exposing 
victims to harsh and rigid scrutiny. Mason (2002: 33) suggests that some progress 
may be made, should we attempt to investigate the reasons behind violent activity 
revealing that: 
 
 [I]t is not always possible to make a neat separation between that which produces the experience of 
violation (what goes into it), and that which the experience of violence produces (what goes out of it). 
Sometimes it is necessary to look at one through the other; for example, to look at the discursive 
implications of violence by looking at the cultural contexts that enable it to make a discursive statement 
in the first place.  
 
There still has not been an efficient and effective way in which rape can be proved 
without further victimizing authentic and sincere victims. It is a shame to have one’s 
humanity and dignity so bruised, only for that vulnerability to be challenged by a 
structure that many victims would not be blamed for assuming is determined to 
protect offenders. Foucault points out the link between one’s subjectivity, identity and 
sexuality, “they do not exist outside of or prior to language and representation, but are 
actually brought into play by discursive strategies and representational practices” 
(Martin, 1982: 8-9). The fact that solutions for the eradication of rape through 
legislation are not being implemented rapidly enough, compel me to believe that the 
issue of gender-based violence is not yet officially regarded as a national crisis.  
 
In cases of rape, it is the rapists that become the victims, while the victims are made 
to feel like the culprits, making it that more difficult for women to seek justice, unable 
to stomach further degradation and indignity from those whom they should actually 
be seeking protection from. A balance needs to be struck in terms of the experience of 
the victims, in terms of the process of healing and appropriate punitive measures for 
rapists, thus making “a social statement about sexual violence” (Artz and Smythe, 





the problem lies with not only the way law providers view rape, but law providers 
themselves have a problem with what they believe women perceive rape to be. 
 
“‘The degree of rape,’” as Suzanne Brogger wrote “‘…lies not in the degree of 
psychological and physical force…but in the very attitude toward women that makes 
disguised or undisguised rape possible’” (Dworkin, 1981: 138). I find that the 
masculine/feminine dichotomy has great relevance in the debate surrounding gender-
based violence, and becomes relevant particularly in relation to rape, based on 
constructed stereotypes, related to both women and men, but more specifically with 
regard to the manner in which men perceive women.  
 
The general consensus culturally is that women are weak, emotional, hysterical and at 
times even delusional and prone to fanciful ideas and exaggerations. “…the behaviour 
of individuals is regulated not through overt repression but through a set of standards 
and values associated with normality” but which Foucault believes one can certainly 
change or redefine (McNay, 1994: 94). The “hysterization” of the female body could 
be described as one of the discursive strategies that have aided in the continual 
marginalization of women and women’s oppression within the social hierarchy 
(Martin, 1982). Changing rape laws could mean women can begin to reinvent 
themselves. It is my feeling that the attitude among many of our male counterparts, 
especially those within the justice system, is that women do not mean to be vindictive 
by falsely crying rape, but rather it boils down to a misunderstanding or 
misinterpretation of events. Questions towards the victims tend to be patronizing, 
grown women are spoken to like children unaware of the difference between love-
making or assault, rather than adults that have experienced a traumatizing ordeal.  
 
Reitan (2001) questions comments made by Norman Podhertz, editor of Commentary 
magazine, who insists that many feminists continue to complicate the definition of 
rape, by including acts that have never traditionally been considered as rape, but what 
he terms as “seduction”. Seduction, in Podhertz’s opinion is a means used to 
“overcome a woman’s resistance by ‘verbal and psychological’ means” (Reitan, 2001: 
1992, 6-7). What Podhertz seems not to consider is that what he refers to as 
“seduction”, for some may incorporate undue aggression, and may actually lead to 





 Dworkin (1981: 138) insists that, “[t]he essence of rape, then, is in the conviction that 
no woman, however clearly degraded by what she does, is a victim”. Even with a 
crime as vulgar as rape, patriarchy continues to protect its own, at the risk of seeming 
biased and lacking objectivity, making a strong and clear statement about who in 
society really matters. Government has been challenged on many levels on the 
“Woman Question”, not only with regards to gender-based violence, unfortunately, in 
light of many of the seemingly positive changes made, the process of victimizing 
victims continues. According to Cameron and Frazer (1994: 267), “…the myriad 
manifestation of male violence collectively function as a threat to woman’s autonomy. 
They undermine our self-esteem and limit our freedom of action”. 
  
The need to break up civil society into male and female factions with their own 
unique or specific attributes, attributes which serve as a basis for whether or not 
justice is administered is by all means absurd, and disqualifies women from grasping 
and internalizing the essence of human dignity. Human dignity for women, unlike 
their male counterparts, is rationed or completely taken away depending on the 
temperament of our very own patriarchal gatekeepers, who manipulate and weave the 
different threads of the law according to their convenience. Mason (2002: 42) 
describes this play of power, by declaring that:  
 
Violence and power may be distinct, even oppositional phenomena in a conceptual sense, but they are 
closely linked in practice. Power is not dependant upon violence. But it does often resort to using it. In 
particular, violence tends to arise out of the struggle between power and resistance, when power is in 
jeopardy of losing support or consent fails to be freely given. 
 
Writing on Foucault, Deacon (2003: 196) cites “difference” as something regimes see 
as unchanging and fixed, that too goes for socially constructed identities. However, 
the mistake of these regimes is to doubt the power of contestation as modern society 
is undoubtedly “a shifting and unstable matrix of relations of power and knowledge 
which generates free and active subjects”. The association made with women as being 
intellectually challenged, casts them as unreliable even in incidents that they 
experienced personally. More faith is placed in the statements of male perpetrators. I 
at least argue that this was certainly so in the case against Mr. Zuma, as statements of 





deemed credible. By making reference to Foucault, feminist politics has deemed it 
necessary to prioritize the ideological, particularly in relation to the “sexed subject” 
which all human beings are. However, the recognition of sexual difference is crucial 
as this is a major aspect in women’s oppression and “the struggle over the production, 
distribution and transformation of meaning as a focus for political intervention and 
opposition” (Martin, 1982: 5) has been given greater legitimacy.  
 
It becomes increasingly obvious through the processing of cases that the protection of 
women, is not enough of a social or political agenda within the justice system, but 
more apparent is that women themselves, may be forced to take more drastic 
measures in order to protect themselves, “…not only must we all live with the fear of 
sexual violence, society makes it our responsibility to prevent it. If the worst does 
happen we may be blamed, not protected…” (Cameron and Frazer, 1994: 267).  
 
There are a growing number of women in the prison system who can serve as 
evidence of the failure of South Africa’s legislation. Having been affected by 
violence, these women have taken the law into their own hands, the result being 
broken families and a lack of stability for children who may be left behind. Fedler, 
Motara and Webster (2000: 136) further illustrate this point, by stating that: 
 
Women who see no way out of their situations, who have been let down by the legal system, and who 
believe that if they do not kill their abusers, they will be killed, sometimes end up killing their abusers. 
These women, as accused persons, face an unsympathetic legal system.  
 
It is has become more than necessary to realize the manner in which gender-based 
violence extends itself into our social structures, encompassing various dynamics and 
lives, beyond the actual incident. It is time that gender-based violence finally becomes 










5.2 EXPOSING PREJUDICE IN THE JACOB ZUMA TRIAL: DEALING 
WITH HIV/AIDS, HOMOSEXUALITY AND GENDER 
 
There are certainly many words that could be used in order to describe the rape trial 
involving Jacob Zuma, however, the words compounded and complex, certainly come 
to mind. More so, due to the status of the alleged victim, who without a doubt was 
representative of many of the taboos that linger in South African society. As a carrier 
of HIV, a homosexual and more importantly a woman, she dared to challenge 
tradition and custom by going against, not only a very public and respected male 
figure, but a figure who many actually regard as a national hero. In Foucaldian terms 
the body, sex, sexuality are all loci of power, and as such “become a focal point in 
subjective identity” (Weedon, 1987: 119). It is therefore necessary that approaches to 
rape that rely heavily on consent need to “acknowledge that sex under conditions of 
inequality can look consensual” (Naylor, 2008: 27), thus, we are in danger of allowing 
any analysis of rape to become superficial. 
 
Although brave in the eyes of few, the alleged victim for others stood for all that is 
wrong within our society, the overbearing cloud of society’s degeneration, as 
someone who was not only diseased, but perhaps even immoral. What can be deduced 
is that it was generally thought that sex had occurred between two consenting adults. 
The revelation of a sexual “act” and in such a public manner, especially by a woman 
was probably regarded as disgraceful, “the mere fact that one is speaking about it has 
the appearance of a deliberate transgression” (Foucault, 1976: 6). Sex itself, has 
traditionally been thought to be a sacred practice reserved for the private space, but 
once exposed and publicized becomes obscene and explicit. Foucault recommends 
that we move past our passive tendencies, and we rather take charge and actively 
participate in our own lives and Weedon (1987: 108) in an effort to further expose 
Foucault’s ideas arguments that: 
 
Discourses, in Foucault’s work, are ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, 
forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and the relations between 
them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the ‘nature’ 






The fact that the complainant was a woman would mean that the expectation by 
society for her to conform to culture and tradition would be much higher, and by the 
same token any judgment of her would be even harsher. As far as Foucault is 
concerned, in order to be “free beings”, we need to engage with seemingly 
“impossible endeavors” especially when our authenticity and ability to define 
ourselves is at stake (Dumm, 1996). Through the internalization of the “male gaze”, 
especially in the case of women, who experience harsh scrutiny, through normalized, 
yet not apparently visible surveillance, this occurs to the point of self-surveillance 
(Simons, 1995). This is seen by Foucault, as one of the consequences of the 
prohibitive power of the state. This is definitely significant, as we consider the various 
stereotypes attached to women, or rather the manner in which society has chosen to 
define or construct what it means to be a woman. Whether inadvertently or not these 
ideas were challenged throughout this case, mostly by the alleged victim’s 
transgressive choice to seek justice.  
 
Mr. Zuma, it could be said was able to mobilize masses, especially women who did 
their best to create pandemonium outside the court house during the trial. This point is 
best illuminated by Saunderson-Meyer (2006: 7) who writes that:  
 
It would only take a word from populist Mr. Zuma to quell his assembled rabble. Instead he leads them 
in a rousing chorus of his favourite song, Lethu Mshini Wami (bring me my machine gun). 
 
An awareness of the hegemonic power that the women were bound to was taken 
advantage of, evoking sentiments on tradition. An ideological stance had been taken 
and a display of the “power relations” that Foucault speaks of was on display. Writing 
on Foucault, Martin (1982: 16) states that:  
 
Our task is to deconstruct, to undo our meanings and categories, the identities and the positions from 
which we intervene at any given point so as not to close the question of woman and discourse around 
new certainties and absolutes.  
 
It is my belief that these women attempted to make a distinction between themselves 
and the alleged victim as they regarded themselves as “real” women, in other words 





sacred and binding, even though they may include a level of subordination. By 
promoting a distinct and unchanging form of femininity, these women partook in an 
exclusionary practice, which meant to crush any other emerging and alternative 
expression of femininity or womanhood, recognized as having a corrupting and 
polluting quality. Connell (1987: 188) thus maintains that “[c]entral to the 
maintenance of emphasized femininity is practice that prevents other models of 
femininity gaining cultural articulation.” 
 
Although the women outside the courtroom did not resort to physical violence, their 
actions were violent and threatening none the less, in a bid to enforce 
heteronormativity as a social ideal, as well as to purge society from the pollution that 
threatened to infect their ultimate paternal figure, Jacob Zuma. Foucault is 
passionately against heteronormativity and through resistance, his aim is to challenge 
“limits” set in particular by systems that seek to impose a particular way of life 
(Pickett, 1996). Pickett (1996: 444-448) holds that: 
 
Foucault is concerned with the foundational issues of a culture. These are basic categories, which he 
sees as dichotomies, providing the context for social belief and action, such as good/evil and 
normal/pathological.  
 
The alleged victim’s defiance of Mr. Zuma may have been regarded as a defiance of 
constructed cultural norms, her HIV status, and being a lesbian simply cemented the 
perception that she deserved to be treated like an outcast. To a large degree this 
confirms Foucault’s perception of power as not only being something we can exercise 
over others, but something we can certainly exercise over ourselves (Deacon, 2003). 
 
Mason speaks of the “interaction between regimes of sexuality and gender” (2002: 
43). Sexuality and gender were a distinct point of conflict that was stamped on this 
case. Had the complainant been a “real” woman, according to traditional notions and 
constructions, she would have been honored to submit to the Deputy-President, and 
felt privileged, and most certainly not have challenged him. As a result of her status, 
society had earned the right to expose her to dehumanizing practices, within and even 
outside the courtroom. Furthermore, I think it necessary to mention, that in light of the 





hoped for result. Mason (2002: 39) insists on describing rape as a “hate crime”, laced 
with prejudice and is of the opinion that: 
 
The misogynist sentiments that often go alongside cases of rape influence our perception of it as a ‘hate 
crime’, particularly due to its capacity to diminish and humiliate. I undoubtedly believe it is a crime of 
prejudice, and like other hate crimes ‘may find a common frame of reference in the intolerance of 
difference’. 
 
I propose that while Mr. Zuma had attempted to strip the complainant of her dignity, 
the judge and the public attempted to strip her of her identity, and the pride she had in 
that identity. By not fully acknowledging who she was, they denied her autonomy. 
The placards that read “Zuma rape me”, carried by Mr. Zuma’s female supporters are 
very telling of the attitude felt towards the alleged victim, and the manner in which 
her plight was undervalued. Although these women were there to support Mr. Zuma, 
more than anything one could argue that they were there to humiliate and discredit the 
alleged victim for what may have been perceived as her insubordination. An analysis 
of the alleged victim shows that she went against hegemonic ideals even before this 
case, through her sexuality. Power, therefore gives us the opportunity to take 
responsibility over our own lives. A feminist reading of Foucault, therefore insists that 
women especially, detach themselves from their “sexually defined identities” 
(Simons, 1995), thereby challenging the location of power.  
 
Even though Foucault sought to de-emphasize the power of the state, by describing 
power as being dispersed and not centered in the state (Baxter, 1996), the 
overwhelming sense of state power can none the less be felt. In spite of this I feel, as 
Foucault, the necessity to view the state as not all powerful, but penetrable, especially 
if changes are to be made in the lives of women as far as rape is concerned. 
 
HIV/AIDS and the implications of living with this disease is something society still 
struggles to come to terms with and for many “AIDS and homosexuality remain one 
disease…They are linked forever by homophobia” (Vasquez, 1998: 79). Its 
association with homosexual men or wayward women, more specifically prostitutes 
has left many with the misconception that it is a disease that can only affect certain 





women or men the alleged victim had been intimate with, to some degree there has 
certainly been allusion to a questionable sense of morality and ethics and that perhaps 
she simply was an easily excitable woman.  
 
The defense introduced statements from past partners, and even included some that 
the complainant claimed had raped her. Not only had her HIV status been trivialized, 
the fact that she could have easily been re-infected by Mr. Zuma, had he been HIV 
positive, the results of which could have been life-threatening for the complainant was 
not even a concern. No effort had gone towards establishing whether Mr. Zuma was a 
carrier of the disease. The judge assumed that the accused was HIV negative, and 
pointed out his carelessness in sleeping with an HIV positive woman, as he stated 
that: 
 
It is totally unacceptable that a man should have unprotected sex with any person other than his regular 
partner and definitely not with a person who to his knowledge is HIV positive. (Judgment of Judge 
WJ van der Merwe, 2006: 42)  
 
The concern being that Mr. Zuma had placed himself in such a vulnerable position 
rather than the complainant. Unlike the alleged victim who was forthcoming about her 
status, Mr. Zuma only claimed that he was HIV negative, no tests to confirm this were 
ever demanded.  
 
The need to include the complainant’s past could be considered a point of contention, 
especially since questioning was targeted on her sexual encounters. The alleged 
victim was not only asked when her last sexual encounter was, she was also asked 
whether during the period 1999, the year she found out she was HIV positive to the 
year 2005, she had consistently used a condom during sex. This line of questioning 
was regarded as necessary as the alleged victim had claimed that in the light of her 
HIV status she would never have intercourse without protection. The judge (Judgment 
of Judge WJ van der Merwe, 2006: 42) states that: 
 
The complainant said that in spite of her own attitude that she would not have unprotected sex, it still 
remains the choice of a person to have unprotected sex. In my judgment that is exactly what she and 





Although there has been much debate on the criminalization of the deliberate 
infection of the uninfected, the fact that there are those who like the victim are already 
infected can actually be re-infected has had little attention, even through a case of 
rape (Artz and Smythe, 2008). South Africa may indeed be commended 
internationally for its liberal constitution; however whether or not the citizen body has 
indeed embraced the spirit of such a system is something we need to concern 
ourselves with.  
 
The perception of the state as an all-knowing and all-powerful entity at times 
diminishes the ability of ordinary citizens to wield power. We speak of stigmatized 
HIV positive people, yet by not opening up a debate about the re-infected within a 
space, such as the court room where all are supposedly confirmed equal, I dare say 
this stigmatization is much greater than we choose to acknowledge. There should be a 
desperate need to hear and take the stories of the disadvantaged and abused seriously, 
not only for the sake of revolutionizing legislation, but even the social order. For 
Foucault, these stories or “voices” “are all vital for critical reflection about our 
contemporary situation” (Pickett, 1996: 457). The rape case and the different 
reactions to the complainant may display evidence of South Africa’s ignorance and 
unwillingness to be more tolerant. To the approval of Foucault, Diamond and Quinby 
(1998: 18) state that: 
 
Feminism does, in fact, provide a context out of which we conceptualize meaning by opening 
apparently fixed constructs onto their social, economic and political determinacies. 
 
The judge’s refusal to recognize the complainant as a lesbian, merely because she had 
been with men previously, reveals his ignorance with regards to homosexuality, 
particularly against the cultural as well as historical background of society. Although 
the complainant regarded herself as a lesbian, the judge refuted this claim by stating 
that she was only “inclined to lesbianism”, but was in fact bisexual (Judgment of 
Judgment WJ van der Merwe, 2006: 41). I dare say the judge displayed much 
prejudice in his statement, as he refused to acknowledge the complainant’s status as a 
lesbian. He rather opted to refer to her as “bisexual”, his reason being that the 






What criteria the judge had chosen in order to make distinctions between the different 
kinds of sexual orientations is unclear, but I can only assume, he believed that one 
could only qualify to be a lesbian, if one had shown indifference to intimacy with a 
man one’s whole life. That said it is certainly plausible to suggest, that as a 
representative of the judicial faction of the state, the judge sought to maintain state 
interests. Heterosexuality, in many states is certainly regarded as a significant aspect 
of the social order. Buker (1990: 827) holds that Foucault believed that the state 
certainly has an interest in matters related to sexual activity and “heterosexual love 
enables the state to increase its domination of citizens and ‘their’ families”.  
 
Considering the history of homosexuality, especially society’s struggle with it, openly 
accepting and expressing an alternative sexuality is not something that many have had 
the luxury of doing. In Mason’s (2002: 49-50) view: 
 
As a discourse, the straight mind does not see lesbian sexuality as a legitimate sexual preference with a 
value of its own. Rather, lesbianism represents the rejection of a social order...  
 
Society’s intolerance of homosexuality truly evokes some concern, but makes clear 
that “sexuality is an actively contested political terrain in which groups struggle to 
implement sexual programs and alter sexual arrangements and ideologies” (Vance, 
1991: 877). It is my belief, that unlike those in society that have unfortunately had the 
experience of being marginalized, many, and for the most part men, who in particular 
hold a very privileged position in society, are unaware and have not been exposed to 
the kind of powerlessness that oppressed groups face, in the same sense as women or 
homosexuals. Writing on Foucault, Martin (1982: 16) recommends that we not only 
take a political stance, but also that we refuse to accept fixed identities. 
 
A lot of time was spent in trying to define and name the alleged victim, not only was 
there an attempt to determine whether she was lesbian or bisexual, she was a carrier of 
HIV and she was also a defiant woman. However, I am yet to believe that her 
humanity was fully recognized. In her own words, and in reference to the judge’s 






And there is his pronouncements about my identity. Who am I. It is so strange to be sitting there like an 
onlooker, to hear someone telling you who you are. And none of it fits, is real for me. And here is this 
man telling me I am mad, unable to even know what is consensual and not; promiscuous, bisexual and 
not lesbian. (Cavanagh and Mabele, Interview with Khwezi, 2006: 4).  
 
In the same breath, the stigmatization extended towards gay men, especially those 
with HIV is heavy and seems unlikely to ever be appeased in the near future, however  
“the assumed nexus between homosexuality and AIDS also functions to ‘dirty’ 
lesbians in similar ways” (Mason, 2002: 46). Foucault gives those who face 
oppression a place of privilege, particularly due to the adversity faced against a 
greater power. He does not see the oppressed as powerless, but simply as “lesser 
forms of power” and what Foucault regards as “resistances” (Heller, 1996). 
 
 
5.3 HIV/AIDS AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE: A UNIQUE POSITION 
FOR WOMEN 
 
The link between gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS is one that has not been 
adequately exposed and women’s unique position within this on-going battle remains 
unnoticed. Furthermore, the relevant institutions seem reluctant to change this. 
“Southern Africa is at present confronted with two key epidemics: HIV/AIDS and 
GBV. When GBV is combined with HIV/AIDS, these two scourges are even more 
lethal than each when viewed as mutually exclusive” (Muthien, 2004: 93). Much is 
said concerning people infected with HIV, but within that realm are those that are 
infected not due to carelessness or ignorance, but through a lack of choice. HIV on its 
own remains a taboo, but is further inflated by the addition of rape. Women’s position 
within this paradigm is difficult and possibly disempowering, as they continue to 
battle with outdated and ill-informed myths and perceptions, particularly those that 
link HIV positive women with waywardness and promiscuity. Foucault’s insistence 
that power should be seen as a “productive force, rather than as a purely negative, 
repressive entity” (McNay, 1992: 38) implies that it is possible that perhaps power 






The rape trial involving Jacob Zuma in my opinion serves as an excellent case study 
in attempting to comprehend the relationship between gender-based violence and the 
deadly disease, and for this exercise, it is necessary to bring to light the gendered 
dynamics surrounding this dilemma. “The process of integrating a perspective on 
gender-based violence into HIV/AIDS programming or HIV/AIDS awareness and 
intervention has been slow to develop…” (Fried, 2003: 102).  
 
Much information is given in relation to HIV/AIDS infection, information that is 
regarded as sufficient enough to make the necessary impact in order to at some point 
in the future eradicate the disease. In a study done in Soweto on gender-based 
violence and HIV/AIDS on women seeking antenatal care between the years 2001 and 
2002 and between the ages 16 to 44, it was found that fifty-five percent of the women 
who participated claimed they had experienced some form of violence from a male 
partner, both physical and sexual. “Those who had experienced both types of abuse or 
frequent violence were significantly more likely to test positive for HIV than those 
who reported little or no abuse…” (Maclean, 2004: 148).  
 
The continued and rapid spread of the disease should signify that current approaches 
have not been as effective and efficient as was hoped. There has been a very general 
prescription to the public in terms of what needs to be done in order to avoid 
infection, without taking into consideration, social intricacies, such as culture and 
gender. “…political rationalities have an epistemological character, in that they 
embody particular conceptions of the objects to be governed – nation – population…” 
(Barry, Osborne and Rose, 1996: 42). This has resulted in the oversimplification of 
solutions targeted towards curbing the spread of the epidemic and has proven to be 
disastrous to say the least. Headway has certainly been made in terms of the provision 
of contraceptives, and Anti Retro-Viral Drugs (ARVs), unfortunately the main 
problem remains that people continue to not protect themselves and that is 
unavoidably the root out the problem.  
 
Women, however, hold a very different position when compared to the rest of society, 
and the gendered reality of this position needs to be given greater significance. Park, 
Fedler and Dangor (2000: 25) in a bid to highlight the link between rape and 





Many women contract sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS through forced sex, either in 
the form of rape, gang rape, marital rape. The risks of HIV infection through sexual violence, is of 
particular concern, because of the combined effects of the high prevalence of HIV in Africa, the 
rampant rape statistics, and the fact that sexual violence can increase one’s vulnerability to 
transmission due to the likely presence of blood caused by forced intercourse. 
 
The fact remains that there has always been a patriarchal power that has designed and 
dictated every aspect of women’s lives, the goal being to ensure that women own the 
position of subordination, mentally, emotionally and even physically and it is this 
subordination that is a key aspect in understanding the spread of HIV/AIDS among 
women. However, it is Foucault’s belief that it is impossible to have complete control 
over any group (Heller, 1996), speaking of less dominant groups he is of the opinion 
that they “will always have access to some mechanisms of power that they can use to 
resist their domination, no group therefore is completely powerless” (Heller, 1996: 
100).     
 
The Zuma rape trial highlights the possibility that infection may not always 
necessarily be a result of neglect, but in many cases it is a result of a lack of choice. 
HIV infection through rape should not be undermined or discounted in its contribution 
to the growing number of infections. It is Foucault’s belief that “the sexual subject is 
perpetually in formation, because power is perpetually unsatisfied, forever in search 
of more pleasures to regulate” (Dean, 1994: 291). This is evident in women’s inability 
to negotiate their encounters with men, particularly their sexual encounters, and it has 
proven to be deadly. This is not a problem that is not known, however it is one that is 
taken for granted, and how this could become relevant when considering infection has 
not been given enough coverage. “Women will be able to protect themselves from 
HIV infection when they have power in their relationships and an independent self-
worth” (Banzhaf and Bellamy, 1998: 104). Even as we regard the many atrocities 
against women through power, Foucault is however convinced that power is never 
fully in control (Dean, 1994).  
 
In the case of gender-based violence, women’s ability to negotiate whether or not 
sexual intercourse takes place and more importantly their ability to articulate their 





a systemization of pleasure” (Martin, 1982: 8) by a prohibiting force, therefore being 
at the mercy of another’s insatiable appetite and the possibility of infection. In the 
fight against HIV, “placing emphasis on concepts such as ‘choice’ ignores the 
violence that is the reality of many women’s lives” (Chisala, 2008: 55). An extreme 
form of patriarchy becomes performed through rape, undisguised and not at all subtle. 
It incorporates violence to achieve its end, without being pervasive or suggestive. It is 
blatant in its show of power and need for control, revealing the very sadistic nature of 
patriarchy that denies women autonomy and the right to make choices with regard to 
intimacy. Cahill (2000: 7) explores the exclusion of women from a more assertive and 
liberating form of power by writing that: 
 
The exclusion of women from the symbolic could be understood as a complex configuration of power 
in which utterances, texts, and other symbolic actions do not create the same sphere of possible actions 
for women as they do for men…the coercion of women by means of the symbolic function of 
negativity is understood to consist of a multitude of symbolic and non-symbolic practices.  
 
The media as a social mouth-piece should be instrumental in making less obscure the 
different circumstances surrounding HIV/AIDS infection. Banzhaf and Bellamy 
(1998: 92) suggest alternative avenues that may help increase conversations on 
HIV/AIDS by suggesting that:  
 
[S]exual silence is a detriment within sexual encounters and must be overcome when instituting 
behavior to reduce the incidence of HIV. Conversations that women have about sex everyday with their 
friends, co-workers, and partners must also be included in a discussion about AIDS… 
 
Unfortunately they continue to make generalizations, preaching abstinence and 
condom use, “…the information directed at women completely ignores the contexts of 
women’s lives. Women are simply instructed to use condoms, a directive that ignores 
the reality that men, not women wear condoms…” (Hogan, 1998: 167). Furthermore 
the media’s attempts to curb the spread of disease are hindered by their sometimes 
demeaning representation of women, therefore, according to Foucault not only are our 
subjectivity, identity and sexuality intimately linked, they are “brought into play by 






Gender-based violence, HIV/AIDS infection as well as women’s unique position 
within this dynamic is a social dilemma that continues to be neglected by the media 
and this is evidence of their patriarchal position. HIV/AIDS is not only a human rights 
issue, it may also be the result of very violent circumstances, therefore taking note of 
the multi-faceted nature of this disease is more than crucial, especially if women’s 
lives are to undergo a dramatic change.  
 
Although much has been said and written, the media fails to capture how much the 
spread of HIV/AIDS among women may also be due to the same attitudes that 
promote other violations against women. As a result of the rape trial, the media were 
given enough reason to spark conversation about not only HIV/AIDS, but HIV/AIDS 
as a result of rape. The fact that Mr. Zuma is a man prone to sexual intercourse with 
more than one partner at a time is reason enough. Furthermore, the fact that he claims 
to be an advocate against HIV/AIDS and having once led the Moral Regeneration 
Movement (MRM), Mr. Zuma was never held accountable for his actions, with the 
victim being blamed entirely.  
 
I cannot help but wonder whether there would have been more sympathy for the 
alleged victim had she not been infected and there was indeed confirmation that Mr. 
Zuma was HIV positive. In retrospect this is doubtful, especially as we consider the 
response of the public, and the media, but particularly the echoes of the female 
supporters outside the courtroom. One is able to perceive how far patriarchy has 
persisted in the mentality of many, sadly this includes women. The idea of entitlement 
and subservience is so entrenched, that it was believed that the alleged victim should 
have thought of her experience as an honor rather than a violation.  
 
There is a perception that it is the duty of women to confirm the masculinity of men, 
by denying men what they are supposedly entitled to, would be considered an 
emasculating practice, and a denial of their superiority and position as supreme father. 
“In the regime of institutionalized heterosexuality, woman must make herself ‘object 
and prey’ for the man” (Bartky, 1988: 72). It is for this reason that I believe that even 
if the alleged victim had indeed been infected by Mr.  Zuma, even this would have 





position, even though he may have put her life at risk by re-infecting her still made 
her worthy of punishment.  
 
Although legislation has indeed approved a bill stating that deliberate infection will 
lead to prosecution, as this will be considered attempted murder, when one considers 
the number of rapists that manage to avoid conviction, this bill is unlikely to make 
any difference, even with proof of infection. Furthermore, it is doubtful that this bill 
even makes room for those who have been re-infected. Medical institutions are not 
better in this regard, as they seem to be more pre-occupied with either diagnosis, or 
finding a cure. They too have a responsibility to publicize the gendered circumstances 
surrounding the epidemic. Erni (1998: 1) clarifies that:  
 
[F]rustrations have been escalating in the care-giving, social service, and activist communities over the 
serious incongruence between people’s concrete and varied experiences in the epidemic and the 
dominant social and scientific practices operating on narrow and deadly cultural assumptions about 
sexual and gendered realities.  
 
However, as we consider this, it is necessary to not ignore the possibility that to some 
extent, like the media, medical institutions themselves have been known to be 
patriarchal in their structure, they “monopolize ‘scientific’ knowledge and exercise 
control over individual’s bodies, families and the social body” (Martin, Diamond and 
Quinby, 1988: 10). This is made most apparent in their approaches to health, ensuring 
that they protect patriarchal interests such as reproduction, especially within the 
nuclear family. Women with HIV/AIDS may be irrelevant within this scenario as they 
may be considered polluted and therefore having no use in achieving patriarchal 
agendas, “it is on the biological difference between the male and female bodies that 
the edifice of gender inequality is built and legitimized” (McNay, 1994: 99).  
 
It is necessary to be wary of the “objectification” embedded in medical programmes 
and the way such schemes are in line with “wider rationalities of government” 
(Osborne, 1996: 99). Being part of a major social institution, it is therefore necessary, 
as Foucault suggests that we be wary of how such an institution may be implicated in 
power, particularly in relation to the state (Buker, 1990). Buker (1990), in reference to 





implementation of power and interference by attempting to convince citizens of its 
desire to protect the privacy of the family. However, “the medicalization of abortion 
and of birth control become mechanisms by which the state exercises control over 
sexual activity and child production” (Buker, 1990: 821) disprove this. Weedon 
(1987: 14) is aware of the boundaries set by science and the medical world, as he 
concludes that: 
 
Within the official institutions of science and research, feminists have begun to challenge the 
boundaries of existing knowledge, the questions which it asks and answers and its patriarchal 
implications. Yet challenge from within the structures of the institutions is fraught with contradictions.  
 
Undeniably, the manner in which women’s personal relationships are defined with 
regards to sex and sexuality need scrutiny, for through this we may gain some 
understanding, for not only are many of these relationships known to be spheres of 
violence, but we also need to take note of the fact that the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
continues to be passed on within and through these relationships. Offering an 
important perspective, Erni (1998: 3) is of the view that: 
 
As the epidemic approaches its third decade, how sexuality and gender can be reconceptualized, and 
more importantly how their interimplications can be theorized, may have the potential to reframe how 
the epidemic is defined.  
 
In line with Foucault’s conception of resistance, McNay (1992: 98) proposes a more 
radical form of political practice, which she believes is essential to any kind of 
political change. However, this requires “a risking of the self”. 
 
The fact that society is under serious threat has not adequately hit home, and the 
disease continues to reach grave heights. Thus far the messages have included safer 
sex through condom use or abstinence, which have had very little impact. Aniekwu 
(2002: 1) makes a significant point in this regard, highlighting how the relationship 
between gender issues and HIV/AIDS has long gone without adequate attention, he 
holds that: 
 
Until very recently, researchers paid little attention to sex or gender issues in HIV/AIDS. When 





on women’s reproductive lives and not on factors affecting the spread of the disease. There was hardly 
any consideration of the influence of inequalities on the spread of HIV/AIDS and on the outcomes of 
infection between the sexes. Hitherto, health policies and programmes focused on biological aspects of 
diagnosis, treatment and prevention.  
 
Aniekwu (2002) brings an important point to the fore and it is my belief that the 
above statement exposes the manner in which for a long time HIV/AIDS had been 
regarded as a disease that threatened to wipe out the male heterosexual community, a 
disease caused by deviant homosexual men or wayward women. With regards to 
women, society’s interest in their health seems to begin and end with the desire that 
women continue to breed healthy children. Women seem to be important in so far as 
they ensure the growth of the population, providing stakeholders that contribute to the 
production of the economy. 
 
 
5.4 VICTIMIZATION THROUGH SEXUAL HISTORY 
 
In a society dominated by patriarchal mores, a woman’s sexual history supposedly 
becomes a significant factor in determining her character. Women are harshly 
chastised, for being more sexually active than is thought to be necessary, although 
truth be told it is probably the preference that all women remain virgins until they are 
married, for we live in a society that is “obsessed with virginity” (Motsei, 2006: 106).  
 
The problem with the use of sexual history has everything to do with the myths 
surrounding the nature of women as wild if not controlled. I propose that the 
interrogation of sexual history come with the will to expose it as an oppressive 
practice, as its intention is to regulate as well as exclude certain kinds of women from 
a full experience of justice, due to a lack of adherence to normalizing practices. “The 
Zuma rape trial starkly brought into the public domain the fragile equilibrium between 
the complainant’s rights to privacy and dignity and the accused’s fair trial rights” 
(Combrink, 2008: 263).  
 
Foucault questions the sovereignty of the state, particularly its tendency to prescribe 





individuals. In this case the excluded would be rape victims with less than desirable 
characteristics with regard to sexual history (Schwikkard, 2008). 
 
There seems to be a great lack of political will when dealing with cases of assault 
against women, especially rape. Any incident of sexual assault, is thought to have 
been provoked by the actions and behavior of women. In fact, the alleged victim in 
this trial was practically ridiculed as she claimed that her sexual life consisted of a 
series of assaults. Just as there are acceptable and unacceptable degrees when it comes 
to rape (Remick, 1993), clearly through this case we see that there are also an 
acceptable number of times that a woman can be raped. Being raped once might be 
regarded as permissible, yet even that occasion will come with its own challenges, 
followed still by much skepticism and disbelief. A woman raped more than once, 
means it is a habit. Sexual history is an extremely manipulative use of the law, as it 
discourages future rape victims from coming forward. Whether inadvertently or not 
the state is communicating that one of the consequences of transgression from 
hegemonic ideals is that the law can only provide limited protection and exposure 
(Martin, 1982). 
 
The tendency, strangely enough, is not to criticize a society that accommodates people 
that unleash such terror, it is the women who are picked on and probed, for it is they 
who are thought to be at fault and that something in their behavior is inviting this 
aggression. Jurors in the case of rape victims with an active sexual history then make 
“personal rather than situational attributions for the sexual assault” (Borgida and 
White, 1978). Critics of the alleged victim in this case, may argue that since she 
claims to have been raped before, she should then have the capacity to recognize or 
sense when a man has the intention of raping her.  
 
When one assesses the randomness and unexpectedness of many rape cases, the 
notion seems somewhat bizarre. The fact is many rapists do rely on the element of 
surprise; this leaves victims with very few options, the point being that they are not 
prepared and unlikely to escape. Like other crimes, the actions of perpetrators are 
indeed random and opportunistic, yet there are also times when the attack is planned, 
with the anticipation of certain outcomes, evading the law being one of them. Yet I 





cases, as though rape could only be a crime of passion, resulting in a degree of 
carelessness and not enough evidence for a conviction.  
 
Adding to the complex nature of rape, Alexander (1980: 23) highlights that “blaming 
the victim ‘is unique to rape’”. Perhaps clues to why the crime of rape is distinctly 
separated from other crimes lies in the fact that it is a crime unique to women 
(Remick, 1993).  
 
Expecting women to know when they are about to be raped, sends the message that 
women should always be more than just alert, but paranoid. As much as rape is a 
reality, it is not something that we should let cripple or limit us. The fact of the matter 
is, there is no real method to recognizing a rapist, and one could be raped at any time. 
This is one of the reasons that rape is such a complex and challenging crime, one of 
the reasons that I am certain many vehemently and absolutely refute the possibility 
that a man of Mr. Zuma’s stature could possibly be a rapist. In the same way that 
victims of rape are expected to have certain characteristics present in order to qualify 
as being “real” victims, the same goes for rapists. It is this expectation of prediction 
that fails many victims, as things are not quite so black and white.  
 
It is necessary for courts to realize “the low probative value of sexual history evidence 
and the high potential for prejudice when such evidence is admitted to show the 
victim’s consent” (Murthy, 1991: 542). With the introduction of sexual history during 
court cases, there is always confusion about who exactly is on trial. There is also the 
risk that judgment will be judgmental and it could be argued that this threatens the 
objectivity that is meant to be associated with the law. Foucault points out the 
necessity to interrogate the boundaries which our subjectivity places us in, once those 
boundaries and limitations are understood, we will then have the capacity to become 
open to new experiences and “the possibility of transgressing” (McNay, 1992: 89). 
Making use of sexual history, in my opinion, is a convenient way to detract from the 
incident in question, which eventually becomes disregarded along the way, but in 
truth should be the main focus of the case. It is imperative to ask ourselves who the 
use of sexual history actually benefits. Through a process of greater resistance, the use 
of sexual history needs to be eradicated, as it makes it easier for courts to dismiss a 





resistance in order to upset traditional notions of power, Baxter (1996: 453) insists 
that: 
 
In displacing the traditional notion of power as sovereign command, Foucault emphasizes that power 
relations include not just the application of force, but also resistance. For Foucault, the very existence 
of power relations ‘depends on a multiplicity of resistance.’ Resistance, understood as the ‘irreducible 
opposite’ in the exercise of power.  
 
When sexual history is such a prominent factor in a case, the evidence gathering 
process almost becomes futile. It could even be said that prosecutors that insist on 
using a victim’s sexual history is proof that they are desperate, by “distorting the fact-
finding process in a manner prejudicial to the rape victim” (Borgida and White, 1978: 
340).  
 
In this particular case, various witnesses were sworn in, all of whom were really 
character witnesses and had not even seen the alleged victim in years, none, except for 
the daughter of the accused were present on the night in question. The “good girl” 
versus “bad girl” scenario brought about by sexual history is something that should 
not be undermined in court cases. The alleged victim’s character and reputation were 
tainted not only due to the fact that she claimed to have been raped more than once, 
but because she also claimed to be lesbian.  
 
Sexuality in a conservative and patriarchal society is still significant, and therefore not 
fitting into the heteronormative mould befitting what is considered a “proper” woman. 
This certainly did nothing to increase the alleged victim’s popularity, particularly 
from ordinary citizens outside the court, something I hold that the prosecution was 
fully aware of and capitalized on. The aim of using sexual history thus is to show that 
the victims are most probably “personally responsible for their own misfortunes” 
(Pugh, 1983: 239).  
 
Her extensive “partners”, or at least those that claimed to have been partners suggest 
that she was promiscuous and her lesbian status perhaps gave the impression of a 
further lack of morals and I am in full agreement with Murthy (1991: 544) who states 





particular occasion”. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the courts insistence to 
select aspects of the alleged victims character and history that cast her in a bad light, 
gave a biased and limited perception of the alleged victim, “a propensity to have 
sexual intercourse” (Schwikkard, 2008: 94) and not a full representation. Whatever 
opinions one may have concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused, the alleged 
victim may not only have resisted the traditional through her lifestyle, but also her 
choice to proceed with the case. It is resistance that “eludes power, and power targets 
resistance as its adversary. Resistance is what threatens power; hence it stands against 
power as an adversary” (Pickett, 1996: 458).    
 
A person’s sexual orientation is an intricate part of who they are, yet this significant 
aspect of the complainant’s life was never fully delved into. An even more 
unwelcome realization may have been the idea that as a lesbian, she had the audacity 
to attempt to take control of her sexual life. This is something very uncommon for 
women in the South African context, due to prevailing cultures and traditions that 
seek to control women’s sexual lives. Those who resist could face alienation and even 
punishment of the severest kind in the form of violence.  
 
Some might be of the opinion that the alleged victim’s experience, tells of a woman 
who chose to not be contained by existing suppressive practices that silence and 
undermine women’s position within society, by not only challenging the accused, and 
not concealing her sexual orientation. Furthermore, as the alleged assault took place in 
a private space, I feel there was a perception that it should have remained a private 
matter, as many domestic abuse cases are, particularly within some Black 
communities. This defiance actually may have led to her banishment as she was 
forced into exile, far from friends and family, as her life was undeniably under great 
threat, the “public degradation of the ‘nonvirtuous’ female” (Giacopassi and 
Wilkinson, 1985: 368).  
 
It has been found that trauma in rape, goes beyond the horrific experience compared 
to victims of other crimes, “victims of ‘completed’ sexual assault experience the most 
trauma in response to the event” (Maw, Womersley and O’ Sullivan, 2008: 123). For 
women who attempt to adhere to cultural mores, there may be a sense that they not 





blameless, self-blame is common, due to social expectation. Therefore, perusing 
through one’s sexual history whether or not there is something to find may be even 
more traumatizing for women who already blame themselves for the occurrence, what 
Luo (2000) refers to as “rape victimization”. “Woman lives her body as seen by 
another, by an anonymous patriarchal Other” (Bartky, 1988: 72), therefore trauma in 
this case is brought on by not only the victim’s perception of herself, but what she 
perceives as society’s perception of her. “In the aftermath of a sexual assault, a 
woman’s faith in the credibility of her own discourse and self-understanding is 
seriously shaken” (Hengehold, 1994: 99). Considering the state’s methods of 
intervention in rape cases, one may have doubts concerning the ability of power to 
work for those who truly need it.  
 
In relation to “rape victimization” Martin and Powell (1994) refer to the “second 
assault”. The “second assault” being a process through which the subliminal prejudice 
of the courts is revealed through actions such as the exposure of sexual history.  
 
I dare suggest that the trial lacked balance, compared to the accused, the alleged 
victim, interestingly went through much scrutiny and criticism. It could even be 
argued that her experience in the courtroom was quite brutal and the intention it is 
claimed being to discover the truth. Others may suggest that the truth had been 
decided long before the case had even begun, and the trial was only meant to formally 
confirm it. So much effort went towards showing that there was foul play on the part 
of the alleged victim, but I ask: What efforts went towards showing that there may 
have indeed been foul play on the part of the accused? The fact that an alleged victim 
may have a colorful sexual history does not prove that a crime was not committed and 
thus victims should not be sacrificed due to the laws flawed methods of fact finding. 
Barbalet (1983 : 544) states that: 
 
The difference between agents with power and agents subject to the power of others is centred around 
who complies with whose wants. This depends on the difference in resources mobilized by agents… 
 
In my interrogation of the use of sexual history, I consider Martin’s (1988: 16) 
suggestion that we analyze the manner in which women have figured as “a 





The accused’s sexual history was never probed, although his admission to sleeping 
with the alleged victim without a condom proves that he is a philandering man. We 
are led to the consideration of two possibilities, the first being that delving into Mr. 
Zuma’s sexual history would have been damaging to the case and his character, and 
that there was evidence that could have at least revealed the possibility that the 
accused was a man likely to have raped his accuser. However, “when accusations of 
sexual assault are made, more attention may be paid to the behavior of the victim, 
rather than the perpetrator’s intentions and actions” (Viki, Abrams, Masser, 2004: 
296), in an attempt to “trivialize the offense of rape and to devalue the victim” 
(Giacopassi and Wilkinson, 1985: 367). This may even confirm that “[s]exual beliefs 
that privilege men’s access to women’s bodies regardless of women’s preferences are 
embodied in many legal practices…” (Martin and Powell, 1994: 856).  
 
I hear of many cases in which prosecutors defending rapists, take advantage of their 
clients’ domestic life. Clients who are employed, married with children or are in 
stable relationships appear believable and harmless. Shaw and Skolnick (1996: 431-
432) are of the view that: 
 
Studies have shown that high status individuals are rated more positively…Status may protect against 
blame when a criminal’s actions are unrelated to his or her professional activities.  
 
As a polygamist, any enquiry into the manner in which the accused acquired his wives 
may not have been favorable for the case. It was no secret that the accused offered to 
pay lobola (payment made for the bride by the groom) for the alleged victim just 
before the case went to trial. This begs the question: Was there transparency on the 
part of the prosecution? Would it be too daring to suggest that the alleged victim was 
further victimized, by not only the inclusion of her sexual history, but even further by 
the exclusion of the sexual history of the man she had accused of rape?  
 
As the case attempted to reveal what were thought to be the dubious tendencies of the 
alleged victim, I argue that it is only fair to say that the accused should have gone 
through the same grueling process. It has been found that only one in nine women 
report cases of rape (Loots, 2007). For Foucault, the judicial system is extremely 





(Pickett, 1996: 455-456) and even though it presents itself as a neutral force, this is 
arguable. Long before women even reach the courtroom, many are aware that those 
from whom they seek assistance doubt them. Law enforcers, such as police who take 
statements, medical officers that examine victims also tend to be biased. Alexander 
(1980: 22) reveals that “rape victims often are blamed for having attracted the crime 
and are treated as if they were the offender by police, medical personnel, the courts, 
and, not infrequently, well-meaning family and friends (Griffin, 1971; Medea and 
Thompson, 1974; Brownmiller, 1975)”. According to Barry, Osborne and Rose 
(1996: 38): 
 
The strategies of regulation that have made up our modern experience of ‘power’ are thus assembled 
into complexes that connect up forces and institutions deemed ‘political’ with apparatuses that shape 
and manages individual and collective conduct in relation to norms and objectives but yet are 
constituted as ‘non-political’.  
 
At this juncture, I am compelled to note the experience of prostitutes, another group 
who are pre-dominantly women and are known to be systematically marginalized due 
to their work which is considered undesirable and shameful. In their attempts to seek 
legal assistance or protection after incidents of rape, these women are often turned 
away as they are judged for their occupation, including the fact that many law 
enforcers are unable to fathom the idea that a prostitute could actually be raped. Their 
sexual experience works against them, and there is the perception that their 
occupation perhaps makes them deserving of the alleged assault. “Abuse of sex 
workers by clients or the police is more likely where sex workers do not have 
recourse to report such acts to a legal authority” (Pauw and Brenner, 2003: 465-466).  
 
Considering the very low number of women who do actually report rape, it is 
surprising that courts still use methods that would ultimately discourage women from 
coming forward when they have been sexually assaulted. When we assess the many 
improvements that are needed in order to prove that women’s right to citizenship is 
being taken seriously, using sexual history in my view projects the fact that our legal 
system is still not fully on board, but wavering in an attempt to keep women silent. 
The persistent attachment to harmful myths about rape has resulted in the focus on the 





having a sense of relief, women are faced with the fear that they will be judged for 
past deeds, rather than the event in question. The result of this is that women are 
placed in a difficult position for the issue of rape becomes de-politicized as it is 
reduced to a matter of character, and this atrocious crime becomes distanced from the 
gendered and social realities that dominate South African society.  
 
As in the case of HIV/AIDS, in the exploration and assessment of rape, one cannot 
afford to be ‘gender blind’, for there are very real and prevalent reasons behind the act 
of rape related to the differences between men and women and how they are expected 
to relate to each other. Martin and Powell (1994) suggest “responsive processing” 
when dealing with victims of rape, as opposed to “unresponsive processing”.  
Responsive processing being the manner in which victims of rape are engaged, the 
intention is to be supportive rather than blame the victim. 
 
With regards to incidents of past abuse as experienced by the complainant, the 
admission of statements from men whom had been accused of raping the victim, 
could be regarded as somewhat perverse, making a spectacle of the case and revealing 
the judge’s ignorance with regards to rape even further as a violation that could occur 
more than once, instead he suggests that due to past trauma she may perceive any 
sexual behavior as threatening (Judgment of Judge WJ van der Merwe, 2006: 42). 
There may be those that hold the view that the judge chose to criminalize the fact that 
she had been abused more than once, suggesting that she was the problem and not the 
accused men, as though being raped once would have been more than sufficient. 
According to the judge (Judgment of Judge WJ van der Merwe, 2006: 42):  
 
A further question that can be asked is why will the complainant deny that she knows any of the men 
who alleged that she had falsely accused them of rape or attempted rape. The answer must be obvious. 
That is that she cannot admit that she has done so in the past because it will be found that she has done 
it again. 
 
The fact that testimony included that of a man who claimed to have had a relationship 
with the alleged victim when she was thirteen and he was twenty-three at the time was 
not considered shocking (Judgment of Judge WJ van der Merwe, 2006: 13). Yet, with 





this was a blatant case of statutory rape. Based on the alleged victim’s past, there was 
not only an attempt to make her seem promiscuous, but further into the case it was 
clear that the judge had still not made up his mind about who was on trial. 
 
According to the judge “[o]n one hand evidence of sexual promiscuity may be so 
strong or so closely contemporaneous in time to the event in issue as to come near to, 
or indeed to reach the border between mere credit and an issue in the case” (Judgment 
of Judge WJ van der Merwe, 2006: 8). In terms of allowing evidence of such a nature 
the judge claims to agree with du Toit et al (op cit at 24-100) who writes that: 
 
[S]everal…policy concerns which militate against admissibility…must be taken to the balance. These 
include the need to protect witnesses from hurtful, harassing and humiliating attacks, the recognition of 
the person’s right to privacy...  
 
Unfortunately before, during and even after the case had been concluded, the 
complainant’s life was threatened as a result of the proceedings and the implications 
that were made and exposed.   
 
It is important to ask, whether the court in its attempt to build a case managed to 
further traumatize the alleged victim. Even with the desire to seek the truth, did the 
court adequately protect the alleged victim? The high-profile nature of the case meant 
the alleged victim; an ordinary citizen became exposed and critiqued by the masses in 
addition to the possible trauma she may have faced if she were indeed raped. There 
are many who might even feel that the case should have been dealt with more 
sensitivity. The sensation associated with the case only went towards making what 
should have been a delicate process, become a spectacle, tainting proceedings through 
a lack of respect particularly for the victim.  
 
The victim’s sexual history, or anyone’s sexual history for that matter, is a private 
matter, and thus deserving of protection and respect, rather than a reason to judge and 
discriminate. The use of sexual history and even personal records, not only makes 
victims’ reluctant to turn to the law, it “leads to a reduction in victim’s reporting 
offences, bringing the administration of justice into disrepute” (Pithey, 2008: 115). In 





very painful were splashed across the media, for the public to divulge and criticize. 
Needless to say, it is my opinion that this case seemed to be more about exonerating 
Mr. Zuma than actually bringing to light the actual occurrences of the night of the 
alleged raped.  
 
It is claimed that the revelation of sexual history speaks to the idea of “public 
interest”, but “whose public interest” as victims of rape are also supposedly part of the 
public being referred, or at least that is assumed. Pithey (2008) suggests that more 
care be taken in the “communication of sexual offences” in order to not discourage 
reporting of sexual offences which it is hoped, would also be considered as being of 
public interest. Foucault insists that power is not negative, but it certainly can have 
negative consequences, particularly for transgressors. Although it may seem like it, 
the state is not the locus of “power”, but a “strategy and effect”, and needs to be 
probed even further on the subject of sexual history (Martin, 1982). 
 
 
5.5 THE QUESTION OF CONSENT 
 
In the process of establishing the legitimacy of rape cases, consent becomes a 
significant aspect, which it should. Understanding the state of mind of not only those 
accused of rape but also those who make claims of rape cannot and should not be 
undermined. However, when the justice system places unnecessary strain on victims, 
to provide scenarios that show evidence of extreme forms of resistance by the victim, 
met with aggression from an equally or even more resistant attacker, resulting in 
extensive bruising and physical damage, only then does a claim of a lack of consent 
become unquestionable and believable according to the law. As much as the justice 
system is significant in providing guidance and order to the citizen body, viewing 
them as a central moral body, has resulted in ordinary citizens making little use of 
their power to intervene, particularly in a democratic society such as South Africa. 
Foucault suggests that it is possible to reject power, especially the kind of power that 
seems to be confined to a central place (Newman, 2004). This seems necessary if rape 






As I peruse over the judge’s statement he refers to the events of the actual night in 
question, and twice he mentions the weight of the alleged victim, which at the time 
was eighty-five kilograms with a height of 1, 65 meters, compared to the weight of 
the accused who was ninety kilograms, while he was sixty-three years old at the time, 
and she was thirty-one. “It was suggested to her that she could have resisted easily 
and that she could have broken the hold the accused had on her two hands.” Mr. Zuma 
may not be a young man, but there was no reason to assume that he was physically 
weak, and unable to rape the complainant, as the judge claims that “[t]he complainant 
was at least a reasonable fair match physically for the accused, being 31 years old 
herself and weighing 85kg compared with the accused who was at the time 63 years 
old and weighing 90kg” (Judgment of Judge WJ van der Merwe, 2006: 39). Motsei 
(2007: 21) notes, however that: 
 
A woman who is immobilised by fear may not be physically strong enough to fend off her rapist. In 
addition to being physically injured, or even murdered, a woman who is raped is presumed to be guilty 
by society if she does not fight back. Furthermore, she is also blamed for being born female. This 
means that she not only has to contend with the trauma of sexual violence, she also has to face a deep, 
negative social stigma that surrounds womanhood, sex and sexual violence. 
  
Many victims continue to be neglected as their experiences do not neatly fit with what 
the law regards as the norms of rape. These so-called norms of course, make the 
processing of cases easier, however at the expense of many due to a patriarchal 
interpretation of the experience of rape, resulting in “legal subordination” (Henderson, 
1991: 422). Dumm (1996), in his subscription to Foucault, speaks of the totalizing 
approach the law has in its administration of justice. In the case of rape, women tend 
to become excluded based on very biased technicalities such as consent. Dumm 
(1996) points out that the state exists because a “collective” consents to its existence. 
Disrupting this compliancy by revealing that the law is limited in its capacity to 
competently administer justice is necessary through political action. Combrink (2008: 
268) adds that: 
 
[T]here is the devaluation and silencing that follows when victim’s experiences are misunderstood, re-
cast or wrongly interpreted: for example, when a court reaches the conclusion that the complainant had 






When a woman claims that she has been raped, it seems that the process is not to 
establish whether or not she did indeed want to take part in sexual intercourse. In fact, 
there seem to be acceptable degrees of consent or non-consent, measured in ways not 
only understood by the courts, but which clarify that in certain situations it becomes 
permissible that a woman’s dignity can be compromised, depending on where she fits 
on the scale between consent and non-consent (Remick, 1993). Foucault in his work 
reiterates the necessity to not underestimate the connection between resistance and 
social change (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004). Through resistance at least attention 
is brought to the areas where the law falls short. The law is meant to protect the 
innocent and punish criminals, however to not be vindicated after an experience such 
as rape, and to be indirectly named a liar based on a technicality becomes a sentence 
in itself. 
 
There seems to be a misconception that there is a “perfect victim”. In this instance, 
there would always be someone to corroborate a claim of rape, evidence of physical 
force and the attacker would not be an acquaintance but a stranger. There would be 
traces of semen, and if the victim were a virgin or at least married that would certainly 
be advantageous, a good woman caught in an unfortunate situation. I use the word 
“unfortunate” because it seems that is all rape amounts to, an unfortunate 
circumstance, faced by an unfortunate individual where “proof of the absence of 
consent is not enough to defeat a consent defense” (Remick, 1993: 1111 ). Political 
activism is not only meant to overthrow oppressive regimes, for even in seemingly 
liberal regimes there could be oppressive forces at work. It is understandable that 
many would choose to avoid action through resistance for fear of conflict (Barbalet, 
1983); however standing against power that has negative consequences reminds the 
state body that it is not invincible and must not ignore that having content citizens 
leads to a stable nation.  
 
There was nothing perfect about the alleged victim in the Jacob Zuma rape trial, 
nothing virginal, as she was regarded as sexually experienced and unchaste. One 
would think such details would pale against the atrociousness of the possible crime. 
Unfortunately, the reality remains that consent means very little, especially when one 
does not live up to the rigid patriarchal requirements set for women, thus symbolically 





The sexism involved in the evaluation of victims is evident, to the extent that Viki, 
Abrams and Masser (2004) speak of “blameworthy” victims. These are victims whom 
because of their character evoke negative emotions and are thus viewed as 
undeserving of the protection of the law, what they refer to as “benevolent sexism” 
which could either be low or high, depending on the supposed victim. The alleged 
victim in this case was a Black woman, lesbian and HIV positive and interestingly 
Franke (2001: 97) states that: 
 
The normative of white, straight middle-class women’s repronormative behavior serves to set-off the 
lesbian/Black/infertile/disabled woman’s predicament as a marked deviation from the natural order.  
 
There is no better way to assess one’s citizenship within a society, one’s position, than 
when a crime has been committed against you. How speedily and efficiently the laws 
comes to your aid reflects your relevance, and for many women who are raped, it is as 
though the state had long revoked their right to that citizenship. Martin (1982: 13) 
notes that: 
 
Feminist criticism must be engaged in elaborating the extent to which the phallocentric meanings and 
truths of our culture have necessarily repressed multiplicity and the possibility of actual difference by 
appropriating difference, naming it opposition and subsuming it under the ‘Identitiy of Man.’ Feminism 
shares with post-structuralist criticism a critique of the hegemony of the identical and the desire for 
other forms of discourse. 
 
If we are to take the complainant’s claim of being a lesbian seriously and not bisexual 
as the judge concluded, I am certain that this would have threatened the credibility of 
the case. As a lesbian, it is in most cases unlikely that the alleged victim would have 
consented to sex with a man. In an interview Ms. K in reference to the judgment of 
Judge van der Merwe (Cavanagh and Mabele, Interview with Khwezi, 2006: 4) stated 
that: 
  
He reaches the conclusion that I am not a lesbian. He did this without asking me for the details about 
my identity as a lesbian…He doesn’t begin to understand the complexity of sexuality.  
 
Did the justice system conveniently ignore the alleged victim’s claims of lesbianism? 





have to make such a dispute and whether this excluded lesbian experience implies the 
deliberate “institutionalization of heterosexuality” (Martin, 1988:12).  
 
Although testimony was provided by males who claimed to be former sexual partners, 
none that acknowledged her sexuality were called. To say, that her sexuality was 
absolutely irrelevant is debatable and one might say her sexual history was relevant 
only as long as it cast doubt on her credibility. Had her sexuality been allowed to 
feature in the case more prominently, there would at least have been some sense that 
the court had attempted to achieve some balance during the proceedings and 
acquisition of evidence. Unfortunately, once a woman lays criminal charges with the 
police, the rape charge becomes an offence against the state and not a matter between 
the complainant and the accused (Combrink, 2008: 265), thus the complainant has 
very little involvement or control over what happens in the courtroom.   
 
Dripps (1992: 1780) states that “every society has punished rape, but only to the end 
of reinforcing the interests of males in controlling sexual access to females”. The fact 
is, as much as rape is generally considered to be an unpleasant occurrence, in the 
minds of many it is still not a crime worthy of greater severity, and this is reflected in 
the complacency of the law.  
 
As there are different degrees of consent, there too are varying acceptable as well as 
unacceptable forms of rape and a woman can actually be “raped a ‘little’” (Giacopassi 
and Wilkinson, 1985). This can have a lot to do with who is being accused or even the 
degree of aggression used. “The important criteria is no longer non-consent, which is 
an absolute, but degree of force used to overcome resistance and cause injury” 
(Giacopassi and Wilkinson, 1985: 375).  
 
The accused at the time was the former Deputy-President of the Republic of South 
Africa, a well-respected and accomplished individual, someone who without a doubt 
has made a vast contribution to society, particularly in relation to the country’s 
struggle to defeat an oppressive political regime. Giacopassi and Wilkinson (1985: 
369) point out that “[c]ase histories indicate the great reluctance of juries to convict an 





one then regard a man with credentials such as those of Zuma as a rapist? The conflict 
is easy to comprehend, but should not sway us from the need to be critical.  
 
In the case of rape by a stranger, there is at least the possibility that the alleged victim 
will be given the benefit of the doubt, but in the case of rape by an acquaintance, 
particularly if there had previously been a sexual relationship puts victims at a 
disadvantage. Domestic abuse comes to mind, and how the “private” is usually meant 
to be associated with safety and security, albeit evidence shows that one’s home can 
be a site of much terror and violence to the point of death. To rule out violence 
between acquaintances, whether or not there is a sexual history, therefore becomes 
laughable, and should certainly not be used to establish the likelihood of consent. 
Instead, courts prefer to rule out rape, for a seemingly neater option such as revenge 
for a previous misunderstanding or fall out, a relationship gone sour. Although 
Foucault is convinced that any kind of power is not “omnipotent”, he also admits that 
there too are limits to resistance. Cahill (2000: 48) writing on Foucault states that: 
 
No embodied subject is capable of resisting any and all expressions of power, for the simple reason that 
to do so would be to undermine that very subject’s ability to act at all.  
 
However, in our selection of causes to resist, the desire to preserve the dignity of 
human beings, particularly in the case of marginalized groups, the need for resistance 
should never be compromised. 
 
In the case of the Zuma rape trial, he was indeed an acquaintance of the alleged 
victim, and no allusion was made to a previous sexual relationship. The result of the 
accuser’s claims was thought to be linked to a political conspiracy (Judgment of 
Judge WJ van der Merwe, 2006), but she was also thought to have a monetary agenda, 
a way to extort money as it was made clear that the accused had failed to provide her 
with funds to further her studies abroad. 
  
A confusing polarity was made in relation to the character of Mr. Zuma in this case 
and clearly caused much division inside as well as outside the courtroom. Certain 
aspects of the case highlighted the accused’s social and political profile, which 





came to the night in question he was viewed as an ordinary citizen. The victim’s 
decision to not scream, to not leave the house or call the police even though there was 
a phone available have resulted in many questions that have cast much doubt on the 
alleged victim’s version of events.  
 
It could be suggested that it was unfair to change Mr. Zuma’s image at will, or where 
convenient, as this only shows the undeniably manipulative capacity of the courts. 
The question remains, did the accused stop being a statesman within the privacy of his 
home, and even if the alleged victim did scream, would the guard, a person in the 
employment of Mr. Zuma’s or any other person on the premises have protected the 
interests of Mr. Zuma or the woman accusing him of rape? It needs to be made clear 
that “[t]he fact that a charge of rape cannot be corroborated does not make it false” 
(Columbia Law Review, 1967: 1141). Naylor (2008: 29) shows that the absence of 
evidence of violence should not necessarily mean that a case against an alleged 
perpetrator should be dismissed, when he states that: 
 
[I]n those cases where the evidential burden of establishing consent is on the defense, evidence of lack 
of resistance or absence of words or conduct should not suffice. 
 
An appeal was made by the courts to sympathize with Mr. Zuma due to his social 
status, yet the alleged victim was condemned for not having a normal reaction to what 
she regarded as rape, as though there is anything normal about rape, or that there 
should even be a standard reaction. The psychologist used in the case, in fact 
confirmed that different people react in different ways (Judgment of Judge WJ van 
der Merwe, 2006), in this case the alleged victim claimed that she froze. Within this 
particular circumstance, could one argue that the alleged victim was not only 
overwhelmed due to the fact that she was being raped, but because of whom she was 
being raped by? Mr. Zuma, as the person being accused of rape was by no means an 
ordinary man, as someone in line to be the next president of South Africa, and the 
world-wide attention the case received proves this. Therefore, was it fair that the 
reaction of the victim be “ordinary”?  
 
Avoiding rape has become a woman’s prerogative, and considering the number of 





Mardorossian (2002: 756) speaks of the lack of responsibility and accountability with 
regards to rapists by stating that: 
 
The responsibility of the rapist is seen as inherently linked to the victim’s behavior an as a result often 
gets erased. Whether it is because she did not fight back physically or verbally, somehow rape always 
comes to be grounded in the victim’s behavioral or emotional dynamics rather than in the perpetrator’s 
actions. 
 
What is most worrying is the lack of emphasis on what a man’s responsibility should 
be in such scenarios. What should men do in order to avoid not being accused of rape, 
particularly since for the most part; it is men who initiate sex?  
 
Mr. Zuma claims that according to tradition, he was obliged to have sex with the 
woman as she was sexually ready, and that it would have been improper to leave her 
in that state. However, it is still not clear what process went towards confirming the 
preparedness of the woman in question. He denied the claims that they had been 
close, yet it is strange that he knew her well enough to know that she wanted to have 
sex with him.  
 
As much as it could be argued that it is up to women to make it clear when they are 
not interested in a sexual encounter, I would think that by the same token, a man 
would want to ensure that the individual that is being pursued is actually interested in 
sex. The need for “affirmative verbal consent” in which case “no” would mean “no” 
and not “yes” is paramount and anything less would mean a lack of consent (Remick, 
1993: 1105). The physically penetrative role that a man has during intercourse calls 
for it and perhaps women would not have to continue paying for what is sometimes 
men’s misinterpretation of events. Putting it plainly, the penis is a foreign element, 
and confirmation that its insertion is welcome is not something that should be taken 
for granted, especially in a time when women are grappling with the idea of sexual 
autonomy, sexual autonomy being “the freedom to refuse sex with any one for any 
reason” (Dripps, 1992: 1785).  
 
Cousins and Adams (1995: 96) speak of the manner in which language becomes the 





The language of the law does not fully comprehend their plight, it is a language that 
asserts that a woman is better off when she remains silent and if “she were to speak 
she would find herself traduced, betrayed and abandoned…” and “[t]hus, for 
Foucault, the fact that the body is socially constructed by the play of power does not 
necessitate its own powerlessness. Rather, its ability to resist certain expressions of 
power is itself attributable to the existence of power…” (Cahill, 2000: 48). 
 
The justice system may have a warped understanding of rape, but I find it surprising 
that in the twenty-first century we speak of acceptable types of consent or non-
consent, acceptable victims, and even acceptable attackers. In truth, there are different 
degrees of intimacy which do not necessarily lead to sex. But, in the society in which 
we live, certain levels of intimacy are forced on women, instead of being consensually 
agreed upon. Smythe and Waterhouse (2008) in agreement with feminist scholarship 
speak of the myths related to women, and when combined with patriarchy impact the 
manner in which rape is policed in ways that have no appreciation of the plight of 
victims. In order to counter this McNay (1996: 97) holds that: 
 
[T]he only way to resolve this dilemma is to break down the patriarchal logic which artificially 
polarizes the distinction between transcendence and immanence or between the desire for autonomy 
and the recognition of one’s dependence in others. 
 
Rather than finding out whether there was indeed clear consent, the courts take it 
upon themselves to show contributory fault on the part of the victim. In fact, Soothill, 
Walby and Bagguley (1990: 218) write that: 
 
[A] proximate reason for the high acquittal rate is that a high proportion of rape charges are contested 
in the courts often by attempting the defence that the woman consented to intercourse.  
 
As in this case, details such as what the alleged victim wore becomes a factor, how 
she sat, the nature of the conversation all of which are used to confirm consent, or 
essentially to justify the assault. There is an assumption that sex is always sexually 
motivated, this too does not fully take into consideration the suppressive dynamics 
that prevail, and that there is a strong patriarchal fraternity that exists at all levels of 
society, beyond social, economic and even racial boundaries which insists on 





The nature of rape brings with it much complexity and at times even the emphasis on 
the sexual aspect of this act tends to take away from its criminality. How do we then 
come to strike a balance between rape as a “crime of violence” and a “sex crime”? 
(Giacopassi and Wilkinson, 1985). Pugh (1983: 240) asks two profound questions in 
this regard: do we live in a society that socializes men to believe that “stigmatized 
women are legitimate targets for sexual exploitation?” or “does our culture dictate that 
degraded women are not in a position to make a creditable complaint?”  
 
Evidence sought against victims goes towards proving that their actions were sexually 
provocative, and thus the accused’s actions were perhaps warranted. But, as Palmer 
(1988: 513, 515, 525) suggests we need to consider the idea that rape is really “a 
political act of violence and domination” and asks whether rape is a “‘means’ or ‘end’ 
for rapists”, a sexual act not exclusively with a sexual goal. Not only is rape not 
necessarily sexual provoked, it does not necessarily require sexual organs in order to 
be achieved.  
 
Society has the power to shun, to attempt to weed out many evils with much 
perseverance, yet when it comes to rape, especially in the case of the unavailability of 
the “perfect victim”, that agency fades. However, if a victim with all the necessary 
characteristics sprung up more often, it is my belief that communities would rally 
together, call for more government action against the wretchedness that continues to 
terrorize women and girls all over the country. As there may be an attempt to ensure 
“normative social control” (Munro, 2001: 549), Rozmarin’s (2005: 4) assessment of 
Foucault makes clear that our freedom as democratic citizens makes it possible for us 
to regulate power and “freedom designates practices that challenge the regularity of 
power”. Munro (2001: 549) further highlights concerns relating to power by claimimg 
that: 
 
Concerns pertaining to the distribution and operation of power illuminate the theses of both feminist 
commentators and Michel Foucault. Recognizing the close relationship between the operation of power 
regimes and the individual’s conception of self, Foucault has, like many feminist theorists, sought to 






The people of South Africa may be accused of being passive and complacent on 
certain issues. However, when one is thought to have been greatly wronged, their 
ability to come together, to be politically active cannot be undermined, as was seen 
when Mr. Zuma had his day in court. What is unfortunate however is that 
victimization, particularly through coercive measures seems to go ignored.  
 
“Rape is the model of abuse and is the logic of abuse” (Cousins and Adams, 1995: 95) 
There is nothing simple about rape. It is not a crime that is rational, or arises out of a 
sensible or reasonable process. The justice system and even ordinary people, potential 
victims themselves, insist on providing simple solutions, thereby undermining the 
experience of victims, and underestimating the context that breeds and allows this 
horror to continue to penetrate our society. McNay (1992) asserts that women’s 
bodies are sites of inferiority according to patriarchal standards and biological 
characteristics are infused with social characteristics. This may explain why it is so 
difficult for women to receive sympathy in cases of rape. Foucault maintains that a 
rehabilitation of the subject is crucial (Dumm, 1996). This may help in establishing a 
renewed political landscape. With this in mind, women’s re-invention within the area 
of rape could lead to a transformation of rape laws, particularly if this re-invention 
leads to political action.  
 
 
5.6 SOCIALLY ENDORSED ABUSE: THE REVELATION OF MISOGYNY 
 
Although fifteen years of democracy have indeed passed, with much being done in 
order to resolve the many challenges and dilemmas brought on by apartheid, one 
particular enigma that continues to remain unsolved is that of women. Stratton (1996: 
25) claims that “[t]he expression of male power lies in the penis, and no man’s penis 
is ever as big as the mythic phallus of the state”. I have suggested throughout this 
dissertation that rape laws, rather than protect victims, have actually confirmed 
women’s marginalized position. Martin (1982: 10) too suggests that even sex has 
been used to structure and regulate desire “toward socially and politically oppressive 
ends”, and reveals the prohibitive and complex nature of the power that Foucault 





women’s position in society as fully fledged citizens, but also how to ensure that this 
status is never undermined. 
 
In the judge’s statement in the Zuma rape trial references are made to party politics. 
This might be seen as evidence of a lack of focus on the matter at hand. Instead of 
attempting to establish whether rape had occurred or not, the judge allowed himself to 
become swayed by political discourse first with the introduction of Mam Samkele and 
Mam Jane, who were said to be pro-Zuma and anti-Mbeki (Judgment of Judge WJ 
van der Merwe, 2006). The judge (Judgment of Judge WJ van der Merwe, 2006) 
states that:  
 
The complainant testified that these two ladies spoke to her about safety after having laid the charge as 
well as the detrimental effect it would have on the ANC.  
 
From this, the judge deduced that these women were pro-Zuma and anti-Mbeki. 
However, from what authority he was able to make such a deduction is unclear, not to 
mention the inappropriateness of that being mentioned within this matter.  
 
It is also thought fit to ask whether the complainant “realized” that her accusation of 
rape “would be popular with the anti-Zuma camp at a political level”. It could be 
suggested that there was an eagerness to steer the case towards a political conspiracy 
which was introduced by the defense. This was certainly indulged by the judge, 
eventually making its way to the public through the media and further increasing the 
aggression towards the victim (Judgment of Judge WJ van der Merwe, 2006: 5, 14). 
Sadly the judge did not think to ask, how the case would affect the victim, considering 
Zuma’s mass political support within the ANC. 
  
It is critical that an assessment of South African society be made, in order to see 
whether the citizenry is beginning to re-define themselves, particularly in relation to 
culture and tradition. According to Combrink (2008: 262) the rape trial involving 
Jacob Zuma “…exposed all the faultlines of South African society, including 
stereotypes, rape myths, HIV/AIDS (un)awareness and contested cultural practices”. 
Foucault suggests in his assessment of power, that power is something that is not 





the many strides already made in the evolution of rape laws. A greater level of critical 
consciousness is needed in order to create these conditions, a kind of awakening that 
will ensure that women are no longer contained by traditions that negate and 
undermine their position in society. Not only that, but a transition is necessary 
particularly in relation to traditions that subtly endorse the harm of women, either to 
instill fear or ensure control. In relation to sex particularly, Martin (1982: 10) writes 
that “[s]exual expression, far from having liberated women, has historically often led 
to increased male access to women’s bodies” where women become exploited. As 
much as the state has certainly made many promises on paper in recognition of the 
equal citizenship of its entire population, the country still unfortunately remains an 
unsafe space for women. Hassim (1999: 6) notes that:  
 
In South Africa, struggles for democracy carried the expectation that political change would facilitate 
the eradication of social and economic inequalities, including those of gender.  
 
The occurrence of rape is becoming normalized, so much so that reaction to incidents 
seems to no longer spark debate, or a call for more severe punitive measures. Rape is 
not only a problem related to women, it is a problem related to society, a sign of the 
sickness that permeates in that society. There is clearly no safe haven for women, 
even publicly where law officials are present or most visible, or privately where any 
form of abuse is that much harder to detect. It is unfortunate that when rape victims 
look to the law for solutions and safety, this tends to lead to a sense of 
disempowerment and abandonment (Combrink, 2008). Exposing such weaknesses in 
the legal system, means opening the possibility for change through resistance. Pickett 
(1996: 460) shows that: 
 
[S]hared experiences of subjugation then can find expression in collective action. It is one way of 
acting in solidarity, not in the name of an ideology or theory, but rather as a revolt against shared 
‘intolerable’. 
 
It has already been stated that rape is a crime not blamed on predators, but on victims. 
The light sentences received as punishment, goes further in making light of women’s 
trauma. Many would describe South Africa as a stable society, yet statistics show that 






Card (1996: 6) in her article Rape as a Weapon of War compares instances of rape in 
war by soldiers to civilian rape and finds that there are continuities with patterns. Both 
attempt to control the victim. She suggests that:  
 
It breaks the spirit, humiliates, tames, produces a docile, deferential, obedient soul. Its immediate 
message to women and girls is that we will have in our bodies only the control that we are granted by 
men. 
 
Unfortunately, unless someone displays clearly that they have a habit for rape, 
perhaps suggesting a mental condition or social disorder, only then is a rapist’s 
actions taken seriously. Soothill, Walby and Bagguley (1990: 212) clarify that: 
 
Rather than seeing rape as a rare act of a mentally deranged man, feminist analysis has demonstrated 
the connections between aggressive sexual behaviour and wider patterns of typical masculinity. 
 
On the other hand, male citizens, who come across as normal and seem to not be 
linked to criminal activity, are given the benefit of the doubt at the expense of women 
who feel terrorized. This does not take heed of the very exploitive, fickle and 
manipulative nature of many attackers who cleverly lure victims. Roberts (1994: 3) 
makes an interesting statement when she declares that:  
 
[F]eminists examining criminal law should be concerned with uncovering the ways that the criminal 
law contributes to women’s deprivation by continuing to reflect and protect patriarchal interests.  
 
Women’s significance and value seems to be based on their purity and chastity, so 
much so that locally there have even been attempts to revive virginity testing, causing 
much uproar among human rights and feminist activists. The misogynist nature of 
rape laws is based on the assumption that women are untrustworthy, “sexually 
duplicitous and deceitful” (Shwikkard, 2008: 72), which result in practices such as the 
use of sexual history, which lead to the underreporting of rape cases. 
 
Rape victims are strangely compared to lesbians, prostitutes, and female criminals all 
of whom are considered to be debased characters, as they do not fit the patriarchal 
stereotype, for the “maternalization of the female identity” is no longer intact (Franke, 





case of rape and many other gendered experiences which have either led to their way 
of life or affect them due to their way of life. Hassim (1997: 7) points out the manner 
in which societies tend to exclude some and not others, by writing that: 
 
While citizenship can be understood theoretically as conferring equality in the public sphere on all 
adult members of society, in practice it can be (and has been) used to create insiders and outsiders 
within the political system. 
 
How far the state goes to intervene and protect females is primarily dependent on an 
assessment or evaluation of their moral character. It could be said that to a certain 
extent women are regarded as the property of the state, which justifies their rigid 
assessment. Foucault refers to the manner in which we are never outside power, but 
constantly “implicated” within power (Martin, 1998). As much as the state may 
control the outcomes of rape cases, we may personally choose how to participate in 
those decisions, by first rejecting certain practices of power, particularly the kind of 
power that seems to work against women. The all-powerful façade of the state should 
not distract us from changes that individuals or civil society as a collective can make. 
Therefore, an evaluation of rape laws, with the intention to root out biased perceptions 
of victims due to their history is possible. If we immerse ourselves far enough into 
history we find that the idea of women as property, barbaric as it might seem, is not 
far-fetched at all. There are those who might even consider the payment of a dowry as 
the purchase of a bride, a right to assume ownership. Motsei (2007: 24) insists that: 
 
Running through the commercialized and misogynist depiction of women is the message that they are a 
man’s property. As a result, sex becomes a commodity that men consume rather than something that 
women and men share together. 
 
A woman’s virginity before marriage or as she enters a marriage ensures her 
protection, if she is defiled the perpetrator is punished not in defense of the woman’s 
rights, but in acknowledgement of the injury to her owner (Brownmiller, 1975). As 
these traditional perceptions decrease, become less enforced, as women seek 
autonomy and protection on their own terms and appeal to the law to consider them as 
citizens like any other man and not as the ward of a father, husband or the state. An 
interest in the well-being of women, particularly in relation to rape seems to have 





point a suspicious finger at the female victim and worry about her motivations and 
‘good fame’”.  
 
Barry (1981) cites the patriarchal family as the location where women’s victimization 
becomes “preconditioned” and Brownmiller (1975: 309) goes even further to say that 
“[w]omen are trained to be rape victims”. Whilst still children, women are the ward of 
their parents or guardians, where their main domain is mainly the home. This changes 
after adolescence as women’s interaction begins to extend beyond the private into the 
public, where she proves her worth and is then rewarded with the ultimate prize, a 
husband. Bassadien and Hochfeld (2005: 9) note that historically: 
 
Culture is an effective tool for affirming and maintaining male authority, across all races and ethnic 
groups in South Africa (Ramphele and Boonzaier, 1988), and strongly permeates social discourses on 
domestic violence in ways that are harmful to women. 
 
In cases where minors are raped, it is my belief that punishment for attackers is severe 
because of an interest in the preservation of innocence, innocence which has little to 
do with a desire to protect a child from violence, but more to do with keeping a 
child’s virginity intact. Therefore, in the case of adult women who are raped, they are 
punished for perhaps being irresponsible, for not protecting what is considered an 
important asset. For those who were already previously sexually active, judgment is 
even worse. History reveals that women have literally been punished together with 
perpetrators for rape, in some cases by being drowned, or even by being stoned to 
death (Brownmiller, 1975)).  
 
During the rape trial the lack of support for the alleged victim was most worrying, as 
it seemed many silently endorsed the manner in which the trial was handled. The 
political turn the case took, detracted the public from the fact that a woman’s rights, a 
citizen of the state may have been grossly violated, and that this was a crime that 
infests our society and could actually happen to anyone, without the slightest 
provocation.  
 
The media had in fact tried the victim, not only did they publicly and explicitly 





as far as this case went, but they also linked her to a possible political conspiracy, the 
evidence of which was never found. According to Armstrong (1994: 35):  
 
Rape is often reported in a way which sensationalizes the sexual aspect, while playing down the fact 
that, in essence, rape is a form of violence used by men to assert their authority and power over 
women’s bodies and minds.  
 
Herman and Chomsky (1985: 35) further substantiate the view that the media is 
extremely instrumental in forming the public’s perception of “worthy” and “unworthy 
victims” by noting that: 
 
Our hypothesis is that worthy victims will be featured prominently and dramatically, that they will be 
humanized, and that their victimization will receive the detail and context in story construction that will 
generate reader interest and sympathetic emotion. In contrast, unworthy victims will merit only slight 
detail, minimal humanization, and little context that will excite and enrage. 
 
In this case the alleged victim was further portrayed as unstable, delusional, 
manipulative and an opportunistic liar. Hardly any sympathy was relayed to her, 
particularly from the public institutions that claim to represent ordinary citizens and 
are or at least should be instrumental in ensuring the protection and safety of citizens.  
 
As was made clear through the mass support Zuma received from female supporters, 
women still sadly continue to perpetuate the stereotypes but also the misogynist 
perceptions that the patriarchal brethren enforce. During the trial it was the women 
who were at the forefront, hurling abuse at the alleged victim. Whether positive or 
negative, this incident confirms Foucault’s belief that no individual is docile, no 
matter how he or she may choose to participate in power. As much as we may choose 
to subscribe to certain kind of discourses, we too have the power to re-write discourse 
(Fox, 1998). It is clear that women certainly have the capacity to protest when they 
believe in a cause, but it is disheartening that this cause could not be an effort to save 
one of their own, but rather to protect patriarchal interests. In relation to this, Bartky 
(1988: 76) interestingly reveals that: 
 
The lack of formal public sanction does not mean that a woman who is unable or unwilling to submit 





severe sanction indeed in a world dominated by men: the refusal of male patronage. For the 
heterosexual woman, this may mean the loss of a badly needed intimacy; for both heterosexual women 
and lesbians, it may well mean, the refusal of a decent livelihood. 
 
Implications were made that suggested that the alleged victim should have felt 
flattered, rather than insulted that the accused had paid her any attention. The placards 
that read “Zuma Rape Me”, proved that these women did not understand the trauma 
and shame associated with rape, or that healing from such an ordeal could take a life 
time. 
  
There seems to be a double standard here, as ordinarily, women are expected to be 
silent, modest and withdrawn. Yet in this scenario and in defense of their male kin, 
those traditions no longer mattered, and their abhorrent diction was justified. Women 
continue to place a lower value on their lives, while giving greater significance to men 
as they continue to see their fate as being bound to the well-being of male folk.  
 
Should someone show that they have a taste for rape, or that there is proof that they 
are a serial rapist, or are at least unstable, only then is a man required to take 
responsibility for his actions. The rest of the time, it is a woman that carries that 
burden, for every excuse or reason is found to blame her for her predicament. Unless 
a woman can prove that she was a virgin before the alleged attack then she is mostly 
likely doomed, particularly if she were thought to have “undesirable conduct” (Pithey, 
2008: 107).  
 
Zuma’s proposal for lobola negotiations could be mistaken as somewhat of a bribe. 
After all he was fully aware that the alleged victim was strained financially as she 
sought assistance from him so that she could study. I thus propose that he attempted to 
take advantage of her position. Being Zuma’s wife would certainly have afforded the 
alleged victim with access to a vast number of resources including social status and 
economic stability. To some degree marrying him may have even excused her in the 
eyes of his supporters for the claims that she made and perhaps even restored the 






I feel it pertinent to ask whether this was an attempt by Zuma to buy the silence and 
loyalty of the woman he allegedly raped. Women continue to be bound by financial 
constraints, and compared to men, women’s lives continue to not be as economically 
sound. Although not always the case, the acceptance of lobola does at times come 
with obligations that involve an acceptance of abuse and violence. For some, the 
acquisition of a bride is almost like the acquisition of a commodity, thus having the 
right to do with “it” as one wishes.  
 
The references made to culture in this case, more specifically the accused’s perception 
of events on the night in question is most troubling. Zuma claims that he was obliged 
to have sex with his accuser, as she was sexually ready. How he was able to come to 
this conclusion is not clear. However, it does suggest and may send the message to 
many men that they have the power to decide when a woman is ready for sex, rather 
than acquiring an affirmative confirmation of interest.  
 
To use culture as a justification, for action that is damaging and dangerous to women 
is nothing new, and statements such as those made by such an important figure do not 
make the struggle for the transition of women’s lives any easier. Making use of 
feminist discourse Martin (1988), suggests that feminism is a useful tool in exposing 
the manner in which “phallocentric meanings” have monopolized culture, to the 
extent that it represses the possibility of difference which directly hinders the 
development of women. Speaking on Foucault, Kendall and Wickham (1999: 50) 
write that: 
 
[F]orces have a capacity for resistance, each force having the power to affect and be affected by other 
forces…For Foucault, resistance to power is part of the exercise of power (part of how it works).   
 
As Zuma is known to be an advocate of Zulu culture and tradition, from his testimony 
in court given in Zulu and his tradition being the reasoning behind his actions that 
night, whatever his practices were, I am of the opinion that he had no right to assume 
they were hers. If we are to take the accused’s claims seriously, we must first consider 
the fact that they were undoubtedly of different generations and very likely to have 
different perspectives on many subjects, including intimacy, which I believe should 





Already we live in a society, in which cultures tend to prohibit women from being 
innovative and independent, setting a precedent where sexual encounters are based on 
what men assume. Berns (2001: 265) claims that “[t]he first major strategy of the 
patriarchal-resistance discourse is to frame the problem as ‘human-violence’”. 
 
De-gendering the problem, and reducing rape to a random instance of violence, right 
along with car-jacking seems to be the order of the day. Unfortunately, this has had 
dangerous consequences for women, as “this perspective undermines the role of 
gender and power in abusive relationships” (Berns, 2001: 265). The female body, as a 
social and political text consists of tales that flow with woe and suppression as well as 
a history that insists that women are less than, or “other”.  
 
Yuval-Davis (1997: 11) describes cultures as being “highly heterogeneous resources 
which are used selectively and often in contradictory ways” and for the most part in 
ways that justify the suppression of women. Cousins and Adams (1995) provide one 
simple solution, that the “connection between sex and domination” be broken but 
unfortunately the inclusion of women in discussions related to justice still remains a 
foreign concept (Okin, 1987). As much as there needs to be a re-definition of 
femaleness and femininity, the same needs to be done of maleness and masculinity. It 
is hoped that the result will be a new masculinity “one that is less strongly defined in 
contrast to femininity and one that is less likely to require aggression… ” (Whaley, 
2001: 534, Smith, 2000).  
 
It is unfortunate, however, that in South Africa, discourse on women’s rights 
continues to be shunned by those claiming to be traditional purists, that make 
reference to corrupting influences, particularly from Western societies (Howard, 
1982). Therefore, further understanding the “subjugated positions” of women and 
finding strategies to resist and counter the patriarchal infantry is certainly imperative 
(Przybylowicz, Hartsock, McCallum, 1989). The never ending negotiation between 
democracy and culture, both of which seem to stand on opposites sides of the fence 






Within a paradigm that automatically grants women-people full status and bodily integrity as citizens 
protected by the constitution, there is no doubt that the assault against women violates her rights, and 
the only argument becomes one with the state. 
 
The lack of progress, even when it is clear that human rights are at stake, particularly 
in the case of women, serves as confirmation of South Africa’s wavering agenda in 
relation to women. It is evident, as Foucault holds, that free speech although regarded 
as a right should be considered a practice. An oppositional discourse is necessary to 
challenge official and seemingly binding “truths” in order to articulate alternative 
truths (McNay, 1992). Much time is taken in order to ascertain women’s position in 
society, but not enough to understand this in relation to men. The manner in which 
societies have historically defined masculinity is indeed important in order to 
understand the reluctance to a restructuring of culture that would establish women as 
full citizens. As much as traditional definitions of masculinity may include 
“independence” they also include “aggression” (Thompson, 2001: 631).  
 
The design of society that deliberately places women in vulnerable circumstances, and 
the determination to define masculinity as the complete opposite to all that is 
represented by women, has had some dangerous socializing consequences, for there is 
always the possibility that the indoctrination of ideas can go horribly wrong, 
especially when these ideas are extreme in nature. To “[t]otalize and universalize 
Otherness”, which Foucault is strongly against, (but in this dissertation, specifically 
for the case of women’s needs), has meant that they have been manipulated into 
believing that they are outside the realm of power (Martin, 1988) which they are not 
only entitled to, but which can affect their lives in positive and empowering ways. 
The continued violence against women proves this as well as the lack of a more 
















The advent of democracy was meant to bring revolutionary transformation, a country 
that would no longer make room for discrimination, based on class, race or gender. 
Assessing the many changes that have occurred, indeed there is much to applaud, but 
at the same time there still remain reasons to be wary. Making use of qualitative 
methods, I was able to describe and interpret the phenomenon that is rape, its effects, 
as well as consequences. It was my hope to humanize and make relatable the plight of 
victims of rape, whilst also revealing the very serious legal implications of rape laws.  
  
Foucault’s theory of resistance, reveal the possibilities that could exist in what seems 
like a hopeless situation. “[T]he legal world is a source of considerable political and 
social power…However, it is not the only source of power; it is but one node in a 
complex matrix of relationships and institutions” (Cahill, 2000: 57). He does not 
necessarily suggest that resistance requires any real degree of fearlessness; however 
he makes a call to the citizen body to not underestimate their power to create positive 
social change against a seemingly all-powerful force.  
 
Compared to the power that individuals or ordinary citizens may hold, state power 
certainly may seem impenetrable. However, we need to consider that the state may 
rely on this very thinking in order to avoid being accountable for action that may not 
necessarily or positively benefit citizens. For Foucault, “all social formations produce 
both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic subject positions” (Heller, 1996). The effort 
to re-invent women’s position in society and to revolutionize rape laws so that they 
work for and not against victims has been long and yet the marginalization that 
women experience in their daily lives is still reflected in the law’s approach to 
incidents of violence against women. 
 
Much has been written in relation to the inequality between the sexes, within the 
family, the workplace and various other institutions, that for a long time have been 
sites of oppression and indignity for women. The struggle to find some middle ground 





keen to stick perseveringly to practices that suppress women is clear. Having tackled 
the subject of rape in South Africa, it is my belief that this struggle is visible within 
the justice system. As articulated by Motsei (2007: 28): 
 
The tendency to exploit tradition for a particular purpose is commonplace in modern society. Its 
success rests on an appeal to ‘go back to our roots’, which for men who were dehumanised by 
oppressive regimes seems to be the only way to resist further dehumanisation by feminism, which they 
believe has foreign origins.  
 
In the wake of this rape trial, it was as though one were watching a cultural revival, 
brought on by a cultural hero, in the figure of Mr. Zuma. The words “tradition” and 
“culture” were thrown around ever so often, and descriptions of the kinds of 
behaviour expected from women and men. Clearly the conduct of the alleged victim 
was met with much disapproval, particularly by Mr. Zuma’s supporters. It is my belief 
that this had very little to do with what she wore, or how little she wore, but simply 
because she was not silent, about what she regarded as rape. The supporters evidently 
had certain beliefs about women, as well as their position and place in society.  
 
I insist that Mr. Zuma signified a mighty phallic figure that took centre stage and 
teased out patriarchal sentiment from the masses reminding them of their roots as 
though their very culture and identity were under attack. The complainant had not 
only insulted an elder, but their culture, a culture that believes in the burden of silence 
for women. Instead she was defiant, a lesbian, sexually experienced and HIV positive, 
everything that a conservative society loathes, fears and finds corrupting, the perfect 
example of everything a woman should not be.  
 
If the alleged victim was indeed raped by Mr. Zuma, did she truly have a chance of 
attaining justice? I find it difficult to imagine, that among the overwhelming 
intolerance and stigma that permeates this country in the form of racism, xenophobia, 
sexism to name but a few, that any sympathy could have truly been extended towards 
the complainant.  
 
As mentioned before, it is not my intention to challenge the verdict read by Judge van 





beneath conversations about equality based on gender, sexuality and disease and how 
this prejudice showed its ugly head, was untameable and exposed long before the 
verdict was read. This dissertation has prompted me to ask, where women truly stand 
in the eyes of the law: whether women are regarded as citizens deserving of the right 
to bodily integrity, and if they can seek justice when this right is violated remains 
debatable.  
 
If the court had a real interest in protecting possible victims, would there have been 
any need for the alleged victim to take flight? Understanding the implications of the 
case, should the judge have allowed the case to become a public spectacle, and did the 
publicity the alleged victim received not contribute to her eventually becoming an 
asylum seeker? As one considers these questions, I feel it is important to note that the 
complainant was not a public servant, simply an ordinary citizen, and therefore unlike 
Mr. Zuma, was not accountable to the public, yet the judge granted permission to 
have the most intimate, painful details of her life publicized. 
 
 I take issue with several utterances by the judge, his understanding of lesbianism for 
one is debatable, as well as his indulgence of any mention of a political conspiracy. 
What I find most troubling, was the fact that the only vulnerability on the part of the 
complainant that the judge considered was when he came to the conclusion that the 
alleged victim might perceive all sexual encounters as “threatening” due to the 
possibility of mental instability, a result of past trauma. The fact that she was HIV 
positive, and may have been re-infected did not matter, nor did the evidence of a tear, 
which suggested that she may not have had penetrative sex in a long time. The tear 
also suggests that she may have been penetrated by someone who had not allowed her 
to be sufficiently lubricated, implying force and that she may actually have been 
raped.  
 
Addressing the plight of women, by re-organizing the manner in which women are 
defined as a form of defiance as Foucault suggests, ensuring that transgressions or 






The possibility of resistance is an effect of the processes whereby particular discourses become the 
instruments and effects of power…in order to have a social effect, a discourse must at least be in 
circulation.  
 
Accommodating an understanding of gender-based violence in language, that 
perceives it as a serious violation, that is physically, mentally and emotionally 
detrimental to any human being must finally be infused into society and recognized 
particularly by the law. There can be no choice in the matter, as human rights should 
never be compromised or negotiated, but simply exist. Thus, an environment in which 
women will finally feel at ease and most of all secure and protected may come into 
being. As stated previously, this case offered many complexities, and intricate details 
that are significant in understanding not only the status of women in society, but also, 
the different routes that women are forced into due to their status.  
 
Making use of Judge WJ van der Merwe’s judgment, it was my hope to expose 
weaknesses in the judicial system’s perception of rape victims and that there remains 
a limited comprehension of the various scenarios that can result in and lead to rape. 
According to Soothill, Walby and Bagguley (1990: 211): 
 
[T]here is no doubt that judges continue to be confronted with shifts, both of attitude and actual change 
in the consideration of rape, which have been informed from a feminist perspective.  
 
HIV/AIDS, rape, slavery, polygamy, genital mutilation, are all violent acts and they 
all result from the same notions and attitudes that continue to place women 
particularly, in great danger. With those unprepared to liberate themselves from a 
rigid, sexist and chauvinistic existence, the alleged victim’s acceptance of herself and 
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IN THE MATTER BETWEEN 
THE STATEVERSUS JACOB GEDLEYIHLEKISA ZUMA 
GENERAL COMMENTS 
Before starting with this judgment I want to make a few general comments. 
 
This matter was not originally allocated to me. Three judges were for different 
reasons not available to hear the matter and it therefore became my responsibility as 
the next most senior available judge. I want to express my appreciation to the two 
legal teams, the media in general as well as the public in court for the courtesy shown 
to me.It must have been clear from the beginning that I would not allow myself to be 
influenced or distracted by anything or anybody. A judicial approach cannot be 
anything else than impartial, objective, fair and totally dedicated to the task lying 
ahead.  
 
Whatever my conclusion at the end of this judgment may be, the outcome will not 
satisfy everybody. At no stage whatsoever did I intend satisfying anybody and I will 
certainly not do it now. As will be seen later herein criticism was at certain stages 
levelled at certain rulings I had made. I hope it will be seen from the reasons that are 
to follow that the criticism was unfounded. I hope that all concerned will carefully 
listen to the reasons for my rulings and findings and I sincerely hope that they 
understand the reasons. 
 
This trial created an unknown interest among the public at large and received 
enormous media coverage, printed as well as electronic. It was difficult not to see and 
hear some of the comments in spite of the fact that I try not to read, look or listen to 
news concerning a matter I am busy with in court. Some matters unfortunately did not 
escape my attention.  
 
Different groups of people and organisations apparently tried to gain some mileage 
out of this trial. For example had I to deal with the application by three organisations 
who asked to be allowed as amici curiae in this matter. The organizations were 
represented by highly respected legal representatives and I therefore accept without 
hesitation that the application was genuine and serious and without any ulterior 
motive. The application was, however, doomed from the beginning and unnecessarily 
side-tracked everyone's attention at a time when it was not needed. The organisations, 
however, succeeded in informing the entire world of their existence and what they 






Pressure groups, non-governmental organisations, governmental organisations, 
politicians and in some instances some of the media, breached the sub judice rule. I 
have no problem with fair comment and the media's duty to keep the public informed 
of important matters, especially the case we are dealing with at present. The decision 
of Duduzile Ncobo to testify is an example of the benefits of reporting by the media. 
What, however, is disconcerting, is the fact that some pressure groups, organisations 
and individuals found the accused guilty and others found him not guilty in their 
comments on the case, without knowing what the evidence is and long before all the 
evidence was presented. 
 
The pressure on a court in a matter like the present is big enough. It is notacceptable 
that a court be bombarded with political, personal or group agendas and comments. 
As one contributor to a daily newspaper very correctly put the matter in the following 
perspective: "This trial is more about sexual politics and gender relations than it is 
about rape." Wise words indeed but what a pity that it had to be said.  
 
Radio and television approached me with a request that the judgment be broadcasted 
live. I discussed the request with a number of my colleagues. In spite of my 
repugnance against any form of publicity I had to realise and accept that times have 
changed. I hope that this live broadcast (which will unfortunately take long) will serve 
as an educational tool. I hope that the public will now realise what enormous effort 
goes into a trial like this and with what objectivity and dedication it is approached. 
Not all the evidence tendered can be repeated and discussed in a judgment like this. 
 
Because of the length of this judgment I will in respect of certain witnesses not read 
for example the entire summary of the cross-examination. Where reference is made to 
case law I will also read the most important part only. The judgment as a whole will 
be made available. Everything will be contained therein. 
 
JUDGMENT 
VAN DER MERWE, J 
 
Mr Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma (hereinafter called "the accused"), a 64 year old male, 
stands accused of the crime of rape as read with the provisions of section 51 of Act 51 
of 1977 ("the Act") in that he allegedly upon or about 2 November 2005 and at or 
near Epping Street, Forest Town, Johannesburg intentionally assaulted Ms K, a lady 
whose name I do not want to disclose and to whom I will hereinafter refer to as "the 
complainant" and had sexual intercourse with her without her consent. The accused is 
represented in this trial by Advocates K J Kemp SC, J Brauns SC and T Mbongwa. 
The state is represented by Advocates C de Beer, H J Broodryk SC and W Ngabela.  
 
The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. A statement in terms of section 115 of 
the Act was read into the record and handed in as exhibit "A". For what is to follow 
and for purposes of clarity I quote the contents of this statement in full. It reads as 
follows: 
 





JACOB GEDLEYIHLEKISA ZUMA the accused herein, plead not guilty to the 
charges as put to me by the Director of Public Prosecutions. In amplification of such 
plea I give the following explanation: 
 
1. The complainant visited my home at Forest Town, Johannesburg on 2 November 
2005 and stayed over for the night. This was of her own volition. 
 
2. Late on that evening of November 2005 we had had sexual intercourse which lasted 
for some time. This was consensual. At no stage did the complainant say no to any of 
the actions we performed. 
 
3. At no stage did I believe that the sexual intercourse was against the will of the 
complainant. She was at all times at liberty to say so and voice her disapproval. 
 
4. My daughter, Duduzile, who is in her mid-twenties, was in the house and a 
policeman was on the premises outside at all relevant times of the incident. 
 
5. The complainant had a cellular telephone with her and could leave the premises at 
any time. 
 
6. Enquiries have revealed that the complainant has made similar false allegations of 
rape against a number of persons, some of which have been alluded to in a statement 
of a witness provided by the prosecution." 
 
As can be seen from paragraph 6 of exhibit "A", reference is made therein to previous 
sexual intercourse or experience by the complainant. That formed a basis for an 
application which was later brought on behalf of the accused in terms of section 227 
of the Act. I will at the appropriate time deal with that application.  
 
After exhibit "A" was handed in the state applied in terms of section 153(2)(a) and 
section 153(3)(a) of the Act that the complainant testify behind closed doors but that 
the court authorises the presence of certain named persons while she is giving her 
evidence. The state further applied for an order in terms of section 153(2)(b) of the 
Act that the complainant's identity not be revealed for the duration of the trial. There 
is now an application by the state to further protect the complainant's identity. That is 
why I did not mention her name earlier. The defence team agreed to the terms of the 
suggested order of court. A draft order was then made an order of court (exhibit "B"). 
The complainant was thereafter called by the state as its first witness.  
 
The evidence, including cross-examination, of the complainant lasted for a number of 
days. As is the case with all other witnesses, the evidence of the complainant will not 
be summarised in minute detail. As the trial developed it became clear what the 
relevant issues were. I will therefore concentrate on the essential aspects of the 
complainant's evidence only. 
 
The complainant is a 31 year old female, unmarried and with no biological children. 





even more involved and interested than before in educating people in respect of HIV 
and other health issues.  
 
The accused is well-known to the complainant. She met him in Swaziland where she 
was in exile with her parents. She was aware of the accused's existence from about the 
age of 5 years. She remembers him from these early days as a "very friendly uncle" 
who used to play with the children in exile and talk to them. It is common cause that 
the accused and the complainant's late father were good friends. They were together 
in the ANC as youth members and they were both sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment at Robben Island. Her father, JK, died in a motor collision on 1 May 
1985 in Zimbabwe. After the complainant's father's death the accused kept in contact 
with the K family. The complainant was devastated by the death of her father and is 
now, even twenty years thereafter, not quite over it. Because the accused and her late 
father were such good friends and comrades she felt close to the accused. He was able 
to tell her stories about his and her father's youth. For that reason she liked being 
around him.  
 
In referring to the accused the complainant used the Zulu word "malume" which 
means "uncle". During her evidence it was clear that the complainant also referred t 
other older men as "malume" such as the present Minister Ronnie Kasrils and others. 
 
I will later deal in slight more detail with the contact the complainant had with the 
accused. 
According to her she came back to South Africa in December 1990. She phoned the 
accused "several times" around 1998. When she was employed in Pretoria in 2001 she 
talked to him over the phone and also visited him on a number of occasions. She saw 
the accused for the first time in person again in 2001 and then told him that she was 
HIV positive. She told him that because, according to her, she regarded him as a 
father and she thought that it was an important part of her life that he should know 
about. As a "father" he was also "a big source of support" to her.  
 
In 2002 the complainant had contact with the accused until June 2002 when she left 
for the United Kingdom and returned in 0ctober 2003. In that period she had no 
contact with the accused at all. 
 
Back in South Africa the complainant phoned the accused twice during the period 
October 2003 to May 2004. In May 2004 she was employed in Pretoria and had more 
frequent contact with the accused.  
 
The complainant was interested in homeopathic medicine and made application to be 
accepted at a homeopathic college in Australia. When she was accepted there she 
asked for financial assistance. Because of the short period before the complainant had 
to start in February 2005 the accused could not arrange funding. According to the 
complainant the accused was also not very keen on her going to Australia because, 
according to him, it was too far away and she would also not have the necessary 
support there. She then told the accused that she had applied to a similar college in the 
United Kingdom. His reaction was that as soon as she was accepted there she should 







In June 2005 the accused was released of his duties as the Deputy President of the 
Republic of South Africa. She thereafter sent him several messages of support telling 
him that she supported him and, she added, "I love you very much malume". Her 
reason for doing that was that as his "daughter" it was important for him to know that 
she was on his side and that she was supporting him. According to the complainant 
she and a person whom she calls her sister, Kimi, as well as other children from exile 
and the accused's own children, invited him to his house for a lunch to show their 
support.  
 
The complainant started working in Johannesburg in July 2005 and, according to her, 
she then contacted the accused more frequently.  
At the end of July 2005 the complainant was accepted as a student in the homeopathic 
college in the United Kingdom. She called the accused and he tried to find money to 
pay for her tuition. The last day for paying the tuition fees was 9 September 2005. 
Money was not obtained.  
 
The complainant visited the accused at his Johannesburg residence situated at 8 
Epping Road, Forest Town, Johannesburg, at the beginning of August 2005. The 
accused welcomed the complainant and gave her a hug. She spent the next few hours 
talking to the children in the house and other people who were waiting to see the 
accused.  
 
He told her that he had to see people and that as she was a child she was to be last on 
the list to be seen. That evening at about 22:00 he had the opportunity of seeing her 
when he was finished with all the other people. They spoke to each other in the 
accused's study. According to the complainant he wanted to know how she was and 
they also spoke about the progress with her scholarship and her social life in 
Johannesburg. According to her he had a sort of a question-mark on his face as if he 
wanted to tell her something else. The complainant then said to the accused "malume, 
you are not getting lobola anytime soon". A discussion then ensued about a boy friend 
and she informed him that she had none. On a question why not she said that the boys 
of nowadays are not man enough and that in any event all the good ones are taken 
already.  
 
The complainant elaborated on the question of lobola and she then again stated that 
although the accused is not from the K family she regarded him as her father and that 
there is nobody else who could be her father but him. If ever she would decide to get 
married he would be the person who would be in the forefront to negotiate the lobola.  
 
The complainant said that when she heard that no money was available for her 
education in the United Kingdom she was devastated and her so-called CD4 count 
dropped, indicating that her immune system had taken a turn for the worse. She 
informed her friends and those she love about this, which included the accused. She 
informed the accused that she wanted to take life easier and that she was longing to 
see her mother. He offered to pay for the airfare to go and see her mother. She 






The next visit to the accused's house was on 2 November 2005, the date on which she 
was allegedly raped by the accused. During the morning of 2 November 2005 the 
complainant received a message from Nokozola, to whom she refers as her daughter, 
in Swaziland. Nokozola is her sister's daughter. The message was to the effect that 
Nokozola's son had been bitten by a snake and was in hospital. The complainant was 
upset about the news and sent text messages to various people including the accused. 
According to the complainant she was in the habit of sending sms messages to 
whoever she could when she wanted to convey something.  
 
The complainant tried to contact the accused during the course of the day but could 
not reach him. Shortly before 17:00 and shortly before she was to leave for 
Swaziland, she once again phoned the accused and got hold of him. She then 
informed the accused that she was leaving for Swaziland. His reaction was that she 
was in too much of a hurry. He, according to her, invited her to his house where she 
arrived at approximately 18:00. As the complainant's mother was going to Swaziland 
the accused advised her that there was no need for her to go as well. 
 
When the complainant arrived at the accused's home she informed the police that he 
was a child of the house but not staying there. She was allowed to go to the main 
entrance where the accused opened the door for her. According to her he again 
greeted her as "his daughter". He had people waiting for him in the sitting room and 
he introduced her as the daughter of a close friend of his and then told her to go to the 
kitchen and that he would see her later. In the kitchen she found a young man not 
older than 18 years. Later a young lady arrived also wanting to see the accused. 
Duduzani, the accused's son, arrived and still later Duduzile, Duduzani's twin sister. 
Another female also arrived. Food was prepared in the kitchen by the complainant, 
Duduzile and the other female. When the visitors left they had their evening meal.  
 
For certain reasons Duduzile had to take the other young female to her place of 
residence and the accused, according to the complainant, then remarked that the 
complainant was staying over. Duduzile and the other girl left and the accused and the 
complainant remained alone in the lounge. According to the complainant the accused 
then emphasised that whenever she was feeling down or upset that she should not be 
by herself and that she should always come home, referring to his home where he will 
console her. According to the complainant the accused again raised the topic of a boy 
friend and she again told him that there were no good ones left. At some point the 
accused advised her that she would have to lower her standards and then in particular 
stated that because she is HIV positive it was important for her to have a companion.  
 
He then also added that because she is HIV positive it did not mean that she had no 
physical needs anymore. A telephone call interrupted the conversation and they 
thereafter started talking about herbs and other medication that could help with her 
HIV status.  
 
According to the complainant a lady later arrived with whom the accused had a 
discussion about alterations to clothes. The lady then left. Thereafter the accused told 
the complainant to prepare for bed. He said he was going to his study to do some 
work for about forty five minutes and that he would see her when he was finished. As 





prepare to sleep". She found it a bit strange. As it was about 21:20 and she normally 
goes to bed at 22:00 she decided to go to bed. After a short discussion the accused 
went with her to the guest room. The accused told her to make use of the double bed. 
The accused also said that when he had finished his work he would come to tuck her 
in. That, according to the complainant, did not mean anything at the time because she 
regarded him as her father who was merely telling her that he would tuck her in. She 
did not think there was anything wrong with it.  
 
The accused left the bedroom and the complainant closed the door. She took a 
shower, put on a kanga, made a few phone calls and sent a few messages. Shortly 
thereafter she heard a door open and some noises and she presumed that Duduzile had 
come back home. She went upstairs to Duduzile's room, knocked at the door and 
when Duduzile opened she found that she was already in her pyjamas. The 
complainant and Duduzile left the bedroom to go to the study to say goodnight to the 
accused. On their way thereto she asked for a book which was given to her by 
Duduzile. Thereafter the two of them went to the study and told the accused that they 
only came to say goodnight. The phone then rang and the accused indicated to the 
complainant to wait for a minute. Duduzile left and the complainant remained behind. 
When the phone call was finished the accused told the complainant that people would 
urgently come and see him. He then asked her at what time she would be leaving in 
the morning and then added "my daughter as I am finished with these people just 
come up to my room so that I can tuck you in". She then enquired what sort of tucking 
in that was. The accused only laughed and the complainant remarked that she had a 
book and that she was sure that after having read a paragraph or so she would be 
asleep. She said goodnight to the accused and informed him that she was going to 
sleep.  
 
At the time the complainant thought that the accused's remark was a bit odd but she 
took it as a joke and did not think anything of it. The complainant went back to the 
guest-room where she lay across the bed and sent messages with her cellphone and 
also made a call. She read a little bit and was feeling sleepy when the accused entered 
the bedroom. According to her he asked her "are you already asleep?" Her reply was 
that she was getting sleepy but that she was going to fall asleep soon. The accused 
then remarked "OK my daughter I am going to attend to my people. According to her 
he then left the room, she went under the bed covers and went to sleep. The light in 
the room was still on. 
 
At that stage of the trial a kanga similar to the one the complainant wore the night of 
the alleged rape was wrapped by the complainant around her body. The piece of 
clothe overlapped and was tucked in between her breasts. The complainant did not 
have any underwear on that night. The complainant fell asleep on her stomach facing 
away from the curtains. Sometime during the night she heard a voice from behind, ie 
from the side of the curtains. It was the accused speaking and he asked the 
complainant whether she was already asleep. She only mumbled in the affirmative. 
The light was still on. Her eyes were closed. At that stage the complainant curled up a 
bit and covered her head with the duvet. According to her she wanted to sleep and to 
be left alone. The accused said that he thought that he would come to tuck her in and 
to massage her. The complainant's reaction was to say "no" she was already asleep 





could even massage her whilst she is sleeping. The complainant again reacted by 
saying "no" she was already asleep.  
 
According to the complainant the accused then removed the duvet and whilst she was 
lying on her left side he started to massage her shoulders after which he held her on 
her shoulders and turned her around so that she was facing upwards. She then felt the 
accused's knees on both sides of her legs and the accused immediately started to 
massage her shoulders. While he was massaging her she again said no but the accused 
did not stop massaging her. At that stage she opened her eyes for the first time and 
saw that he was naked, she saw his naked body and his naked penis. She immediately 
thought that that could not be true, the accused being naked on top of her, in his own 
house. She said that she was confused and thought that it could not be happening to 
her. She immediately realised that he was about to rape her. She closed her eyes and 
turned her head sideways. At that stage the accused opened her kanga and with his 
right knee pushed her legs apart whilst he took both her hands and held it above her 
head. With his other hand he touched her vagina, opened it, moved with both his legs 
in between her legs and penetrated her whilst holding both her hands with both his 
hands.  
 
According to the complainant the accused spoke to her whilst he was having 
intercourse with her. He told her that he had told her that he would take care of her 
and he called her "sweetheart". He said to her that she was a "real girl" and at some 
point gave her a peck on the lips and a peck on the cheek as she was facing away from 
him. The accused started thrushing harder and harder and he then asked her whether 
he should ejaculate inside her. 
 
Once the accused was finished he got up and left. The complainant remained lying on 
the bed. She could not move. She found her kanga and tried to put it on top of her and 
covered herself with the duvet. The accused did not use a condom when he raped her. 
She could feel his semen coming out of her vagina.  
 
Sometime later that night the accused came back to her bedroom and asked her again 
whether she was already sleeping. The complainant did not respond. He also asked 
her whether she had money for transport the following morning and she abruptly 
confirmed that she had money. The accused also asked her to say goodbye to him on 
leaving the next morning. Thereafter the accused left her room.  
 
The complainant tried to fall asleep but she could not. At approximately 02:00 she 
called Swaziland and spoke to her daughter just to check how she was and how the 
child was. A text message was sent to Kimi and Hlabe. In that sms she apparently just 
said that she was very uncomfortable as "Malume is starting to look at me sexually. 
There must be something in my drawers." By that she referred to her panties. She 
testified that she could not get herself to convey to her sisters what actually had 
happened. She was still trying to digest and to accept what had happened.  
 
The complainant did not scream or try to attract anybody's attention before or during 
the rape. She explained that by saying that she was shocked, in a total daze and could 





the evidence of Dr Merle Friedman who testified that it was very common for women 
to freeze under such circumstances. 
 
The complainant explained her failure to leave the house immediately after the 
incident on the basis that she was still trying to process what had happened. Another 
reason was that it was in the middle of the night in Johannesburg which was still a 
strange place to her. She also did not want to go back to her own place and to be all 
by herself.  
 
The complainant got up at about 05:10 or thereabout. She was still very confused 
about what had happened and was still in a daze. She had a bath, made a phone call 
from the landline in the house, took some food out of the refrigerator and left for work 
around 07:00.  
 
During the course of the morning the complainant was still trying to gather her 
thoughts and was trying to get some assistance. She had a "horrible discomfort in 
between her legs" and felt a sting in her vagina. Approximately 11:00 she came back 
to her office after having gone out for a while and she then broke down and started 
sobbing. 
 
Some time during the course of the morning a lady called aunt Pinkie (that is the 
witness Nosipho Mgudlwa) phoned the complainant and after some exchange of 
words the complainant said that "malume" raped her the previous night. 
 
Arrangements were then made for the complainant to see a doctor. Round about 20:00 
that evening the complainant was examined by Dr Likibi who also testified during the 
trial. That evening the complainant spent with Nomthandazo Msibi also known as 
Kimi. This lady also testified. The incident of rape was reported to the police on the 
Friday 4 November 2005 at approximately 14:00. The complainant testified about the 
dangers of a person who is HIV positive having unprotected sex. I need not deal with 
that aspect at this stage as Prof Martin testified as an expert. It is, however, clear that 
the complainant had enough information available to understand the dangers to 
herself if she had unprotected sex with another HIV positive person. She was also 
aware of the dangers to the other person with whom she had unprotected sex if that 
person was HIV negative.  
 
The complainant therefore reiterated that she would not have consented to intercourse 
without a condom. She also stated that the accused did not ask her for her consent 
before he had intercourse with her. The leading question was then put "Did you give 
him your consent or was there anything in your conduct which could have led the 
accused to believe that you gave him consent to have intercourse with you?" The 
answer was "No I did nothing to make him believe that, no."  
 
The complainant left for Swaziland on Friday 4 November 2005 and returned on 
Monday 7 November 2005. That evening she was contacted by two people whom she 
described as Mam Samkele and Mam Jane. She explained that Mam Samkele is like a 
mother to her since she was a child in Swaziland whilst Mam Jane is an "auntie" from 






The complainant testified that these two ladies spoke to her about her safety after 
having laid the charge as well as the detrimental effect it would have on the ANC. 
From what they told the complainant it appears as if they were pro-Zuma and anti-
Mbeki supporters. The discussion made the complainant feel very pressured.  
 
The complainant was placed in a witness protection program. She was contacted by 
newspapers to enquire about the rape charge and on advice of her minders she denied 
that anything had happened between herself and the accused and she also denied 
having laid a charge. The complainant's mother came to see the complainant on 
Monday 14 November 2005. The complainant's mother also testified and reference 
will be made to her evidence later. It is common cause that Dr Zwele Mkize arranged 
for the complainant's mother to come from Durban to Johannesburg. There was talk 
of compensation for the alleged rape with which I will deal later. The complainant 
decided to continue with the charge laid against the accused.  
 
The complainant testified about telephone calls she received from the accused trying 
to arrange a meeting between him, the complainant and her mother. She also testified 
about a meeting she had with an attorney who turned out to be Attorney Docrat. Her 
evidence regarding the meeting with the attorney was that although he initially 
seemed objective he later tried to persuade her to drop the charge against the accused.  
 
The complainant testified that the incident totally devastated and disrupted her whole 
life. She is in witness protection and separated from the people she desperately needs. 
She is also aware of certain allegations in newspapers which trouble her. She referred 
to a condition where her heartbeat goes low, she cannot move and saliva bubbles 
come out of her mouth. It is not an epileptic fit but she goes into a condition of shock 
and becomes emotionally upset. She calls it an attack. Her CD4 count is also not 
going higher and is an indication that her immune system is badly affected.  
 
At the end of the complainant's evidence in chief the state applied for leave to ask the 
complainant a question concerning the last time she has had sexual intercourse with a 
man prior to 2 November 2005. The state handed in written heads of argument with 
which I will later deal in more detail.  
 
The defence did not oppose the application. From the contents of paragraph 6 of 
exhibit "A", referred to above, it was clear that the defence would bring a similar 
application. The application was brought practically immediately after the state's 
application.  
 
Leave was granted to the state to ask the complainant the following question: 
 
"How long before this incident did you last have sexual intercourse?" 
 
The complainant answered that it was during July 2004. The relevance of this 
question and answer will later become clear. Before the cross-examination of the 
complainant started an application was brought by the defence in terms of section 227 
of the Act not only to cross-examine her on her past sexual history but also to lead 





absence of the press and the agreed fifteen family members and friends on each side. 
The complainant herself also left the court room. After having heard argument I gave 
a short judgment and granted an order granting leave to the defence to cross-examine 
the complainant about her past sexual history and to lead evidence in respect thereof. I 
stated that I would give reasons for the ruling at an appropriate time. Before giving 
the reasons a few general remarks need again be made.  
 
A disconcerting aspect in this trial is the fact that all and sundry were prepared to and 
apparently claimed the right to, comment on my decision in terms of section 227 of 
the Act even before they knew the bases on which and the reasons why leave was 
granted to cross-examine the complainant on her past sexual experience and to lead 
evidence concerning aspects of that past. People commented on the ruling without 
having been in court or knowing anything about the contents of the application or the 
provisions of section 227 of the Act. The application was supported by an affidavit by 
Mr Michael Andrew Thomas Hulley, Mr Zuma's attorney of record. When the ruling 
was made I specifically stated that for obvious reasons no reasons ought to be given. 
Over and above the reasons to be furnished for the ruling the evidence in this matter 
will also be discussed and the question will also then be answered as to whether the 
evidence dealing with the complainant's previous sexual experience is relevant and 
therefore admissible asevidence or not. 
 
Section 227(2) of the Act reads as follows: 
 
"(2) Evidence as to sexual intercourse by, or any sexual experience of any female 
against or in connection with whom any offence of a sexual nature is alleged to have 
been committed, shall not be adduced, and such female shall not be questioned 
regarding such sexual intercourse or sexual experience, except with the leave of the 
court, which leave shall not be granted unless the court is satisfied that such evidence 
or questioning is relevant:  
 
Provided that such evidence may be adduced and such female may be so questioned 
in respect of the offence which is being tried." 
 
Two things must be clear from the provisions of this subsection. Questions can be 
asked and evidence can be adduced regarding the complainant's sexual experience or 
sexual intercourse: 
 
1. only with the leave of the court; and 
2. if the court is satisfied that the questions or evidence are relevant. At the time when 
the application was brought I referred to what was said by SCHREINER JA in R v 
Matthews and Another 1960 1 SA 752 (A) at 758A-B: "Relevancy is based on a blend 
of logic and experience lying outside the law." 
 
In the law of evidence much time is usually spent on the question what evidence is 
relevant and admissible and what is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. See eg 
Zeffert, Paizes and Skeen The South African Law of Evidence p219-225; Schwikkard 
and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 2nd edition p45-55; Schmidt Bewysreg 4th 





What is clear though is that the question of relevancy can never be divorced from the 
facts of a particular matter before court. The state submitted in its heads of argument 
that the question it wanted to put to the complainant is relevant on the basis of what is 
contained in the report of the medical examination. That submission was correct as is 
borne out by the evidence.  
 
The bases for the application by the defence as set out in Hulley's affidavit and as 
amplified by Mr Kemp's submissions can be summarised as follows. (In what is to 
follow I will not refer to the allegations in Mr Hulley's affidavit and Mr Kemp's 
submissions individually where not necessary.)  
 
Mr Kemp argued that the complainant testified that she knew since April 1999 that 
she was HIV positive and that she would not willingly have unprotected sex and 
would not consent to such intercourse. The inference is therefore that the complainant 
would not have had intercourse with a male without a condom since 1999, and as in 
this case a condom was not used, the further inference therefore is that intercourse did 
not take place with the complainant's consent. Mr Kemp further argued that if the 
complainant is asked about it she will say that on each and every occasion she had had 
sex since 1999 a condom was used. The question posed by Mr Kemp was therefore: 
 
How can the credibility of the complainant on this aspect be properly tested without 
going into her sexual history since April 1999? It was therefore submitted that the 
evidence led by the state logically and naturally requires that the complainant be 
cross-examined on her sexual history at least between the period April 1999 and 
November 2005.  
 
A further reason advanced by Mr Kemp was the evidence led by the state itself about 
the complainant's sexual history by asking her (with the leave of the court) when last, 
prior to November 2005, she had had sexual  intercourse. That in itself, so it was 
argued, entitled the defence to ask questions about the complainant's sexual history at 
least between the period July 2004 and November 2005. 
 
Mr Kemp referred to a witness statement handed by the state to the defence in which 
reference is made (so I understood the argument) to an incident of rape where the 
complainant had fainted. Apparently the complainant had hinted to the witness that in 
casu the same had happened. This, it was submitted, made it necessary to investigate 
the particular incident referred to in the witness statement.  
 
Reference is apparently also made in the witness statement to two other incidents 
where the complainant was raped but the matters were not pursued. From a motive 
point of view, Mr Kemp argued, it was necessary to investigate the two incidents to 
find out why the present incident is hotly pursued but the two others were not. 
Reference was made to exhibit "E3", apparently part of a book the complainant 
intended writing. I do not want to deal with the contents thereof in detail at this stage. 
What is clear is that reference is made therein to a number of instances of rape. I was 
told that the defence intends leading evidence of a lady who sat as a member of a 
commission which investigated two of the incidents and who will say that the 






In respect of further allegations of rape made in exhibit "3", some of the men accused 
were traced who will say that the allegations are false. Mr Kemp therefore submitted 
that in order to put forward a proper defence, he need to obtain permission to cross-
examine the complainant about these incidents and to lead evidence about them. The 
state referred at length to the matter of S v M 2002(2) SACR 411 where the supreme 
court of appeal had the opportunity of considering section 227 of the Act. In that 
matter a court of appeal had granted leave to re-open the trial before a lower court in 
order to lead evidence concerning a complainant's previous sexual behaviour. The 
supreme court of appeal was critical of the court of appeal's order in that regard and 
referred to the common law position regarding evidence to attack a complainant's 
character. In paragraph [17](6) at p422c-g the following is said in this respect: 
 
"(6) The purpose of adducing the evidence of Ngema could only be to attack the 
credibility or character of the complainant. However, as Du Toit et al Commentary on 
the Criminal Procedure Act at 24-100A, note, 'conventional wisdom' in relation to the 
common law is that the accused may not lead evidence of the complainant's acts of 
misconduct with other men (see R v Adamstein 1937 CPD 331) unless those acts have 
a relevance to an issue other than by way of character, but such acts may be put to her 
in cross-examination, since they may be relevant to her credibility. It is true that such 
evidence will usually be irrelevant to the substantive issues confronting the court; but 
not always.' Faced with that statement of the common law, the court must necessarily 
have experienced difficulty in allowing the application to reopen to in order to call 
Ngema." 
 
After having referred to section 227(2) and (3) HEHER AJA (as he then was) 
continues as follows in paragraph [17](6) at p422h: 
 
"The members of this court are not aware of any instance where s 227(2) has been 
applied in this country. It seems likely that it is more honoured in the breach than in 
the observance. Since it requires of the courts that it be applied in the manner in 
which it was no doubt intended, namely to militate against offensive, hostile and 
irrelevant questioning of complainants without thereby diminishing a full and just 
investigation of the real issues in the case, it may be as well to make certain 
comments concerning the proper application of the section." 
 
The learned judge then refers to the position in Australia, England and Canada. It is 
worthwhile quoting at length what is stated at p422j-426a:  
 
"So-called 'rapeshield' legislation, as s 227(2) is, has been passed in many 
jurisdictions, inter alia the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand 
and the Australian States. Ligertwood Australian Evidence 3rd ed at 165 summarises 
what appears to be the common background to such enactments: 
 
'Cross-examination is normally permitted on grounds of relevance, either to the issues 
in the case, or to determining the witness's general creditworthiness. Courts have 
allowed cross-examination of a victim regarding past sexual history on both grounds. 
It is worth noting at the outset that, where the cross-examination is of relevance to the 
issues in the case, matters raised in cross-examination may be taken further by the 





part of the accused's case. On the other hand, matters of general creditworthiness are 
regarded as collateral matters which cannot be pursued beyond cross-examination. 
The witness's answer is final.  
 
The difficulty is in determining when sexual experiences are relevant, either to the 
issues or to the general creditworthiness of the victim. Controversy has arisen because 
(male) common law judges have allegedly been all too willing to allow the (female) 
victim's previous sexual character to be revealed, most often in cross-examination. In 
consequence, victims wanting to prosecute their assailants have had to be prepared to 
subject themselves to the ordeal, at both committal and trial, of a long and searching 
cross-examination on their sexual experiences and attitudes. Needless to say, the 
potential humiliation and embarrassment of this ordeal, whereby the victim is 
effectively also put on trial to defend her moral character, has discouraged victims 
from prosecuting their assailants. This controversy has led to legislative protection 
against gratuitous revelation of a victim's character.' 
 
Section 227(2) is in substantially the same terms as s 2(1) of the English Sexual 
0ffences (Amendment) Act 1976. In R v Viola [1982] 3 All ER 73 (CA) at 77 
Lord Lane CJ said of s 2: 
 
'Having said that, [that it is wrong to speak of the exercise of a discretion in the 
context] when one considers the purpose which lay behind the passing of the 1976 
Act, as expounded by Roskill LJ [in R v Mills (1979) 68 Cr App R 327], it is clear that 
it was aimed primarily at protecting complainants from cross-examination as to credit, 
from questions which went merely to credit and no more. The result is that generally 
speaking (I use these words advisedly, of course there will always be exceptions) if 
the proposed questions merely seek to establish that the complainant has had sexual 
experience with other men to whom she was not married, so as to suggest that for that 
reason she ought not to be believed under oath, the judge will exclude the evidence. In 
the present climate of opinion a jury is unlikely to be influenced by such 
considerations, nor should it be influenced. In other words questions of this sort going 
simply to credit will seldom be allowed. That is borne out by the cases to which we 
have been referred, not only those which I have cited, but other unreported cases 
which have been before this court, to which perhaps it is not necessary to make 
reference.  
 
On the other hand, if the questions are relevant to an issue in the trial in the light of 
the way the case is being run, for instance relevant to the issue of consent, as opposed 
merely to credit, they are likely to be admitted, because to exclude a relevant question 
on an issue in the trial as the trial is being run will usually mean that the jury are 
prevented from hearing something which, if they did hear it, might cause them to 
change their minds about the evidence given by the complainant. But, I repeat, we are 
very far from laying down any hard and fast rule.  
 
Inevitably in this situation, as in so many similar situations in the law, there is a grey 
area which exists between the two types of relevance, namely relevance to credit and 
relevance to an issue in the case. On one hand evidence of sexual promiscuity may be 
so strong or so closely contemporaneous in time to the event in issue as to come near 





Conversely, the relevance of the evidence to an issue in the case may be so slight as to 
lead the judge to the conclusion that he is far from satisfied that the exclusion of the 
evidence or the question from the consideration of the jury would be unfair to the 
defendant.'  
 
(Although the restriction on the judge giving leave to adduce evidence or ask 
questions only if he is satisfied that it would be unfair to the defendant to refuse to 
allow the evidence to be adduced or the question to be asked, is not included in our 
Act as it was in s 2(2) of the English statute, such a consideration is, no doubt, a 
matter to be taken into account in the exercise of a proper judgment on s 227(2).) The 
dictum of Lord Lane applies with equal force to s 227(2). 
 
In Canada, s 276 of the Criminal Code sets out specific aspects which a court is 
obliged to take into account in determining admissibility of evidence relating to 
sexual activity of a complainant. See the discussion in Martin's Annual Criminal Code 
2000 at CC/510 et seq. These aspects are: 
 
'(a) The interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer 
and defence; 
 
(b) society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences; 
 
(c) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist in arriving at a 
just determination in the case; 
 
(d) the need to remove from the fact-finding process any discriminatory belief or bias; 
 
(e) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice, sympathy or 
hostility in the jury; 
 
(f) the potential prejudice to the complainant's personal dignity and right of privacy; 
 
(g) the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal securityand to the 
full protection and benefit of the law; 
 
(h) any other factor that the judge, provincial court judge or justice considers 
relevant.' 
 
These are matters which would mutatis mutandis be proper for a South African court 
to consider in judging the admissibility of evidence under s 227(2) in our 
constitutional dispensation, even in the absence of specific statutory prescriptions. It 
can be noted that if the trial court had applied tests of this nature (over and above a 
plain enquiry as to relevance) the evidence of Ngema could hardly have been 
admitted.  
 
The South African Law Commission published Discussion Paper 102 relating to 





concerns 'Evidence of the previous sexual history of the complainant' and surveys the 
state of law directed to similar ends as those of s 227 in many other jurisdictions. In 
their evaluation the researchers conclude (at 501) that s 227 has to some extent failed 
of its purpose and that '(t)he unfettered discretion given to presiding officers to 
determine the admissibility of such evidence on the broad and subjective basis of 
relevance seems to be a large part of the problem'. 
 
Accordingly, they propose that s 227 be amended 'to clearly delineate the 
circumstances under which evidence of previous sexual history may be adduced'. In 
the draft amendment a subsection is included which provides that a court shall grant 
an application to adduce evidence of or put questions about previous sexual 
experience or conduct of a complainant if it is satisfied that such evidence or 
questioning: 
 
'(a) relates to a specific instance of sexual activity relevant to a fact in issue; 
 
(b) is likely to rebut evidence previously adduced by the prosecution; 
 
(c) is likely to explain the presence of semen or the source of pregnancy or disease or 
any injury to the complainant where it is relevant to a fact in issue; or 
 
(d) is not substantially outweighed by its potential prejudice to the complainant's 
personal dignity and right to privacy; or 
 
(e) is fundamental to the accused's defence.' 
 
Whether or not the proposal becomes in due course the subject of legislation, the 
matters identified must, even in the present state of the law, be regarded as 
considerations of great importance in arriving at a properly-considered judgment on 
admissibility in terms of s 227(2). The proposed evidence of Ngema would have not 
been admitted after due regard to any of these considerations either. 
 
It follows that I agree with Du Toit et al (op cit at 24-100B) that in deciding whether 
to allow evidence of such a nature, 'several ... policy concerns which militate against 
admissibility ... must be taken to the balance. These include the need to protect 
witnesses from hurtful, harassing and humiliating attacks, the recognition of a 
person's right to privacy in the highly sensitive area of sexuality and the realisation 
that the exposure of their sexual history may deter many victims of sexual offences 
from testifying.'  
 
One is here dealing with an issue which requires of a trial court great sensitivity and 
about which strongly conflicting views may be held. See, for example, J Temkin 
'Sexual History Evidence – The Ravishment of Section 2' [1993] Crim LR 3. There is 
a responsibility on practitioners and the courts to uphold the spirit of the legislation." 
 
I am in full agreement with what is said by Ligertwood Australian Evidence, and Lord 
Lane CJ in R v Viola (supra). The restriction referred to by the learned judge at 





referred to in the Canadian Criminal Code referred to. I have also considered the 
South African Law Commission's proposed amendments to section 227 of the Act. 
Since the judgment in S v M (supra) the Law Commission's final report was published 
as well as the Criminal Law (Sexual 0ffences) Amendment Bill of which I have also 
taken note. See also S v Latoo 2005(1) SACR 522 (SCA). 
 
In the course of a short judgment in terms of which I granted leave to the defence to 
cross-examine the complainant about her past sexual history and to lead evidence in 
respect thereof I referred to a judgment reported in the Canadian Rights Reporter vol 
6 1992 in the case of R v Seaboyer. I referred to two quotations referred to by 
McLACHLIN J from other judgments. The first quotation deals with the question of 
relevance and reads as follows: 
 
"It is difficult and arguably undesirable to lay down stringent rules for the 
determination of the relevance of a particular category of evidence. Relevance is very 
much a function of the other evidence and issues in the case. ..... in the past to define 
the criteria for the admission of similar facts have not met with much success ... The 
test must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the variance circumstances in which 
it must be applied." 
 
The second quotation reads as follows: 
 
"Every possible procedural step should be taken to minimise the encroachment on the 
witness' privacy, but in the end if evidence has sufficient cogency the witness must 
endure a degree of embarrassment and perhaps psychological trauma. This harsh 
reality must be accepted as part of the price to be paid to ensure that only the guilty 
are convicted." 
 
For the above reasons I granted leave to the defence to cross-examine the complainant 
and to lead evidence concerning her past sexual history.  
 
The accused's application in terms of section 227 of the Act was supported by 
Hulley's affidavit setting out facts on which the application was based. Part of the 
facts relied on is the information obtained from the statement of the state witness. The 
facts were not disputed by the state.  
 
In my judgment the purpose of the cross-examination and the evidence the defence 
wanted to lead concerning the complainant's behaviour in the past was not to show 
that she misbehaved with other men. In fact it was aimed at showing miscoduct in the 
sense of falsely accusing men in the past. The cross-examination and evidence are 
relevant to the issue of consent in the present matter, the question of motive and 
indeed credibility as well. It was not aimed at showing that the complainant was a 
woman of questionable morals. It was aimed at the investigation of the real issues in 
this matter and was fundamental to the accused's defence. I will later herein refer to 
her answers in cross-examination and the evidence tendered by the defence.  
 
The complainant was cross-examined at length. The cross-examination was thorough 





examination was fair. I do not intend dealing with the cross-examination in detail. I 
will try to highlight aspects in the cross-examination that is worth mentioning when 
considering the evidence as a whole.  
 
The complainant's evidence that she regarded the accused as a father or father figure 
was thoroughly investigated. Throughout her evidence she referred to him as 
"malume". Older people in exile were also referred to as "malumes". She also referred 
to people who are presently in South Africa but who were also in exile as "malumes". 
The word for "father" in Zulu is "baba". She said that she used that word for the 
accused very occasionally.  
 
The contact between the complainant and accused was also investigated. As stated 
before she has a recollection of the accused since she was 5 years of age. That would 
have been round about 1979 or 1980. During the period 1980 to 1985 when her father 
passed away the accused visited the K family from time to time. The complainant 
remained in exile until 1990. During the period 1985 to 1990 the complainant can 
recall having seen the accused once or twice either in Lusaka or in Harare. 
 
Since the complainant's return from exile in 1990 she for the first time spoke over the 
phone with the accused in 1998 and saw him for the first time in 2001.  
 
As stated before the complainant was diagnosed as being HIV positive in April 1999. 
She did not advise the accused of her condition immediately. That was only done in 
2001 when she for the first time again met him in person. 
 
It was then put to the complainant that the person whom she regarded as her father 
had no contact with her for approximately fourteen years since 1985. She then 
explained about the reference to older people as "malumes" and "aunties". The 
complainant was also taxed about the fact that she did not phone the accused in 1999 
when she learnt about her HIV status. Her explanation was that she probably lost his 
phone number. She, however, conceded that she phoned him during 1998 and she also 
confirmed that she could have obtained his telephone number either from the ANC 
office in Natal or in Johannesburg.  
 
After the contact with the accused in 2001 the complainant left for overseas during the 
period June 2002 to 0ctober 2003. She was confronted with the fact that the lack of 
contact between father and daughter during that period is strange. 
 
The complainant had some difficulty in telling the court on how many occasions she 
made contact with the accused since her return from the United Kingdom in October 
2003 till May 2004. She said that she did call him a few times. From May 2004 she 
was employed in Pretoria and therefore had more frequent contact with the accused.  
 
As stated earlier the complainant asked the accused for financial assistance to go to 
the United Kingdom for further studies. A certain Linda Makhathini, who worked for 
the accused, tried to get funding. Linda Makhathini was somewhat negative about the 
complainant's going to the United Kingdom firstly because according to Makhathini it 





hours a student had to attend on that course, even fulltime, were not enough for the 
immigration department in the United Kingdom to grant a study permit. When 
funding was not forthcoming the complainant confirmed that she was devastated and 
blamed that disappointment for the deterioration of her health.  
 
It was put to the complainant that the accused had never introduced her to anyone as 
his daughter or called her "daughter". She admitted that he never phoned her on her 
birthday.  
 
The complainant denied that she had asked the accused whether she could come and 
visit him at his home. She also denied that she decided to stay over for the night. The 
complainant conceded that it is possible that she could have said on the evening of 2 
November 2005 that she always carries a panty and a toothbrush with her. She could, 
however, not remember that. She admitted, however, that it is true that she always 
carries a toothbrush, a face cloth, a panty and a kanga in her bag.  
 
The complainant denied that Duduzile offered her a lift home the evening of 2 
November 2005 at the same time she took another visitor back home.  
 
The complainant stated that the day before she laid the complaint against the accused 
she had a telephone conversation with Minister Ronnie Kasrils whom she called 
"malume Ronnie". Her close friend, Kimi, with whom she spent the night after the 
alleged rape, worked for Kasrils at the time. She stated that she wanted to discuss her 
safety with Kasrils. Before the incident she was in regular contact with Kasrils as he 
was also a person trying to find funding for her tertiary education.  
 
Kasrils was not called as a witness by the state though a statement by him was 
provided to the defence. As Kasrils could not be tested on the contents of his 
statement I am not going to discuss the cross-examination that flowed from that 
statement. During the cross-examination on Kasrils' statement it, however, appears 
that the complainant apparently knew one of the accused's daughters fairly well from 
the time they were in exile in Zimbabwe. That was not Duduzile whom she met on an 
occasion before 2 November 2005. I will later return to the complainant's alleged 
friendship with this daughter. 
 
The complainant stated that she started school around June 1991 after her return from 
exile. When asked what standard she achieved in school she stated "I finished 
standard 10". That was in 1992 at the Phambile high school in Durban. Thereafter as 
from 1993 to 1997 she mainly did voluntary work with different non-governmental 
organisations. She had a keen interest in HIV work at the time. By the end of 1997 
she knew quite a lot about HIV as she was educating young people in secondary 
schools about HIV. She did a lot of training for educators and councillors and did 
some advocacy work. She therefore knew how a person could contract HIV and at the 
time advised one person whom she suspected infected her through sexual intercourse. 
 
It was put to the complainant that Duduzile's evidence would be that the complainant 
informed her that she wanted to talk to the accused and therefore took her to the study 
where the accused was. The complainant said that she could not remember that she 





The complainant confirmed that she had only a kanga on without any underwear 
when she went to the accused in the study. When it was put to her that Duduzile will 
say that according to her (Duduzile) the complainant was inappropriately dressed, the 
complainant did not want to comment thereon.  
 
The statement made by the complainant to the police on 4 November 2005 was put to 
her during cross-examination. According to her she thought about the incident and 
discussed various aspects thereof with her friend Kimi. She was aware of the fact that 
the accused would deny raping her and she also assumed that he would say that 
consensual intercourse took place. She therefore considered and discussed these 
aspects with Kimi. She furthermore considered the fact that she did not scream and 
shout when she was allegedly raped. Furthermore she thought about the fact that there 
were only two people in the bedroom where intercourse took place and she therefore 
expected that there could be two different versions of what had happened. She knew 
that consent would be a major issue in this matter. With all these aspects in mind the 
statement was made. She said that the policeman who took down the statement 
listened to her version, asked her a few questions and then started writing. It appears 
that while he was writing the statement he asked her a few more questions. 
 
Without going into all the detail that was put to the complainant in cross-examination 
regarding her statement it appears that she said that after the alleged rape she fell 
asleep and woke up at about 05:00, had a shower, went to the kitchen, took some fruit 
and put it into her bag. It was put to the complainant that in that version no reference 
is made to text messages sent to people in Swaziland, the reason therefore being that 
she did not inform her sisters that she had been raped. In her statement she 
furthermore referred to a telephone call to Nokozola in Swaziland and it was 
specifically stated that she did not tell her about the rape.  
 
The complainant testified that when she and the accused remained in the sitting room 
when Duduzile took the visitor back home she did not at that stage understood the 
conversation to have any sexual undertone. Only after the alleged rape did she think 
back about any sign that could have warned her of what was going to happen. She 
then thought that the accused's reference to a boy friend and to her physical needs in 
spite of her HIV status might have had sexual undertones.  
 
The complainant stated that it was Duduzile's suggestion that the two of them say 
goodnight to the accused after Duduzile had given a book to the complainant. She 
conceded that it would have been strange of Duduzile to have suggested that had she 
said goodnight to the accused at an earlier stage. It is clear, however, that when the 
complainant went to Duduzile's room, Duduzile had already changed into her pyjamas 
and she was obviously either in bed or going to bed.  
 
It appears that the complainant was aware of the different rooms in the accused's 
house. She admitted that Duduzile on a previous occasion took her on a tour through 
the house. She denied, however, of having gone into the accused's bedroom at that 
time. She further stated that when she collected the money for the airfare to Durban to 
visit her mother it was getting dark and she then drew the curtains in the accused's 
house and therefore also went through the house. She knew where the guest-room was 





because a visitor was sleeping in that bedroom. She, however, did not spend the night 
with Duduzile in her room. 
 
When cross-examined about her position when the accused entered the bedroom she 
reiterated that she was lying facing the bathroom. When he started massaging her 
shoulders she curled up a little bit and turned completely on her left hand side. In 
terms of her statement to the police the complainant stated that the accused was 
standing on the bed side when he initially came in. When she said that she was asleep 
she turned away from him and he was then behind her. The complainant was cross-
examined on the basis that she described her position and that of the accused in the 
police statement quite differently from her testimony. She recognised that fact and 
stated that she was in court telling what had happened.  
 
The complainant could not explain why she did not sit upright and tell the accused to 
leave her room because she wanted to sleep. The initial massage lasted for 
approximately a minute, perhaps less than a minute. She at the time did not think of 
the reason why he was massaging her and when taxed about it she conceded that that 
was a way of making physical contact between man and woman.  
 
The complainant conceded that at the time of the alleged rape she weighed 85kg and 
are 1,65 metres tall. She was 31 years of age. She accepted that the accused was at the 
time 63 years of age and weighed approximately 90 kilograms. It was suggested to 
her that she could have resisted easily and that she could have broken the hold the 
accused had on her two hands. She then explained that she did not pull her hands 
away because she did not move. She could not move as she froze at some point when 
she saw he was naked. The only thing she did and could do was to turn her head away 
and keep her eyes closed. She could not resist him pushing her legs apart because she 
was not moving anymore.  
 
The complainant estimated the duration of the intercourse at approximately ten 
minutes. She made that deduction because of what he told her and what he did to her. 
She felt discomfort when he penetrated her. That was because of the friction. At no 
stage did she tell anybody of this discomfort. During the intercourse the complainant 
did not tell the accused to stop. The reason being that she could not talk, she could not 
move and she could not do anything. The complainant conceded that she was 
concerned about the fact that she was only wearing a kanga and no underwear. This 
aspect concerned her when she on 3 November 2005 realised what had happened to 
her. She also discussed that with her friend Kimi. The complainant further conceded 
that the fact that she had not said anything to the accused during the intercourse to 
convey her refusal to him, would be an issue in the matter. The complainant conceded 
that at the time of the alleged rape a uniformed policeman was on the premises and 
that Duduzile was in the house. 
 
In cross-examination the complainant was asked the following question:  
"You gave no indication during this process to your rapist that you are objecting to 
what is going on. Is that right?" The answer is: "That is correct yes." It was thereafter 
again put to the complainant that with the policeman ten metres away from where 
intercourse took place she could have screamed to notify the policeman of her 





move. Thereafter the following question was asked: "Well he could have thought that 
you are not objecting to this whole process. Is that not so?" The answer was: "He 
could have." It was also put to the complainant that the mere fact that the accused 
after the intercourse came back to her room to ask her about money, etc indicates a 
mindset that consensual intercourse had taken place. The complainant reacted by 
saying that she tried to think about what the accused thought of everything but as she 
could not come up with answers she had stopped thinking about it.  
 
The complainant conceded that while intercourse was taking place the accused did 
whisper things to her. She confirmed that he did say that he would take care of her, 
that he called her sweetheart and that he said that she was a real lady. She could not 
recall that he had said that she was delicious. She can recall that he asked her whether 
he could ejaculate in her. The complainant conceded that the accused was aware of 
the fact that she had her cellphone with her, that a Telkom landline was available for 
her use and that she could leave at any time she wanted to. She also conceded that the 
accused could not have foreseen that she would freeze if he attempts to have sexual 
intercourse with her, or that she would not scream. She further conceded that the 
accused would have realised that she could notify Duduzile and/or the policeman 
about any unwanted advances and that under normal circumstances she could have 
wrestled a hand free and push the accused away from her.  
 
The complainant testified that although she prefers not to have unprotected sex being 
HIV positive, as an activist and as an educator of people living with HIV, she takes 
the stance that it is a person's own choice to have protected or unprotected sex. She 
personally has a point of view but she does not accept that people can be criticised for 
what choices they make. The complainant testified that she started tertiary education 
at the University of Natal in 1998. She did not complete her studies.  
 
It was put to the complainant that nobody phoned the accused the evening of 2 
November 2005 and informed him that they had to see them urgently. In particular it 
was put that only three phone calls were made after 20:30 and that the people who did 
phone the accused deny that they wanted to see him. Reference will later be made to 
the particular witnesses. 
 
Mr Kemp SC then cross-examined the complainant about her past sexual experiences. 
At the time when the application in terms of section 227 of the Act was brought it was 
clearly stated by Mr Kemp that he did not want to embarrass the complainant. He 
emphasised that he only needed to cross-examine in order to put up a proper defence 
for the accused. It therefore happened on occasion, with the co-operation of the state, 
that a question was put in writing and the reply was received in writing so that nobody 
could hear what was being asked and answered. That was obviously to prevent any 
embarrassment for the complainant. When Mr Kemp started his cross-examination on 
this point he also said that unless he specifically asked for the names of people or 
dates or places there will be no need to refer thereto.  
 
The complainant conceded that she has some previous sexual experience. She can 
recall having had sexual relations with approximately five men. When she referred to 
men as such she was asked whether the qualification was given because she is bi-





sexual orientation to be a lesbian". I refer to this aspect in particular as during the 
cross-examination of the accused it was on more than one occasion put to him that the 
complainant is a lesbian. It is clear that the complainant is bi-sexual with a lesbian 
orientation. She did not testify in chief that she is lesbian orientated.  
 
The complainant clarified her answer to the single question posed by the state 
concerning her previous sexual experience in that she confirmed that the intercourse 
in July 2004 was with a male. 
 
Reference was also made to the book that is being written by the complainant. Part of 
that book was handed in as exhibit "E2".  
 
The complainant was most upset about the production of sixteen pages of this 
document. She said that although she intended publishing it, it would have appeared 
in a completely different form. She was merely writing down her thoughts as it was 
coming and going and she was upset about the names that do appear in the script. The 
complainant was given the assurance that the defence team has in fact discussed 
certain allegations with some of the people referred to in the document. 
 
In the document at p7 thereof the complainant refers to a rape in Swaziland when she 
was 5 years old. I need not go into detail as far as that is concerned as the complainant 
said that rape did not take place on that occasion. It was merely "an experience with a 
penis". She stated, however, that she was in fact raped at the age of 5 but on a 
different occasion. It was not taken any further by the defence.  
 
Reference was made to an incident where a person named Godfrey was involved 
when the complainant was approximately 13 years old. The document describes how 
Godfrey raped the complainant. She confirmed that that had happened. The rape was 
stopped when the complainant wriggled out from under Godfrey. She also told him to 
stop and he did. She confirmed that at that stage she did not freeze.  
 
Reference was also made in the document to an incident with a person called 
Mashaya. According to the complainant Mashaya and a friend of his kidnapped her, 
bundled her in a car and took her to his house. According to the complainant Mashaya 
attempted to have sex with her but when he discovered that she was menstruating he 
did not do so. That, according to her, was an attempted rape. She denied ever having 
had sex with Mashaya. The question about any sex at any stage between her and 
Mashaya was again put and her reaction was that she cannot remember whether she 
did have sex with him. She at a stage took some time to answer and I asked her 
whether she was thinking about the question which she confirmed. She then said that 
she knows that she did not have sex with Mashaya in Lusaka. She also saw him in 
Zimbabwe but she could not remember having had sex with him there though she had 
spent some time with him.  
 
It was then put that what had happened between the two of them in Mashaya's house 
happened with her consent. The complainant reacted by saying that the situation is 
somewhat complicated in that any type of sexual relationship with a 13 year old 
person, even with consent, will be an offence. She therefore said that whatever 





understood the situation because she was young. She then reiterated that she 
unwillingly went by car to Mashaya's house, that she did not want to go into the 
bedroom and that she did not want him to do what he was about to do and that he at 
no stage asked her permission. She can, however, not recall what happened in the 
bedroom.  
 
The complainant confirmed that she was found in Mashaya's house by Godfrey's girl 
friend and that she was administered a severe beating. Reference was also made to a 
person called Charles and the complainant confirmed that he did have sex with her 
without her consent. She described that as rape. When she was confronted with the 
question whether she describes it as rape because of her young age she answered by 
saying that she had always regarded it as rape because she was 13 years of age. She 
again said that it was hard to remember what actually happened.  
 
The complainant then referred to an investigation by two ladies from the ANC in exile 
into the actions of Godfrey and Charles. She said that she told her story to the ladies. 
A sort of a court case was held where the two men were charged with rape based on 
what the complainant's version was, namely that they had had sex with her without 
her consent. Both were found guilty of rape. She denied having told the committee 
that Charles and Godfrey were her boyfriends. The complainant referred to one of the 
two ladies as aunt Nomswakazi. A lady in court was pointed out to the complainant 
and she identified her as aunt Nomswakazi. It was put to the complainant that this 
lady will testify that she said that Charles and Godfrey were her boyfriends, which 
was denied by the complainant. Eventually the complainant said that Godfrey was 
found guilty of rape but Charles not. 
 
When it was put to the complainant that Charles would deny that he had had sex with 
her the complainant maintain that he did have. The complainant in fact referred to a 
“very uncomfortable, horrible feeling of having ... been penetrated". The complainant 
also denied that her mother, as far as Godfrey was concerned, was satisfied that the 
complainant and Godfrey could do what they wanted to do. The complainant 
confirmed that before she came to South Africa in 1990 she had a boy friend in 
Harare by the name of Bheki.  
 
The complainant testified that since her return from exile she was raped once. The 
questioning then turned around the complainant's desire to join the ministry. She was 
a member of the African Methodist church. To join the ministry she had to have a 
matric certificate. It then transpired that the complainant did not pass matric although 
she was in matric but did not obtain the certificate. The questioning also turned 
around the complainant's involvement with the Council of Churches. Reference was 
then made to a person by the name of Sandile Sithole. The complainant denied that 
she ever knew a person by that name. When it was put to her that she had accused 
Sandile Sithole of raping her she said that that was not true and that she cannot even 
remember such a person.  
The complainant also denied that there was ever a committee set up to investigate 
allegations of rape against Sandile Sithole. 
 
The complainant related to the incident of rape subsequent to her return from exile. 





went to school to study to be a priest. During that time she had attacks during which 
she would faint and have bubbles from her mouth. She related to an incident or two 
where a particular young man at the school touched her and wanted to have sex with 
her where she wrestled with him. This, the complainant said, together with her history 
of rapes and attempted rapes, was most disturbing and she started having more attacks 
and also nightmares. She described herself as being really disturbed. During the 
period Easter to June of that year ie 1995 she got extremely ill and was sent home. 
She said that at the time her nightmares were related to rapes and attempted rapes and 
she can then distinctly remember when she was sent home, a feeling of having been 
penetrated. She also had a discharge from her vagina. It was later discovered that she 
was pregnant. She testified that looking back, she was at the time not pregnant from 
her young friend. She said together with her mother she came to the only logical 
conclusion namely that somebody at the seminary had sex with her without her 
knowing it. She said that when she started fainting she used to spend the week-ends at 
the boarding master's house. The young men at the college stayed together in groups 
and they had keys for their rooms. She ten deducted that somebody who could be with 
her alone without fear of being interrupted had intercourse with her while she was 
unconscious. She expected the boarding master to have been the culprit. In any event 
she said that when her pregnancy was terminated her mother saw the five month old 
fetus and that resembled the boarding master. 
 
The complainant could not remember the boarding master's name. An attempt was 
made by Mr Kemp to obtain the name of the young man who troubled the 
complainant and wrestled with her on two occasions. She, however, denied that she 
had had any intimate cession of a sexual nature with him. In fact she said "I did not 
have any intimate cessions with anybody in the school in the time that I was there." 
The complainant also testified about an attempted rape at a stage when she was with 
the Council of Churches and she was alone with a young man. She could, however, 
not remember his name. 
 
Another incident happened during Easter of 1994 at Chesterville. A young man then 
attempted to rape her. That she reported to her priest whom she described as "the 
Mbambo character".  
 
The complainant said that Mbambo walked in on what was happening so that when 
she told him he already knew what the position was. She said that the young man who 
attempted to rape her was interrupted by Mbambo walking into "the house". She then 
told Mbambo that the young man came naked and he was pulling or trying to pull the 
blanket off her whilst she was in bed. She then tucked herself in the blankets and 
when the priest, Mbambo, walked in she was in the process of telling this young man 
to go away. At that stage the complainant was, according to her, wearing the clothes 
that she had been wearing to church.  
 
When it was put to her that this young man's name was Nestor the complainant 
recalled it. I do not intend repeating Mbambo's evidence at this stage. It was, 
however, put to her that Mbambo woke up at about 04:00 and he went to Nestor's 
room and he then found Nestor naked next to her on the bed while she was clothed in 
a T-shirt with a panty, both fast asleep. She denied that version as well as that Nestor 





The complainant denied that she and her mother at about 18:00 that evening reported 
an attempted rape by Nestor. She further said that if the incident was reported to 
Mbambo or Pastor Mayakizo, she was not present.  
 
It was put to the complainant that she accused Mbambo of having raped her. That was 
denied by the complainant. She said that she can, however, recall that at a stage when 
Mbambo's wife was absent, he said to her that he needed a girl friend and he thought 
about asking her but he decided not to do so as it would affect her faith. This incident 
was reported to the elders in the church but it was not alleged by the complainant that 
it was rape or an attempted rape. The complainant confirmed that there was a meeting 
to discuss her complaint but she denied that she said that she was no longer interested 
in this stupid or dirty church and that she was leaving.  
 
It was also put to the complainant that a certain Modise would suggest that they had 
an intimate relationship in the sense that they had all sorts of sexual interplay but 
never intercourse. The complainant denied that anything like that had happened. In 
general, concerning the college, the complainant denied that she had ever alleged that 
she was raped there.  
 
The only person the complainant could think of who could have transmitted the HIV 
disease to her was a person referred to in cross-examination as Z. He was the only 
man with whom she had consensual penetrative sex. The only other possibility was 
the rape at the college to which reference had already been made. The complainant 
said that she had unprotected sex with Z about three times in 1996 and never 
thereafter. She only had sex with a male again in July 2004. Earlier in the 
complainant's cross-examination she referred to sex with five males. She said that the 
only occasion when there was penetrative sex was with Z and not with the others. 
 
The complainant gave more information about the man Z. A condom was used and it 
was not in South Africa. It became clear that she met him in Thailand at an 
international Aids conference. She met him for the first time in 1992 but did not see 
him for the next two years. She again saw him in 1994.  
 
The gynaecological findings of the doctor who examined the complainant after the 
alleged rape by the accused was put to her where it is stated that the "hymen ring 
disappeared or disappearing". There was some uncertainty whether it had disappeared 
or is disappearing. It was put to the complainant that such a finding is only associated 
with frequent penetrative sexual intercourse. She had no explanation for that finding. 
This question and answer is relevant to a question that was put to the complainant on 
paper. It is not necessary to refer in detail to the contents of that question because it 
was regarded as part of the in camera documents. The aim of the question was to find 
out whether there was any other reason for a disappeared hymen ring if it was not for 
penetrative sexual intercourse. From the contents of the answer there was no other 
reason why such a finding could be made.  
 
The complainant was asked whether she realised that her action of charging the 
accused with rape would be very popular with the anti-Zuma camp at a political level. 
Her reply was as follows: "What I realised was that my rape would be turned into a 





The accused's version was then put to the complainant. It is not necessary for me to 
deal in detail therewith. What is, however, of some significance is that the 
complainant admitted that in the time before 2 November 2005 she had often sent sms 
messages to the accused ending with words like "hugs" or "love" or similar words. 
She also denied that the accused invited her to his room. 
 
That completed the complainant's evidence. The next witness for the state was the 
complainant's mother Ms K. It is not necessary to summarise Ms K's evidence in 
detail. According to her the complainant regarded the accused as her father.  
 
When she heard about the snake incident in Swaziland she went there. The following 
week-end she saw the complainant who made a report to her. That made her cry and 
she felt very bad. She was shocked. She did not anticipate the actions she were told 
about from her comrade, the accused. She confirmed that the accused knew that the 
complainant was HIV positive.  
 
As a result of the report she had to do two things. The first thing was to get rid of the 
heavy load by carrying it to and giving it to God. Secondly she had to confront the 
accused. The complainant's mother therefore contacted the accused and told him that 
she wanted to see him. He was unable to come to her and she therefore saw him in 
Johannesburg on a Sunday evening. She started by asking him "why he did such a 
thing". She said that the answer he gave her was not clear because according to him 
he did not also know. He, however, apologised and said that he was sorry but he did 
not say for what he apologised.  
 
The witness started explaining to the accused that the complainant wanted to continue 
with her studies and he remarked that he would assist her. He also referred to a fence 
around her property, something the complainant testified about and for which the 
complainant had apparently saved money.  
 
When she saw the accused she described him as very sad, he looked somber. The 
witness felt a bit of relief after the apology, also because she thought he was really 
sorry.  
 
It appeared that Dr Zweli Mkize arranged for the visit and he also arranged for a 
lawyer, Attorney Docrat, to be seen. Mkize gave her money for the airfare as well as 
money for food in Johannesburg. 
 
During cross-examination it appeared that had there been a love relationship between 
the complainant and the accused the witness would have been surprised about it but if 
the accused had said that he loved the daughter she would not be that distressed. It 
also transpired during cross-examination that the witness was the first person who 
spoke about the complainant's further education. That was even discussed with Dr 
Mkize in KwaZulu Natal. That would have been some reparation for the wrong done.  
The witness returned from exile in 1991. Mbambo is known to her. It is true that her 
daughter developed an interest in becoming a church minister. That was discussed 





Mayakizo is also known to her. She can also recall an incident of an attempted rape 
that was reported to her in Chesterville.  
 
The report to Mbambo about Nestor's attempted rape was put to the witness but she 
could not remember that. The witness could remember Godfrey, Charles and Mashaya 
while they were in exile. She also remembers a lady Promise and Nzwake, also from 
exile. The witness could, however, not recall a relationship between the complainant 
and any of Mashaya, Godfrey or Charles. She can, however, remember an incident 
where Godfrey was tried for rape. She was present and she knows that he was 
convicted and punished.  
 
When it was put to her that she would have allowed her daughter to have intercourse 
with Godfrey she stated that that was an insult to her. I had to calm her down because 
she was obviously upset and repeatedly stated that she was insulted.When the witness 
was confronted with her approval of the relationship with Mashaya she referred to her 
upbringing by her parents. She again stated that had she allowed that she would be 
insulting her parents.  
 
The witness was referred to the existence of a mental institution not far from where 
the family lived in Zambia called Chamaima. She confirmed that. She, however, 
denied that the complainant attended that institution and said that she in fact attended 
one in Zimbabwe. The witness also stated that as far as she can recall the complainant 
was treated and was mentally not sound.  
 
The complainant's mother then gave a short history of her illness. She said that after 
the complainant's father's death she experienced hallucinations and nightmares. 
Medication was prescribed. She became better after seeing a psychologist in 
Zimbabwe. As far as she knows the complainant still visits a psychologist today.  
 
The complainant's mother described the complainant as a person who had been raped 
on a number of occasions from a young age and whose father died tragically in a 
motor accident. That was the cause of her problems. It was also caused by the 
complainant seeing her comrades die, her uncles die in exile, attacks being carried out 
on the people in exile and then you finally come home with a number of problems. 
Some of the problems are the fact that the complainant did not have a matric 
certificate and that she could not go to university. She tried to write exams and failed 
and finally she got expelled from university. Then she finds out that she is HIV 
positive, she is given tablets that make her a zombi, and all these problems add up to a 
confused and troubled person. The witness said that she herself may need a 
psychologist.  
 
The witness was also asked about her friendship and relationship with Kasrils. 
According to her he was with her husband on Robben Island. She very seldom phones 
him. As will be seen from the evidence of the accused Kasrils was not in custody on 
Robben Island. The witness could not remember that she phoned Kasrils on 12 







The next witness was an expert, Dr Merle Friedman, a clinical psychologist with a 
doctorate in psychology. She is a trauma expert. The witness prepared a report which 
was handed in as exhibit "I".  
 
In her evidence Dr Friedman recited her report and then dealt with certain aspects 
thereof. The contents of the report therefore forms part of the record and I do not 
intend dealing with it in detail. It is, however, necessary that I refer to specific aspects 
relied on by Dr Friedman and the state.  
 
The witness had two consultations with the complainant. The first was on 6 February 
2006 and the second on 8 February. The witness was also briefed on the matter in two 
meetings with the public prosecutor. She also saw two police statements made by the 
complainant. 
 
The reason for the referral was described as follows: 
 
"The Director of Public Prosecutions and prosecutor in the matter requested an 
opinion regarding her (ie the complainant's) behaviour during and after she was 
allegedly raped. An added request was made regarding the possible impact of the 
experience on her." 
 
 
The assessment was based on the clinical interview and on the material presented in 
the interviews as well as the police statements made by the complainant. Dr Friedman 
referred to the complainant's own version of the alleged rape and described that as 
follows: 
 
"She reports that she was completely overwhelmed and shocked by the rape, and that 
she said 'no' twice but to no avail. She reports that she froze during the incident and 
closed her eyes, as she was not able to believe what was happening. After the rape she 
tried to look for some support by sending sms messages, but was so distressed that she 
could not use the word rape. She describes the time after the rape and until she arrived 
at work the following morning as if she was in a 'trance'. She was only able to take 
further steps to seek medical help and report the rape when she had support to do so." 
 
Dr Friedman then discussed the complainant's behaviour during the event. Her 
conclusion is as follows: 
 
"It is therefore entirely consistent with the literature, as well as with my personal 
experience in dealing with rape directly as well as supervising therapists and 
psychologists treating patients who have been raped, that there is a variation in 
response. However, when the attack is completely unexpected and the victim is 
woken from sleep and perceives herself to be trapped, it is probable that her response 
would be to freeze and submit rather than to fight. In addition, the history of the 
relationship, as that of father/daughter, and the respect in which she held him, would 
further reduce the chance of her fighting. She did say 'no' twice to him and turned her 






In summary the conclusion was as follows: 
 
"... the shock at being awoken from sleep by the man she regarded as a father figure, 
naked with an erect penis, and his intentions clear, was such a shock, she was trapped, 
terrified and helpless and was unable to respond in any way other than freeze. This is 




Regarding the complainant's behaviour after the event Dr Friedman stated that the 
sms' were confused and she did not want to use the word "rape" as that would mean 
that she would be facing reality. She was traumatised and could therefore not act as 
one would under normal circumstances expect. Dr Friedman's conclusion was 
therefore as follows: 
 
"In general, the conclusions may be drawn in relation to the behaviour of the 
victim/survivor both during and after the alleged rape. Freezing and submitting during 
the course of the rape, and confusion, inability to take decisions, great distress and 
avoidance of initial help seeking, including reporting to the police after the rape, are 
both entirely consistent with what may be expected from someone who is exposed to 
this kind of traumatic experience." 
 
The so-called "added request" concerned the impact of the incident on the 
complainant's life. The witness came to the conclusion that the complainant is 
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. I do not deal with the requirements of 
such a condition but will, in the passing, refer thereto when I deal with the witness' 
cross-examination.  
 
The witness also listened to the complainant's evidence in court. I understood Dr 
Friedman to say that the evidence was in line with what she found during her 
interviews. In cross-examination it was put to Dr Friedman that the only test she did 
was to establish whether what the complainant had told her was consistent with the 
complainant's statements. The witness answered "yes". On a question whether the 
witness had concluded that because what the complainant said to her did not deviate 
at all from her statements, therefore the version must be true. The reply thereto was 
that the conclusion the witness came to was that the complainant had been through a 
serious traumatic episode. 
 
In order to find out what kind of person the complainant is Dr Friedman said that she 
used her clinical skills which she has been using for a number of years. In using those 
skills the witness tries to establish how the "patient" connects with the world and 
engages with her as the interviewer, she looks at evasions, emotional tone and 
whether the story told is too glib or not. She also went into her background and how 
she grew up. It, however, became clear under cross-examination that Dr Friedman 
was not aware that the complainant attended sessions at a mental hospital. Dr 
Friedman, however, did speak to the complainant's therapist. During cross-






The complainant told Dr Friedman about her past sexual history. Dr Friedman said, 
however, that that history was not needed to be in the report and she therefore did not 
note it. The history was, however, not traversed in detail because Dr Friedman did not 
regard that as of relevance to the court. It was only of importance to indicate to the 
expert who the complainant is and where she is coming from. The witness was cross-
examined at length about her finding of post-traumatic stress disorder. I am not going 
to deal with that.  
 
What is, however, of some importance to me is that no psychometric tests were done 
to find out more about the complainant's personality. Dr Friedman concluded that in 
view of the complainant's background and history it was not abnormal for her to 
freeze during the alleged rape and not to cry out but rather to submit.  
 
Dr Friedman was also cross-examined in detail on the effect previous sexual 
experience might have had on the complainant. It is clear that Dr Friedman did not 
have all the evidence concerning previous incidents of rape or allegations of rape. It is 
so that an expert in the position of Dr Friedman must rely on what she is told by the 
complainant. That is exactly what happened here too. I was also, as stated, not 
favoured with any psychometric test results to be able to make deductions therefrom. I 
will later herein refer to my view of the value of the expert's evidence. 
 
Dr M L Likibi is the doctor who examined the complainant on 3 November 2005 at 
the Ntabiseng clinic at the Baragwanath hospital. Form J88 was completed and 
tendered as exhibit "K". Dr Likibi testified that the complainant informed him that she 
was raped by a family member, an uncle, when she was at his house to sleep over. No 
physical injuries were found. The doctor only found a small fresh tear on the posterior 
fourchette. There was no bleeding. Nothing of further importance was found during 
the examination.  
 
Dr Likibi was asked about the tear he found and stated that there can be a few reasons 
for such a tear. 0ne he immediately mentioned was that the complainant did not have 
penetrative sexual intercourse for a fairly long period. The doctor recalled that he was 
told that for a period of more than seven months prior the complainant did not have 
any intercourse. According to the doctor "any type of intercourse at that moment 
would have provoked that tear". Another reason for the tear could have been lack of 
proper preparation before intercourse so that there was not enough lubrication. An 
instrument like a fingernail could have caused that tear as well. Passionate intercourse 
between the two participants could also have caused the tear. From his examination 
the doctor concluded that the complainant was sexually active. The tear was less than 
5mm and was estimated by the doctor to be between 2 and 5mm and it was caused 
within the last three days. Certain samples were taken from the complainant. Dr 
Likibi testified that semen could be found from one to three days after intercourse. 
The complainant told Dr Likibi that she was HIV positive. 
 
In cross-examination the doctor stated that if a woman douches, the use of a finger 
can also create a tear in the posterior fourchette. Dr Likibi testified that because of 
anatomical differences between male and female it is easier for a woman to contract 
HIV than a man. Ms Nosipho Mgudlwa is a 46 year old lady also known as Pinkie. 





August and September 2005. 0n 3 November 2005 she sent an sms message to the 
complainant asking her for an Indian outfit. The complainant phoned her at her work 
in reaction to this message. The phone call came through round about 11:45.  
 
The witness testified that during the discussion of the outfit she noticed that the 
complainant was not "her giggling self". The witness asked the complainant whether 
she was all right and received the answer "yes ma". According to the witness the 
complainant was more subdued than normal and later told her that she was not all 
right. The complainant then said to her "ma I was raped". She started crying. The 
witness wanted to know by whom she was raped and the reply was "it is uncle in his 
house last night". The witness knew that she referred to the accused. According to the 
witness the relationship between complainant and the accused was one of respect. The 
complainant always referred to the accused as malume without mentioning his name.  
 
The witness asked the complainant to put her through to a colleague of the 
complainant which she then did. Ms Nomthandazo Msibi is a 30 year old lady also 
known as Kimi. She is employed at the Ministry for Intelligence Services at Pretoria.  
 
She knows the complainant well. They were together as children in exile in Swaziland 
and had become very close friends. The witness described the complainant as a friend 
and her sister. They had regular contact with each other. At a stage they were staying 
together and they phoned each other four to five times a day. 
 
The accused is also well-known to the witness. She knows him from exile. Since she 
came back from exile she had been in regular contact with the accused. The witness 
said that the complainant regarded the accused as a father. She is aware of the 
friendship between the accused and the complainant's late father. She had contact with 
the complainant during the day of 2 November 2005. Towards the end of the day she 
told her that her nephew or grandson had been bitten by a snake in Swaziland. The 
witness tried to persuade her not to rush to Swaziland. Later that afternoon after Ms 
Msibi had arrived home from work she received an sms message from the 
complainant informing her that she was going "to malume's place because he asked 
her to come over and he also discouraged her to go to Swaziland".  
 
The next time she heard from the complainant was when she received an sms round 
02:00-02:30 which she read when she some time during the early morning woke up. 
She was then told that the complainant could not sleep because she was disturbed by 
the fact that the child had been bitten by a snake. The message also stated "malume 
had been looking at me sexually". The witness said that in brackets it was then stated 
"there must be something in my drawers" and that "the mothers must not be told". She 
understood the reference to drawers to be a reference to panties. The witness also 
understood that there was some negative sexual energy coming to the complainant 
because she knew she had been through a rape before. Therefore the witness 
understood that the complainant was conveying to her that she had attracted negative 
sexual energy towards her.  
 
The witness spoke to the complainant the next morning. According to her she was 
dismissive and very abrupt. She then said to the witness "I hate that man, I never want 





complainant, however, did not want to discuss her sms with the witness in any more 
detail. 
 
Later that morning around 11:00 or 12:00 the complainant phoned the witness and 
told her that she had been penetrated by him, obviously referring to the accused. The 
necessity to be examined by a doctor was raised. The complainant that night stayed at 
the witness' place. She found her to be extremely unsettled and she kept on talking. 
She was restless. She appeared not to be wanting to go to sleep. The witness was 
present when the complainant met the attorney. Also present was the complainant's 
mother and the witness' boy friend. According to the witness the attorney on more 
than one occasion advised the complainant to drop the charges.  
 
In cross-examination the witness was asked about the so-called father/daughter 
relationship between the complainant and the accused. She said that when the people 
came back from exile the relationship shifted from that of comrade to uncle. The 
witness left Mozambique in the years 1984/1985. She again met the complainant 
during the years 2000/2001. She then became aware of the fact that the complainant 
was referring to the accused as malume. She referred to other older men as malume as 
well.  
 
The witness never heard the accused calling the complainant his daughter. It was 
pointed out to the witness that she never referred in her statement to the fact that the 
complainant told her that she hated the accused. That is in spite of the fact that she at 
an earlier stage said that what was standing out from the first report was the fact that 
the complainant said she did not want to see the accused ever and that she hated him. 
The witness confirmed that she discussed with the complainant the difficulties that 
might be encountered during the trial. During these discussions reference was made to 
the fact that the complainant froze. The witness said that the complainant's mother 
was worried about a possible forthcoming trial and wanted the complainant to 
withdraw the charges. She eventually had to concede that it is therefore reasonable to 
accept that that would have been discussed with Attorney Docrat, in spite of the fact 
that she in chief testified that the attorney wanted to force the complainant to 
withdraw the charges. 
 
Commissioner Norman Othniel Taioe is a commissioner in the South African Police 
Services and the provincial head detective in Gauteng. He is a police officer with 
thirty two years service. He assisted the investigation officer in this matter, being 
Superintendent Linda. Commissioner Taioe together with Superintendent Linda saw 
the accused on 10 November 2005 at Nkhandla to obtain a warning statement from 
the accused. During the interview Mr Mike Hulley and the accused were present. 
When the police officers eventually met the accused and his attorney a prepared 
statement was handed to them. The commissioner then decided to warn the accused 
first and did so. Thereafter Superintendent Linda completed a document headed 
"statement regarding interview with suspect" tendered as exhibit "L". The warning 
statement contained in the exhibit was again read to the accused. The accused's 
warning statement was then signed by him. The contents of the warning statement 
was read into the record. For purposes of clarity it should be referred to in this 






"I the undersigned 
JACOB GEDLEYIHLEKISA ZUMA 
do hereby make oath and state: 
 
1. I am an adult male presently residing at 8 Epping Street, Forest Town, 
Johannesburg. 
2. I further reside at my traditional home at Mkandla, with my wife and extended 
family. 
3. I have been made aware that a charge of rape has been brought against me by one 
Ms K. 
4. I protest my innocence and vehemently deny the charge, to which, if the matter 
proceeds, I intend to plead not guilty. 
5. I have known Ms K for a long period of time. 
6. Initially I became acquainted with her through her family. Both her parents were 
comrades in the African National Congress. 
7. I continued to maintain our friendship after the death of Ms K's father. 
8. Ms K would frequently visit at my official residence in Pretoria and later at my 
present residence in Forest Town, Johannesburg. In fact, it had occurred on previous 
occasions that she had slept over at my residence. 
9. Initially our friendship had been of a general nature, with me playing a supportive 
role. 
10. Later, through the many conversations we had as well as the nature of the sms text 
messages that I received from her, I became aware of her affection for me. 
11. 0n Tuesday 1 November 2005 arising out of a telephone conversation Ms K 
suggested that she visit me at my Forest Town residence. I agreed and she duly 
arrived at approximately 17h00. 
12. During the course of the evening we had supper together with a friend and another 
member of my family. 
13. Later that evening after I had finished work in my study we again began 
toconverse and share in each other's company privately. 
14. Much later that evening at approximately 11h30 she retired to the room prepared 
for her where she spent the night. 
15. It was only some days later that I was advised that a charge of rape had been laid 
against me and that Ms K was the complainant. 
16. As stated previously I deny the charge against me."  
 
The commissioner said that he had some difficulty with the date as it was referred to 
as 1 November and it was pointed out to the accused and his attorney. While the 
police officers were at Nkhandla arrangements were made to meet the accused again 
in Johannesburg at his Epping Street home. The purpose of the visit was for the police 
officers to familiarise themselves with the house and to obtain samples for DNA tests.  
The meeting took place on 15 November 2005. According to the commissioner he and 
Superintendent Linda together with the photographer and other police officers were 
met by Mr Hulley. The commissioner then told Hulley in the presence of the accused 






At all stages the accused and Hulley were together with the police officers. At no 
stage did Hulley advise the accused not to say anything or not to point out any place. 
The commissioner did not warn the accused again of his rights. The reason for that 
was, according to the commissioner, that the attorney was aware of the purpose of the 
meeting and he was present. He could have warned the accused not to say anything or 
not to point out anything if the accused was doing something against the attorney's 
instructions. The question then was: "Then what did you do there on the alleged crime 
scene?" The answer is as follows: "The accused pointed the guest room to us as the 
room of the alleged crime scene." The relevance of this will later become clear. When 
the group of people entered the guest room the commissioner asked the accused 
whether that is the room "where it happened". A positive answer was given and the 
photographer was instructed to take photos of the room. That room was on the ground 
floor.  
 
As the police officers wanted to have an overview of the house and also because the 
commissioner said he wanted to know how far the accused's bedroom was from the 
guest-room they went to the study and also to the accused's bedroom. In the accused's 
bedroom he asked him what took place there. The reply was "nothing happened".  
 
Later samples were taken by Dr Nkobi. On his way from the accused's house the 
commissioner overheard a radio report that the complainant had filed a withdrawal 
statement. He managed to trace her and he confronted the attorney, Docrat, about his 
business with the complainant. I need not go into anymore detail as far as this is 
concerned. 
 
The commissioner's cross-examination is of some importance. I will comment later 
herein on the evidence of the commissioner because the defence, during the 
application in terms of section 174 of the Act, as well as at the end of the case, asked 
me to rule that part of the commissioner's  highlight aspects which are important to 
me in the cross-examination.  
 
It appears that because the matter was serious and because of the profile of the 
accused immediate steps were taken once the complaint was laid. The commissioner 
was notified of the complaint and he met the complainant. He said that a statement 
had already been taken from her when he arrived at the police station and he 
"confirmed all the data that were mentioned in the statement". The commissioner had 
a lot of difficulties with this piece of evidence. He had to concede that at that stage he 
had not read the complainant's statement and he could therefore not confirm the data 
contained therein. He only read her statement the following morning but he tried to 
persist with his initial statement that he had confirmed the data. This caused the 
commissioner, when he was asked when he had confirmed all the data to say "listen to 
me what I said". He then repeated his previous answer. He was referred to the fact 
that he only read the statement on the Saturday and he then replied "on Saturday in 
the morning I took the statement and read it again". He later on replied as follows: 
 
"What I said is that I only confirmed the data that I read her statement in full on 
Saturday morning." The commissioner refused to concede that his written statement 






The commissioner was also questioned at length about the so-called follow up 
meeting and why he had to tell Hulley again on 15 November that it was a follow up 
meeting. He was pertinently asked why he did not only warn the accused again. He 
persisted with his statement that it was a follow up meeting and that he did not regard 
it necessary to again warn the accused. The commissioner was also questioned at 
length about the question that was put to the accused as to the location of the alleged 
crime scene. It was pointed out to the commissioner that the question was totally 
unwarranted in terms of the accused's statement. If one looks at exhibit "L" there is no 
crime scene and reference could not be made to any crime scene. In fact if one reads 
the contents of paragraphs 13 and 14 of the warning statement together, it becomes 
clear that the accused and the complainant conversed and shared in each other's 
company privately.  
 
Much later that evening she retired to the room prepared for her where she spent the 
night. This last-mentioned room could only have been the guest room. The 
commissioner must have been aware of the fact that the complainant referred to the 
guest room as the place where the rape took place. If one reads the accused's warning 
statement objectively it appears that wherever the two of them were together the 
complainant left that place to go to bed. The commissioner was questioned on the 
basis that it was an unwarranted question designed to trap the accused. That was 
denied but the commissioner could do no better than saying that he wanted to ask the 
question that way.  
 
The commissioner regarded that specific pointing out and statement made to him as of 
the utmost importance though he stated that he only learnt in court that, according to 
the accused, intercourse took place in his own bedroom. In spite of the importance of 
that pointing out in the mind of the commissioner it was not referred to in his 
statement and no follow up written statement was made.  
 
A photo album marked "D" was handed in as an exhibit. It depicts inter alia the photo 
taken of the guest room and the key merely refers to it as the guest room and not as 
the alleged crime scene.  
 
Mr J C G le Roux is a private consultant in the information technology systems 
software product and development field. He was asked to trace and analyse certain 
phone calls and sms text messages between different cellphones belonging to different 
people. A very impressive exercise was done and different exhibits were handed in to 
show the results. I need not deal in any detail with Mr Le Roux's evidence as in the 
end it appeared to be common cause.  
 
Mr Yusuf Ismail Docrat is the attorney referred to earlier herein. A colleague of his, a 
certain Mr Latib, referred a matter concerning a rape to him. He was later contacted 
by a lady Ramjene Moonsamy who gave him certain background information. This 
lady was concerned about the allegations of rape and was according to Docrat hopeful 
that it would amount to naught. Discussions took place between Docrat and the 
complainant's mother as well as Dr Mkize and Moonsamy on various different 
occasions. It eventually transpired that the complainant needed some legal advice and 
a meeting was arranged.The discussion was apparently of a general nature because 





difficulties in relation to the matter at both personal and legal as well as social level. 
There was also discussion about a withdrawal of the matter. Docrat also confirmed 
that Commissioner Taioe appeared at the scene at a stage and that he was upset about 
the consultation that was taking place. It appears that the end result was that the 
complainant would think about the situation. A report was made to Dr Mkize and 
eventually Docrat got rid of the entire matter. 
 
Prof Desmond James Martin is a professor specialising in virology associated with 
HIV Aids. It is not necessary to summarise Prof Martin's evidence in detail. It appears 
as if his evidence is common cause. He confirms that intercourse without a condom 
creates a risk of acquiring HIV infection. He referred to what is called super infection 
if a HIV positive person has unprotected sex with another HIV positive person. He 
estimates the risk of a male to contract HIV in a single case of unprotected sex at, 
03% to ,1%. There are, however, various factors that will influence the risk. I need not 
deal with all those risks. He stated that a circumcised man's risk is smaller than that of 
a man who is not circumcised. Unlubricated sex and a visible tear in a woman's  
mucosa will increase the risk too. What Prof Martin's evidence does show is that HIV 
Aids is a terrible pandemic with which one should not take the slightest risk at all. 
 
 
Superintendent Bafana Peter Linda is a detective in the South African Police Service 
attached to the family violence, child protection and sexual offences specialized unit. 
He has twenty years experience. Linda is the investigating officer in this case. Linda 
accompanied Commissioner Taioe when they went to Nkhandla to obtain the warning 
statement from the accused. He supports Taioe as to what occurred on that occasion. 
There is a slight difference in that he testified that the accused greeted him and Taioe 
first whereas Taioe stated that Hulley met them first. He also confirmed that a further 
meeting was arranged for 15 November in Johannesburg. There is also a difference 
between the two police witnesses as to who met them on this occasion and exactly 
where it was said that it was a follow up meeting. Linda supported Commissioner 
Taioe as to what was said in the guest room and the main bedroom.  
 
When the differences between him and the commissioner were pointed out the 
witness stated that he was still a young man with a good memory and that he was 
satisfied that he was right. After the evidence of Linda Mr Kemp stated that he had 
put to the complainant that a certain student by the name of Goeieman had been 
expelled from the college as a result of the rape allegation and that Goeieman had in 
the meantime passed away. He rectified the position by saying that the person's name 
is in fact Matsoko and that he is still alive. The state confirmed that the name of 
Matsoko was also cleared with the complainant and that she stands by her version that 
Matsoko did not rape her, that she does not know such a person and that she is not 
aware of any person that was expelled.  
 
Certain further exhibits were handed in including exhibit "CC" which is a transcript of 
an interview Cape Talk Radio held on 14 November 2005 with Mr Hulley, the 
attorney. A transcript was handed in. Thereafter the state closed its case. When the 
matter resumed on 27 March 2006 the application was made by the three 





that application earlier herein and gave a short judgment at the time. I do not intend 
amplifying that judgment in any way.  
 
An application in terms of section 174 of the Act was then brought for the discharge 
of the accused. I have already referred to this application as well. I made a ruling and 
gave short reasons therefore. I indicated that I would at the appropriate time give 
more detailed reasons. In the short judgment refusing the accused's discharge I dealt 
with the principles to be applied in such an application. I referred in some detail to the 
judgment in S v Lubaxa 2001(2) SACR 703 (SCA). I will not repeat the principles 
laid down in Lubaxa's case and as set out in the short judgment.  
 
Before dealing with some factual aspects, reference should be made to mens rea. Mr 
Kemp spent most of his argument in the section 174 application on the absence of 
mens rea on the part of the accused. He argued that the state must prove that the 
accused had the intent to rape the complainant and must do so beyond reasonable 
doubt. He further argued that the state must thus negate beyond reasonable doubt any 
belief of the accused that the complainant had consented to intercourse. He developed 
that argument with great skill and in great detail. I do not intend burdening this 
judgment with a long and learned discussion of the argument and reference to the law 
in all detail. It is, however, necessary for me to refer to a few principles in this 
respect, because Mr Kemp again argued at the end of the case that, depending on my 
final finding on the facts, the absence of mens rea remains relevant. At present rape 
consists, by definition, in a male having unlawful and intentional sexual intercourse 
with a female without her consent. See Snyman Criminal Law 4th edition p445. See 
also Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 3rd edition p699.  
 
The element of intention is vital because rape can only be committed intentionally. A 
principle of our criminal justice system is expressed in the maxim actus non facit 
reum nisi mens sit rea – the act is not wrongful unless the mind is guilty. In casu it 
means that the intentional sexual intercourse had to take place with the accused 
knowing that there was no consent by the complainant. See R v Mosago and Another 
1935 AD 32 at 34; R v K 1958 3 SA 420 (A) at 421F: 
 
"The offence (of rape) consists in having connection with a woman, other than a 
man's wife, without her consent, from which it follows that if the crown provesthat 
there was no consent, and also, of course, that the accused knew this, it has 
established his guilt." 
 
 
See also p423A; p426D-E; S v S 1971 2 SA 591 (A) at 596E-597H; R v Z 1960 1 SA 




In the United Kingdom the legal position was exactly the same as in South Africa. An 
important judgment in the United Kingdom in the history of the development of mens 
rea in that legal system is that of Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan [1975] 2 
All ER 347 (HL). At the time the Sexual 0ffences Act, 1956, was in force. Section 





course of his speech in the Morgan case supra, Lord CROSS of Chelsea states as 
follows at p352e-g: 
 
 
"But, as I have said, s 1 of the 1956 Act does not say that a man who has sexual 
intercourse with a woman who does not consent to it commits an offence; it says that 
a man who rapes a woman commits an offence. Rape is not a word in the use of 
which lawyers have a monopoly and the question to be answered in this case, as I see 
it, is whether according to the ordinary use of the English language a man can be said 
to have committed rape if he believed that the woman was consenting to the 
intercourse and would not have attempted to have it but for his belief, whatever his 
grounds for so believing. I do not think that he can. Rape, to my mind, imports at least 
indifference as to the woman's consent. ... On the other hand, to the question whether 
a man, who has intercourse with a woman believing on inadequate grounds that she is 
consenting to it, though she is not, commits rape, I think that he would reply, 'No. If 
he was grossly careless then he may deserve to be punished but not for rape.'" 
 
 
See also the speech of Lord HAILSHAM of St Marylebone at 357b-h: 
 
"If it be true, as the learned judge says 'in the first place', that the prosecution have to 
prove that 'each defendant intended to have sexual intercourse without her consent. 
Not merely that he intended to have intercourse with her but that he intended to have 
intercourse without her consent', the defendant must be entitled to an acquittal if the 
prosecution fail to prove just that. The necessary mental ingredient will be lacking and 
the only possible verdict is 'not guilty'. If, on the other hand, as is asserted in the 
passage beginning 'secondly', it is necessary for any belief in the woman's consent to 
be 'a reasonable belief' before the defendant is entitled to an acquittal, it must either be 
because the mental ingredient in rape is not 'to have intercourse and to have it without 
her consent' but simply 'to have intercourse' subject to a special defence of 'honest and 
reasonable belief', or alternatively to have intercourse without a reasonable belief in 
her consent. No doubt it would be possible, by statute, to devise a law by which 
intercourse, voluntarily entered into, was an absolute offence, subject to a 'defence' of 
belief whether honest or honest and reasonable, of which the 'evidential' burden is 
primarily on the defence and the 'probative' burden on the prosecution. But in my 
opinion such is not the crime of rape as it has hitherto been understood. The 
prohibited act in rape is to have intercourse without the victim's consent. The 
minimum mens rea or guilty mind in most common law offences, including rape, is 
the intention to do the prohibited act… I believe that 'mens rea' means 'guilty or 
criminal mind', and if it be the case, as seems to be accepted here, that mental element 
in rape is not knowledge but intent, to insist that a belief must be reasonable to excuse 
it is to insist that either the accused is to be found guilty of intending to do that which 
in truth he did not intend to do, or that his state of mind, though innocent of evil 
intent, can convict him if it be honest but not rational." 
 
 






"Once one has accepted, what seems to me abundantly clear, that the prohibited act in 
rape is non-consensual sexual intercourse, and that the guilty state of mind is an 
intention to commit it, it seems to me to follow as a matter of inexorable logic that 
there is no room either for a 'defence' of honest belief or mistake, or of a defence of 
honest and reasonable belief and mistake. Either the prosecution proves that the 
accused had the requisite intent, or it does not. In the former case it succeeds, and in 
the latter it fails. Since honest belief clearly negatives intent, the reasonableness or 
otherwise of that belief can only be evidence for or against the view that the belief and 
therefore the intent was actually held..." 
 
 
The same approach was adopted by Lord FRASER of Tullybelton at 381h. The 
judgment in the Morgan case supra led to an amendment of the Sexual Offences Act, 
1956, in terms of the Sexual 0ffences (Amendment) Act 1976. Section 1 of the 1976 
Act reads as follows: 
 
"1.-(1) For the purposes of section 1 of the Sexual 0ffences Act 1956 (which relates to 
rape) a man commits rape if- 
 
(a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time of the 
intercourse does not consent to it; and 
 
(b) at that time he knows that she does not consent to the intercourse or he is reckless 
as to whether she consents to it; and references to rape in other enactments (including 
the following provisions of this Act) shall be construed accordingly. 
 
(2) It is hereby declared that if at a trial for a rape offence the jury has to consider 
whether a man believed that a woman was consenting to sexual intercourse, the 
presence or absence of reasonable grounds for such a belief is a matter to which the 
jury is to have regard, in conjunction with any other relevant matters, in considering 
whether he so believed.” 
 
A new Sexual 0ffences Act 2003 was subsequently introduced in the United 
Kingdom. According to its preamble it is "an Act to make new provision about sexual 
offences, their prevention and the protection of children from harm from other sexual 
acts, and for connected purposes". 
 
Section 1 of the 2003 Act deals with rape and reads as follows: 
"1. Rape 
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if- 
(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another 
person (B) with his penis, 
(b) B does not consent to the penetration, and 
(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. 
 
(2) Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the 





(3) Sections 75 and 76 apply to an offence under this section. 
..." 
 
Sections 74, 75 and 76 of the 2003 Act are of importance in respect of consent. 
Section 74 defines the concept "consent". Section 75 deals with evidential 
presumptions about consent and section 76 deals with conclusive presumptions about 
consent. It is not necessary to deal with those provisions in any detail, save to say that 
the sections contain provisions our courts deal with daily in order to decide whether 
there was in fact consent or not. It is clear that the 2003 Act in the United Kingdom 
changed the position drastically after the Morgan case and the 1976 amendment to the 
1956 Act. 
 
The Criminal Law (Sexual 0ffences) Amendment Bill referred to earlier deals 
insection 2 thereof with the offence of rape. I do not intend dealing with the entire 
section 2. Subsections (8) and (9) are of importance and read as follows:  
 
"(8) Subject to the provisions of this Act, any reference to 'rape' in any law shall be 
construed as a reference to the offence of rape under this section, unless it is a 
reference to rape committed before the commencement of this Act in which case it 
must be construed to be a reference to the common law offence of rape. 
(9) Nothing in this section may be construed as precluding any person charged with 
the offence of rape from raising any defence at common law to such charge, nor does 
it adjust the standard of proof required for adducing evidence in rebuttal." 
 
I am not aware of any further amendments to this bill. As far as I know the proposed 
legal situation in South Africa will be as set out in this bill. This bill, even when it 
becomes law, will in all respects be a major step forward to combat the ghastly 
offence of rape and other sexual offences. It will also be in line with similar acts in 
modern countries. It is not the judiciary's fault that the bill has not been made law. 
Even if this trial was heard in terms of the proposed new Act the result would have 
been the same. The proposed amendment to section 227 of the Act will give a trial 
court a discretion to allow cross-examination on a complainant's sexual history as 
well as evidence regarding that history on certain conditions. Those very same 
principles were applied by me in the exercise of my discretion as already stated 
above. It also appears as if the position concerning mens rea will in the proposed new 
Act not be changed. The legal position concerning mens rea is at present as contained 
in the judgments referred to and it appears that it will remain the same in terms of the 
proposed Act.  
 
As far as the factual position is concerned I decided not to grant the application 
interms of section 174 because of inter alia the following. The complainant's 
evidence, as stated in the short judgment, was not so broken down that it could be 
disregarded. In terms of her evidence she saw the accused naked, massaging her, 
while he was already on top of the bed and on top of her. From her evidence alone it 
appears as if the accused came into the guest room naked or undressed himself before 
he started massaging her. Therefrom it appears as if there was an intent to have 
intercourse whether with or without consent. I am aware of indications to the contrary 
such as that there was a policeman on site and the accused's daughter close by. I am 





evidence of Dr Friedman, uncontested at that stage, could not be disregarded because, 
according to her, there was merit in the complainant's version that she froze at the 
sight of the naked accused.  
 
The reference to false charges that had been laid in the past were at that stage also 
only mere suggestions.  
 
The evidence of Dr Likibi, though open for different interpretations, may be an 
indication of rape. The evidence of the witnesses Kimi and Pinkie, read with that of 
the complainant's mother, is indicative of the fact that the complainant was upset 
about what the accused had done to her and that he had apologised to her mother. One 
can also not lose sight of the fact that the complainant's evidence is to the effect that 
she would not have consented to unprotected sex. Though she is not an out and out 
lesbian, the fact that she is inclined to lesbianism cannot be lost sight of. If one looks 
at the evidence of Docrat it appears as if various people were keen to have the charge 
of rape withdrawn. I could therefore not find beyond reasonable doubt that the 
accused did not have the required mens rea. 
 
With the aforegoing in mind I concluded that the application in terms of section 174 
of the Act should be dismissed which I did. The accused thereafter testified. The 
accused spent the first part of his evidence describing his association with the ANC 
and his political career.  
 
The accused was born on 12 April 1942. He became involved in the freedom struggle 
during 1958 when he was 16 years of age. He was then an ordinary member of a 
branch of the ANC. In 1962 Umkhonto we Sizwe was formed and the accused 
became a member thereof. In 1963 he was arrested by the police and was placed 
under ninety days detention. He was later convicted and sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment.  
 
The accused met JK, the complainant's father, in 1958 when he (JK) also became a 
member of the ANC youth league. The two of them worked together in the freedom 
struggle. The accused realised that JK was also a member of Umkhonto we Sizwe 
when they again met at Durban station when a group of young men had to undergo 
certain training. They were arrested together, were in detention together and were 
sentenced during the same trial. They spent their ten years of imprisonment together 
at Robben Island. Once they were out of prison both the accused and JK continued 
with their participation in the freedom struggle. Asked whether Ronnie Kasrils was 
also on Robben Island, as suggested by the complainant, the accused denied that 
Kasrils was ever with him on Robben Island. Kasrils was not arrested in 1963 because 
he had already left the country. 
 
In 1975 Mozambique became independent and young recruits of the ANC were then 
trained there. The accused left South Africa and was initially based in Mozambique 
from where work in Swaziland, Lesotho and South Africa was directed. JK and his 
family also left South Africa and was initially based in Swaziland. Because of good 
work done he was sent to Lesotho and later to Zimbabwe. JK was killed in a motor 






In 1990 the accused was one of the first people to come back to South Africa to start 
negotiations between the ANC and the then government. The negotiations eventually 
led to democratic elections. At the time, however, there was violence in the then 
called Natal. The accused played a prominent role in trying to resolve the problems 
between the ANC and Inkhata.  
 
Since the accused joined the ANC Youth League he had held various positions in the 
ANC. He was a group leader while in prison and later became the public relations 
officer. He was a cell leader, a section leader and later the chairman of the political 
committee. After his release from Robben Island he was the secretary of the 
underground movement of the ANC in Natal. In 1977 he became a member of the 
national executive committee of the ANC. In 1990 he became the elected chairman of 
the southern Natal region of the ANC. He was also chairman of the ANC in the 
province of Natal as well as the MEC for Economic Affairs and Tourism.  
 
In 1999 the accused was appointed the Deputy President of the Republic of South 
Africa, a position which he held until mid 2005 when certain corruption charges were 
brought against him. Those charges will be tried mid 2006 and the accused has 
already pleaded not guilty to those charges.  
 
The accused testified that his political career put him in the public spotlight. A charge 
of rape will affect any person but especially a person in the accused's position. The 
trial has received enormous publicity and as the accused put it most of the reports 
were very damaging to his image. The accused is also aware of people working 
against him in the sense that there is an anti-Zuma camp. The accused did not go into 
detail regarding this aspect but he did mention two names of people whom he knows 
work against him. The accused had been the deputy president of the ANC since 1997 
and still holds that position. He volunteered to stand down and not to perform certain 
duties in that capacity pending the outcome of this trial.  
 
The accused testified that it is true that he had had contact with the complainant as a 
child in the early parts of the 1980's. While JK was in Lesotho and in Zimbabwe the 
accused had contact with him only. While JK was in Swaziland the accused saw him 
at his home and would have seen the complainant as well. The role of Dr Mkize was 
also touched on. Mkize stayed in South Africa for some time while JK was in 
Swaziland and reported to him in Swaziland. Later Mkize also went to Swaziland 
with his family. While JK was in Lesotho Mkize took care of both families. 
 
The accused saw the complainant while they were in Zambia but only as part of the 
children of the people in exile. He said that it is possible that he spoke to the 
complainant some time in 1998. Had she lost his telephone number during or about 
2001 it would have been the easiest thing to get hold of him because he was playing a 
prominent role in Natal and anyone of the offices in Natal and Johannesburg could 
have provided the complainant with his telephone number. The accused next dealt 
with the so-called father/daughter relationship between himself and the complainant. 
In the Zulu language "malume" refers to the brother of your mother. There is a 
different word for your father's brother. In exile the situation was slightly different. 
Older men folk were in general referred to as "malume". Once the younger people 





The accused denied that he had ever referred to the complainant as his daughter. He 
said that he not even refer to his own daughters in that manner. He called them by 
name. On the few occasions the complainant had visited the accused's home she was 
introduced to people present but never as his daughter. 
 
During the last two months before 2 November 2005 the complainant had sent a large 
number of sms messages to the accused. She never referred to herself as his daughter 
but called herself by name. There was also a new trend in those messages in that it 
ended off by referring to love, hugs and kisses. The accused conceded that on 2 
November 2005, and on an occasion prior to that, he had discussions with the 
complainant about a boy friend and he even referred to the fact that she will still have 
physical needs in spite of her HIV status. He denied that such discussions ever take 
place between a father and a daughter and he had never discussed that with his own 
daughters. In fact he says that in Zulu culture an older girl is allocated to a younger 
girl to educate her as far as relationships and sexual behaviour are concerned. 
Reference was made to the fact that the complainant was overseas for a period of 
approximately sixteen months during 2002 and 2003.  
 
During that period she had no contact with the accused at all. The accused said that 
that would not have happened with his own daughters. He would not have allowed 
them not to contact him and in any event he would have contacted them. The accused 
denied that the complainant had a close relationship with one of his daughters in 
Zambia or Zimbabwe. She had never been a friend of any of his daughters. Duduzile 
was in Zimbabwe but the complainant did not even recognise her. The other daughter 
Pumzile, who is presently 18 years of age, was too young and could not have been a 
friend of the complainant. The accused denied that he had ever had any discussion 
with the complainant about labola negotiations. He heard of such alleged discussions 
in court. The accused said that discussions about boy friends were introduced by the 
complainant and not by him. 
 
On 2 November 2005 the accused received a telephone call from the complainant 
telling him about the incident in Swaziland. At a stage he discovered that she had sent 
an sms earlier that day which he did not see at the time. The complainant indicated to 
the accused that she was in a hurry to leave for Swaziland. She also said that her 
mother was en route to Swaziland. The accused tried to persuade her not to go in a 
hurry but rather to wait until the next week. Later that day the complainant phoned the 
accused again and then informed him that she had decided not to go to Swaziland. She 
then added that she would like to see him at his home because she had something to 
discuss with him. He agreed. When the complainant arrived at the accused's home he 
was in a meeting with people. He was downstairs in the sitting room and opened the 
door for her. He denied having greeted her as his daughter but he merely said "hello 
big girl". As he was still busy with people he said she could go through to the kitchen. 
Later the accused had dinner with the other people present namely his daughter 
Duduzile, his son Duduzani, a person known as Kadusha, a child of one of his 
comrades, and the complainant. Later Duduzani left. 
 
After dinner there was again mention of the child in Swaziland. Kadusha was to be 
fetched by a person who phoned and said that she could not fetch Kadusha. Duduzile 





complainant whether she would be leaving with Duduzile and Kadusha. The 
complainant then said "I am not leaving, I am sleeping tonight." There was talk about 
a taxi because normally when the complainant visited the Zuma home she was picked 
up by a taxi. While Duduzile was away the accused and the complainant had a 
discussion. The complainant raised the discussion of a boy friend again. It developed 
into a discussion about the complainant's physical needs and that she had to lower her 
standards to get a suitable boy friend. There was also talk of medication for people 
with HIV Aids. The accused explained that many people come to him with ideas of 
how to treat such people. The accused told the complainant that he had work to do 
and as she was to stay over he asked her whether she knew where the guest-room was. 
She confirmed that she knew. The accused then said that he would go on with his 
work and once he is finished they can start discussing whatever the complainant 
wanted to discuss. The accused noticed that the complainant had not come to a point 
where something in particular was discussed. 
 
The accused went to his study and continued with his work. Some time later Duduzile 
came back. At a stage she came to his study to bid him goodnight. Still some time 
later somebody knocked at the study door and Duduzile and the complainant came in. 
The accused was then informed by Duduzile that the complainant wanted to discuss 
something with him. Duduzile left. The complainant remained behind in the study 
where the accused informed her that he still had to do some work. The complainant 
said that she was going to read and if she was asleep when the accused finished his 
work he must wake her up. The accused also said that at that stage the complainant 
was wearing a kanga, something he had not seen her in before. The accused could not 
remember a lady fetching clothes the evening of 2 November 2005. He also denied 
having received a telephone call while the complainant and Duduzile were with him 
in the study. He said he could not recall such a phone call. In any event his evidence 
was to the effect that nobody phoned him to come and see him urgently. Once the 
accused had finished his work he went to the guest-room. He found the door slightly 
open and as the light was switched on he went inside. He found the complainant lying 
on her stomach on the bed with her thumb in her mouth, fast asleep on top of the 
bedding. The accused woke the complainant and asked whether she still wanted to 
discuss something with him. She said she did and he then said that he would meet her 
in his bedroom. 
 
In his bedroom the accused was busy preparing the bed when the complainant 
entered. She was still wearing the kanga. She sat down on the bed. The accused took 
off his shoes and leaned against the pillows. The complainant again spoke about the 
child in Swaziland. She said she was getting cold and asked if she could get 
underneath the duvet. She did so. The accused then decided to put on his pyjamas and 
undressed in the room and put on his pyjamas. He also got into bed. The complainant 
then said that her body was tired and asked the accused to massage her. He fetched 
baby oil in the bathroom and started massaging her back while she was lying on her 
stomach. She loosened her kanga to allow him to rub her entire back and he noticed 
that she had no underwear on. He also rubbed her legs at the back and he noticed that 
she had no problem when he was rubbing her legs close to her private parts. She also 
asked him to massage her body in front. She turned around and the accused complied 
with the request. Once finished she thanked him, he washed his hands and came back 
to bed. In bed she covered him with her arm and as the accused noticed that 





they started touching and kissing and eventually he asked her whether she had a 
condom because he had none. She did not have one. He said that he hesitated a bit 
which caused the complainant to say that he could not leave her in that situation and 
they continued to have sexual intercourse. 
 
He said that he spoke to her during that process. She laughed and she said that she 
was fine and the discussion about the ejaculation took place. Once finished the 
accused went to the bathroom and took a shower. When he was finished with the 
shower he realised that the complainant was no longer in the bedroom.  He got 
dressed and went downstairs. She was lying on the bed with her kanga on and in 
answer to his question whether she was alright she said that she was fine and that 
nothing was wrong. They talked about her leaving the following morning, they kissed 
each other goodnight and the accused left. The accused said that had the complainant 
at any stage informed him that she did not want to have sex or to continue with it he 
would have stopped and left. Later this "left" was explained that the accused would 
have left it there, ie left what he was doing. The accused was not aware of any illness 
suffered by the complainant such as the attacks, referred to, during which she lost 
consciousness. The accused also said that if the complainant did not want him to have 
intercourse with her she could have pushed himaway. She is not a submissive woman. 
She is assertive and independent and she does not beat about the bush. She will say if 
she does not want anything. There was a policeman on duty not far away from the 
main bedroom and the guest room. 
 
The accused knew that the complainant was HIV positive. As Deputy President of the 
Republic of South Africa he was the chairperson of the Aids Council. He knew that 
the chances for a man was less than that of a woman to be infected during sexual 
intercourse. The accused learnt that there was a problem when he was told by 
members of the protection unit at his house that the police wanted to investigate an 
alleged rape at his home. The accused was shocked on learning this and wanted to 
contact the complainant, but seeing that she had laid a charge he was not prepared to 
see her alone. He tried to get hold of Kimi's mother which he eventually succeeded in 
doing. Though Kimi's mother was prepared to come to the accused she later 
withdrew. That was strange to him. He then contacted Kimi's stepmother, a certain 
Ellen Molekane, also known as Jane.  
 
Jane later contacted the accused and said that she had made contact with a person 
known as Samkelisiwe Mhlanga, referred to as Samkele, an acquaintance of the 
complainant. The two ladies, Jane and Samkele, then tried to make contact with the 
complainant and her mother. It is not necessary to deal in all detail with the efforts 
testified about. It eventually transpired that the complainant's mother was of the 
opinion that she could not decide for her daughter what to do and that she would abide 
her daughter's decision. It was also reported to the accused by the two ladies 
individually that the complainant was inter alia upset because of the fact that the 
accused did not phone her after the night of 2 November 2005 to enquire about how 
she had travelled to work, etc. 
  
The ladies alsoMspoke about labola negotiations as they were of the opinion that 
there was a loveMrelationship between the complainant and the accused. The accused 





unhappiness about his failure to contact her the accused phoned the complainant on 9 
November 2005. It was arranged that the accused would see her and her mother in 
Durban. That meeting did not take place. As indicated earlier the accused was a good 
friend of Dr Mkize who also knew JK and his family. During an ANC meeting in 
New Castle between the period 5 to 7 November 2005 Dr Mkize was warned by the 
accused about reports that would appear in newspapers concerning the alleged rape. It 
is common cause that the complainant's mother visited the accused on 13 November 
2005. Mkize was instrumental in that visit. The accused said that the complainant's 
mother was upset about what had happened. She also said that she was troubled by the 
fact that her daughter had to go to school and that she was not well. The accused 
apologised to the complainant's mother for hurting her emotionally. He was still 
prepared to assist the complainant to go to London for further studies. He was also 
willing to assist with the fence at the complainant's parental home in KwaZulu Natal. 
The complainant's mother did not accuse the accused of having raped her daughter. 
 
The accused next testified about the statement obtained in Nkhandla. It is not 
necessary to deal in detail therewith. The accused said that there was an express 
denial of rape. There was, however, no express statement concerning sex or no sex. It 
was decided that the only reference would be to the two people sharing each other's 
company privately as stated in the statement. There was no discussion of a wrong date 
being referred to in the statement. It was only during the trial that the accused became 
aware of the contents of the discussion his attorney had with the Cape Talk Radio. He 
knew about a discussion but not about the contents. The meeting on 15 November 
2005 at the Epping Road house was also dealt with. The accused denied that there was 
any word about a follow up meeting. He also denied that he was asked to point out a 
scene of an alleged crime. He said that the idea of the visit was to have an overview of 
the house and to take certain samples for DNA tests. What he was required to do was 
to point out the room where the complainant slept, the room where he slept and the 
study. He was never asked whether the guest-room was the place where "it" 
happened. No question was asked about anything having happened in the main 
bedroom. At the end of his evidence the accused referred to certain "indications" that 
the complainant was interested in something else than a mere discussion. In that 
respect he referred to the skirt she wore when she visited him on 2 November 2005 
instead of pants as she used to wear. He also referred to the type of discussion that 
took place. The accused stated that he would have had no problem having sexual 
intercourse with the complainant.  
 
Under cross-examination the accused reiterated that a condom was not used. He said 
that when he pre-plans sexual intercourse he normally has a condom. Neither he nor 
the complainant had a condom and they both wanted sexual intercourse. He was 
aware of her HIV status and he was aware of his own status as well. He was tested in 
London in 1988 and thereafter in 1998 again and then one month ago. He is HIV 
negative and he knew that at the time because he normally does not take any risks 
when having intercourse. The accused was criticised for the fact that he in his 
responsible position in government took the chance of being infected with HIV. He 
was also critizised for running the risk of infecting his wives. The accused conceded 
all that and indicated that he has suffered a lot because of the publicity of what had 
happened between him and the complainant in private. He also agreed that he wanted 
to stop proceedings. He therefore wanted to make contact with the complainant, but 





it to the accused that the complainant's evidence was that she would never have 
consented to unprotected sex. His reaction was that they did have unprotected sex and 
that the complainant was in fact the person who took the initiative. 
 
The accused was cross-examined at length about the relationship between himself and 
the K family and the complainant in particular. He again stated that he regarded the 
complainant's father as a comrade and as a friend. He never regarded the complainant 
as his child. The allegation about a father/daughter relationship is not true. The state 
cross-examined the accused about his power and authority in politics and in 
government structures. The state thereby wanted to indicate that the complainant, as a 
much younger person, the daughter of a comrade, would never have expected the 
accused to be sexually interested in her. The accused stated that she started discussing 
sexual aspects with him. It was put to the accused that the complainant is a lesbian.  
 
I have earlier in the discussion of the complainant's evidence referred to the fact that 
she is bisexual and that she regards her orientation as being lesbian. From the 
evidence it cannot be said that the complainant is a lesbian and only a lesbian. During 
the cross-examination various aspects were put to the accused and asked why the 
complainant would lie about it. One example is that it was put to him why would she 
lie about who invited who to the house. Obviously the accused said that he did not 
know. Another example is who raised the fact of sleeping over. I do not intend 
dealing with each and every of those aspects because it is clear that the cross-
examination was directed at showing to the accused that each and every step in the 
process up to sexual intercourse was pre-planned by him and intended to lead thereto.  
 
That is also the reason why much was made of the accused's evidence concerning the 
complainant's attire on 2 November, the way she sat and what was discussed between 
them. The accused said that he was sensing that there was something else in the 
complainant's mind, he noticed certain actions on her part and did not mind having 
sexual intercourse with her. It was put to the accused that he was running a huge risk 
to have sex with the complainant because in case of an emergency the police could 
come rushing in or even his daughter. I really did not understand the question at the 
time because one can hardly imagine the accused and complainant continuing with 
intercourse in a case of an emergency. If the reference was to shouting and screaming 
by the complainant as being the emergency, the question can be asked whether the 
accused would have run the risk of the complainant screaming in the event of non-
consensual sex, with the police and his daughter so close by. It was also put to the 
accused that the sexual intercourse took place in the guestroom and not in his 
bedroom. It was therefore put to him that he did not invite her to his bedroom but 
raped her in the guest-room.  
 
One must not lose sight of the fact that whatever happened between the accused and 
the complainant happened in the accused's house where there is more than one 
bedroom available for them to do whatever he or they wanted to do. The guest-room 
had a double bed and a bathroom, the same as the main bedroom. It is true that the 
accused's case sounds better once he says that the complainant came to his bedroom. 
On the other hand consensual intercourse could have taken place in the guest-room as 
well. In fact the one bedroom could have been just as risky as the other and just as 





It was suggested in cross-examination to the accused that he went down to the guest-
room to see whether the complainant was asleep or not. When she was awake the 
accused again left the bedroom. It was also suggested that because she was not paying 
attention to his suggestions all evening he had to catch her when she was asleep. I will 
deal with this later but wish to say now already that I have difficulty in understanding 
that approach. Had the accused started raping the complainant whilst asleep there was 
a much bigger danger that she would have screamed or shouted for help the moment 
she was awakened by the rape. There would then also be no sense in the accused 
talking to the complainant in trying to get her attention when she was not reacting to 
the intercourse. It was put to the accused that there can be no logic reason to have 
unprotected sex with an HIV positive person. The accused's reaction was that if two 
people have agreed to do a certain thing while knowing the risks involved it is 
possible to proceed therewith. The complainant herself said it is every individual's 
own choice to have unprotected sex with an HIV positive person.  
 
It appears from the cross-examination that the accused was somewhat surprised to 
find that the complainant had left his bedroom while he was having a shower. That is 
why he went down to the guest-room to find out whether everything was in order and 
he was assured that it was. The accused was questioned about his warning statement 
prepared by Mr Hulley. He was asked why the word "consent" or the words 
"consensual sex" were not used in the statement. The answer was that the statement 
clearly contains a denial of any guilt and then refers to something that happened 
privately. That was the accused's statement on advice of his attorney.  
 
The accused was asked why he did not deny the rape to the media. He said that there 
was no need to discuss anything with the media at all. Duduzile Zuma, the accused's 
23 year old daughter, also testified. During November 2005 as well as at present she 
is living with her father. Ms Zuma met the complainant approximately a month or six 
weeks before 2 November 2005. It happened on a day when she arrived home at about 
17:00 and saw the complainant with her father in the lounge or TV-room as she called 
it. The witness proceeded to the kitchen whereafter her father called her to introduce 
her to the complainant. The complainant was introduced by name and referred to as 
the child of a comrade. The witness denied that the complainant was at any stage 
introduced as the accused's daughter or that she was ever referred to as his daughter 
by the accused. Ms Zuma was also in exile and returned to South Africa 
approximately 1990 or 1991. She lived in Mozambique and Zimbabwe during her 
years in exile. She cannot recall having seen the complainant in Zimbabwe while she 
was there. There was also one other sister, a younger child, with her in Zimbabwe. 
She denied that the complainant had been friendly with either herself or her sister 
while in exile. On that first meeting the complainant passed a remark about the house 
the Zuma's were staying in and asked to be taken on a tour. The witness did so and 
pointed out all the rooms. When they got to the accused's room the complainant asked 
to see that and she went in. That is in contradiction with what the complainant herself 
testified. The witness denied that she and the complainant spent three to four hours in 
each other's company and said that it was approximately one hour.  
 
On 2 November 2005 the witness again arrived home after 17:00. She found the 
complainant and Kadusha sitting at the dining room table. The witness was 





thought that the complainant was looking for money from her dad because, according 
to her, everyone does that. Because of the irritation the witness immediately went into 
the kitchen and a lady, Mamzezani, walked in to help her cook. Mamzezani is a 
family friend. Later the complainant joined them in the kitchen and she inter alia 
related to a child of hers who had been bitten by a snake. The witness said that the 
complainant did not look too concerned as a mother. Later the complainant asked 
Kadusha to turn on the lights in the house, something that worried the witness as well. 
She formed the opinion the complainant was getting too comfortable. The witness 
herself then put on the lights. After Mamzezani had left, the witness' brother, 
Duduzani, joined them and the family enjoyed their meal. While having the meal the 
complainant apparently again referred to the child in Swaziland and also spoke about 
a book she was writing. After dinner the complainant helped the witness wash the 
dishes where the complainant spoke about a show at the civic theatre and the witness 
deducted that she was living close by.  
 
The witness said that she was getting an uneasy feeling about the complainant and 
then offered her a ride home. She said that the uneasy feeling was that there was 
something not right. The complainant accepted the ride home and then, with the 
accused's permission, phoned Swaziland. At a stage the complainant took a lunch-box 
out of her back pack and said that she wanted to wash it because it would be too late 
when she gets home and she also liked samp and beans which they had as part of their 
meal that night. She wanted to take some home. The person who was supposed to take 
Kadusha home could not do so any longer. The accused therefore asked Duduzile to 
do so, she fetched her car keys and while walking to her room overheard the 
complainant saying that she always carries a toothbrush and a panty in her bag. Ms 
Zuma was not happy about that because she now formed the opinion that the 
complainant was trying to stay the night at the Zuma residence. She again said that 
there was something just not right about the complainant and she was very protective 
of her father.  
 
The witness in general told Kadusha and the complainant that she was ready to go and 
she noticed that the complainant was also saying goodbye to Kadusha. The witness 
remarked "but am I not taking you home" whereafter the complainant reacted "no I 
had decided to spend the night". She took Kadusha home and when she returned she 
saw that the guest room light was on and the shower was running. The accused was 
working in the study. Sometime later there was a knock on her bedroom door, she 
opened and saw the complainant who said that she could not sleep and asked for a 
book to read. She gave her one whereafter the complainant said she wanted to have a 
discussion with the accused. The witness took her to the study. The complainant was 
wearing a sarong which is a kanga. The witness said that she could clearly see that the 
complainant did not wear any underwear and thought it was most inappropriate in 
other people's house. Whilst in the study the phone rang and the witness left the study. 
The complainant stayed behind. After having left the complainant in the study, the 
witness said that she laid in bed trying to listen if she could hear footsteps going down 
the stairs to the guest room. She fell asleep without hearing any footsteps. She did that 
because she was convinced that the complainant was trying to entice her father. The 
witness was in the house all night but did not hear anything. She confirmed that there 
was a policeman on duty. She referred to an incident where her sister screamed about 
a huge cockroach in the bedroom and she said "like in two seconds" the police was 





Nothing much came out of the cross-examination of this witness. The reason why the 
witness thought the complainant was going to ask for money is because the moment a 
person is referred to as a comrade's child they always need help. The witness said her 
feeling of uneasiness was as a result of women's intuition. The witness did not ask her 
father about rumours of rape and discussions thereof in newspapers.  
 
Shortly before the allegation of rape was made public she overheard mention thereof 
in the house from people who visited her father. Ntswaki Sigxashe is a lady who 
testified about the allegations concerning Charles, Godfrey and Mashaya. She was 
also in exile. She knows the complainant as a child in exile in the 1980's. She came to 
hear of an incident between the complainant and Godfrey when the complainant 
complained about an assault by a lady called Ndileka, Godfrey's girl friend. The 
witness, a certain Promise and the complainant's mother was working at the South 
African Council of Trade Unions. Comrade Nkadimeng was the secretary of SACTU 
and requested the witness and Promise to investigate the assault. They asked the 
complainant for the reason for the assault but she said she did not know. Later she 
said she was assaulted because Godfrey had raped her. The two ladies, ie the witness 
and Promise, then consulted Godfrey. Eventually after more consultations with the 
two people involved, Godfrey admitted that there was an intimate relationship 
between him and the complainant. He stated that whatever had occurred between 
them was consensual.  
 
The two ladies were upset about an affair with a 13 year old girl and recommended to 
the regional political committee and the legal department of the ANC that Godfrey be 
punished for having had an affair with a 13 year old girl, but not for rape. The 
punishment was six months without allowance and labour at the ANC's small farm. 
Godfrey, however, went overseas for studies and on his return served his punishment. 
The witness is also aware of an allegation against Charles. Charles' name was 
mentioned when the two ladies asked the complainant who else had given her trouble. 
She then said that Charles had also raped her. The witness immediately conceded that 
Charles did not have a fair trial because Charles denied the allegation of rape and he 
was not given an opportunity to explain exactly what the position was. He was 
punished in the same way as Godfrey was. The witness is also aware of allegations 
about Mashaya. She said that Mashaya's situation is completely different. He was a 
fairly young man at the time and it was clear that he and the complainant were in love 
and they reprimanded him not to do anything untoward and he promised not to do 
anything until the child was grown up and ripe for whatever adults do. The most 
important aspect that came out of cross-examination was that the complainant was 
taken to a doctor to be examined. It was clear from the doctor's examination, 
according to the witness, that the complainant had not been penetrated prior to the 
examination. It was therefore clear that no intercourse had taken place between the 
complainant and either Godfrey or Charles.  
 
It was then explained that what had happened between the complainant and Godfrey 
was what is called "metcha". That is the situation where the man puts his penis 
between the girl's thighs but not penetrating her. Mbuso Ncube, also known as 
Mashaya, then told his part of the story. I will refer to this witness as Mashaya. 
Mashaya left South Africa in 1983 and returned in 1993. He is at present 43 years of 





and Zimbabwe. He met the complainant for the first time at a wedding in Lusaka. He 
immediately fell in love with her. That must have been during or about 1988. She was 
looking beautiful to the witness and he proposed to her. They thereafter met on 
various occasions. At a stage he was no longer based in Zambia and only saw the 
complainant when he went to Zimbabwe. At the time the witness stayed with a couple 
of friends and the complainant with her mother.  
 
On one occasion he, together with a friend Jabu, fetched the complainant with the 
witness' car. The complainant accompanied them voluntarily. Arriving at his house he 
went to buy drinks and when he returned he was told that Godfrey and his girl friend 
had taken the complainant away. The witness denied having attempted to rape the 
complainant at the time. He also denied that he desisted from raping her because she 
was menstruating. He said when he came back she was no longer there. A relationship 
later developed between Mashaya and the complainant and they were intimate in that 
they had penetrative sex. It happened mostly in the car (on three or four occasions) 
and once in the house. No condoms were used. The witness saw the complainant 
again in Durban at her workplace in St Andrews Street. They had a general discussion 
but the relationship was at an end. 
 
The cross-examination turned to a great extent on establishing whether the 
complainant was under 16 when intercourse took place between her and Mashaya. 
That did not take the matter further and I need not go into that in any further detail. 
Sitembele Wellington Masoka is a pastor presently at the parish at Upington. He 
attended the theological school in Vereeniging where he met the complainant during 
1995. He fell in love with her and together with a friend, Ndumiso Conco, went to the 
place where she was living. He proposed love to her, meaning that he wanted to have 
an affair with her. She rejected his proposal. The next day the witness was called to 
the office of Pastor Mahlabe who informed him that the complainant had alleged that 
he had raped her. The witness was immediately expelled from the college. He tried to 
explain but was not given an opportunity. He was most upset and had to attend 
another college to complete his studies. He said that he did not touch the complainant 
and he did not persist with his proposal when she rejected it. He and his friend left the 
complainant's room. Duduzile Ncobo met the complainant during 1993/1994 when 
she was introduced to the witness by Pastor Mbambo.  
 
The witness was at the time based at 20 St Andrews Street in Durban and was 
involved with the Council of Churches. The place where she worked was also known 
as Deaconia. The witness was a youth worker and had to co-ordinate the affairs of the 
youth from various church denominations. The complainant was a representative of 
the youth from her church. She was initially brought to the witness because according 
to Mbambo she had to complete St 10 so that she could go to a seminary to study for 
ministry. The complainant was enrolled at the Phambile high school. The witness had 
regular contact with the complainant through her involvement with the youth. She 
therefore became aware that the complainant was keeping the company of a person 
known as Sandile Sithole, a person representing the youth of the Anglican church. 
Sandile Sithole was, according to the witness, a person with feminine features. He 
was a small bodied, thin person, much smaller than the complainant. It was clear to 






During 1994 the complainant on an occasion approached the witness, crying, telling 
her that Sandile Sithole had tried to rape her. The witness was upset and telephoned 
Father Lazarus, the chairperson of the Council of Churches to report the incident to 
him. A committee was immediately formed to investigate and Pastor Mbambo was 
appointed as the chairperson of that committee. The complainant was the first female 
who wanted to enter the ministry and she was well-liked. The witness therefore 
wanted to ensure that Sandile be arrested if he was guilty of the complaint against 
him. It was arranged that the complainant and her mother would attend the meeting of 
the committee but they failed to arrive. The complainant completely disappeared. She 
said that the complainant's disappearance shocked all of them. 
 
The witness later learnt that the complainant had in fact gone to the ministry college. 
She, however, did not report to the witness or the Council of Churches and theywere 
all worried about the complainant. One day she bumped into the complainant in West 
Street in Durban and asked her how it was going at school. The complainant then 
reported to her that she had abandoned her studies because the pastors at the ministry 
wanted to rape her. The witness asked the complainant whether she had reported that 
to Pastor Mbambo whom the witness regarded as a sort of a father figure. The 
complainant's reaction was that she and her mother do not want to see the very sight 
of that pastor ever again because he also raped her. The witness said that three 
allegations regarding rape were made by the complainant. The first was that of 
Sandile Sithole as well as another attempted rape at the college and then the allegation 
of rape against Mbambo. All these allegations made the witness tender her evidence 
to the accused's legal representatives. She saw them the Saturday before she testified 
and well after the complainant had testified.  
 
The witness said that she read in the newspapers about the allegations that had been 
made by the complainant and then realised that it must have been the complainant 
who laid the charge against the accused. In the meantime, she said, Sandile Sithole 
had also phoned her and referred to the allegations against himself. Sithole was 
worried about the complainant, saying that she was mixed up and that she needed 
help. The witness herself said in court that after having heard of the various 
allegations from the complainant and reading about it in the newspaper and because 
she loves the complainant, she just wanted to reveal all she testified about in court 
because it may be that the complainant has a problem. She said that if the court can, 
she will appreciate it if the child, the complainant, can be helped. It is not necessary to 
deal with the cross-examination in any detail. It was interesting to note that the 
witness said that when she told Sithole about the allegation against him he initially 
laughed and asked her whether the complainant was making a joke. Later he was 
upset and wanted to clear his name and wanted the committee to meet to investigate 
the allegations. 
 
Pastor Peete April Mbambo is a pastor in the African Methodist Church from the 
parish at New Castle. He graduated in the year 1988 from the Wilberforce Institute in 
Vereeniging. He was the pastor of the parish at KwaMashu in Durban from 1991 till 
1998. The complainant and her mother are both well-known to Mbambo. When they 
returned from exile they had no place to stay and with the assistance of his parish 






The complainant and her mother were members of the congregation served by the 
pastor. The complainant was responsible for youth activities, in particular health 
matters in relation to HIV Aids. She was in that way attached to the District Council 
of Churches in Durban. The pastor himself was the chairperson of the ecumenical, 
educational and renewal ministry of a branch of the South African Council of 
Churches. The office from where the work was done was commonly known as 
Deaconian in Durban at 20 St Andrews Street. In his church the pastor has, what is 
called, an altar call where people in the congregation can express their desires or 
wishes. On an occasion the complainant expressed her wish to become a pastor. The 
witness and the congregation were happy about it and proud of the young lady and 
therefore recommended her to the district conference and later to the annual 
conference to be accepted as a student and to have her tuition fees paid by the church. 
All this happened in 1994. The complainant did, however, not have a matric 
certificate and she went to the Phambile high school in Durban to write certain 
subjects to obtain her matric certificate. At the end of that year there was an annual 
conference which the complainant did not attend because, according to her, she was 
writing matric examinations.  
 
For some time Mbambo did not have any contact with the complainant and later in 
1995 learnt that she had already joined the college. The witness therefore contacted 
the dean at the college and asked for a copy of the complainant's matric certificate. 
During a service in KwaMashu during Easter 1995 a person fainted. Mbambo later 
learned that it was the complainant. He then raised the question of the matric 
certificate with her. She told Mbambo that it was at the college and that she would 
supply it later. She also arranged for further finances to be made available. The 
witness only heard of the complainant again in September of 1995 when it was 
reported that she was at home and that she was sick. The annual conference was to 
follow shortly thereafter and the witness realised that at the annual conference a roll-
call would be held and the complainant's name as a future pastor would be called out. 
On a Sunday he sent elders of the church to go to the complainant to find out what her 
problems were and why she was not attending college. The elders reported back that 
the witness must forget about the report. He forced them to tell him what the 
complainant told them and they then said that she had alleged that he had raped her. 
He immediately arranged for the complainant to be fetched by car and brought to the 
church.  
 
Having arrived there he invited her to sit down which she refused to do. He explained 
the complainant's rights to her in that she could go to the police with the complaint 
and that there were also internal disciplinary procedures in the church. Her reaction 
was "if you do not know about it I am leaving this dirty church". She then left. At the 
annual conference the complainant's name was called and she was not present. It was 
then reported by the secretary of the conference that the complainant had alleged that 
she left the college because she was raped at the theological seminary. Mbambo then 
also reported her allegation of rape against him. The complainant was given a year to 
put her house in order but she never reported back to the conference or made any 
complaints with the police.  
 
The witness denied that he had suggested to the complainant to become romantically 





Sandile Sithole. He confirmed that Sithole was a member of the Anglican Church, 
that he was a short, tiny young man with feminine features, smaller than the 
complainant. He confirmed having heard about an attempted rape concerning Sithole 
and the complainant from Dudu Ncobo. Mbambo testified about the allegations made 
against Nestor Ragedzi. This happened in1993 before the complainant went to the 
theological seminary. It was during Easter. Mbambo had to stand in for the pastor 
who had to preach the closing ceremony on the Sunday. He therefore prepared his 
sermon at the home of Reverend Mayakizo. He also slept in Mayakizo's house. The 
Sunday morning between 03:00 and 04:00 he heard a loud knock on the window of a 
room next door. He got up to investigate and found Nestor naked on the bed lying 
next to the complainant who was sleeping on her stomach with a white panty and a T-
shirt on with either a Telkom or Escom insignia on it. As both Nestor and the 
complainant were asleep he woke them up and told them that certain ladies wanted to 
collect vegetables from that room and to open for them. Mbambo went back to bed.  
 
The next morning at breakfast the complainant's mother was present and so were the 
complainant and Nestor. The complainant introduced Nestor to her mother. Mbambo 
then remembered what he saw earlier that morning and reported that to Mayakizo. 
That evening at about 18:15 at his own home in KwaMashu, Mbambo was visited by 
the complainant and her mother. The complainant was carrying the T-shirt and it was 
alleged that Nestor had raped her and that DNA samples were on the T-shirt. Mbambo 
advised the complainant and her mother to lay a charge with the police as he was very 
suspicious and skeptical about her story. He pointed out to the mother what he had 
found in the bedroom and also referred to the introduction at the breakfast table. The 
mother became cross and left with the complainant and nothing was heard again of 
this allegation. Mbambo said that the room in which he found Nestor and the 
complainant was immediately adjacent to the room in which he was sleeping. It was 
the room normally occupied by Nestor. There was no door in that room but only a 
curtain. Had the complainant made any noise whatsoever he would have heard that. 
Nothing much came out of the cross-examination. It was put to Mbambo that the 
complainant denied having accused him as well as Nestor and Sandile Sithole of rape. 
 
The witness stated that he was most surprised about those denials. Sandile Nhlanhla 
Sithole testified about the attempted rape he was accused of by the complainant. 
Sithole is a 38 year old unmarried male from Durban. He met the complainant in the 
early 1990's. When she was introduced to him he was aware of the fact that she was a 
candidate to go to a theological college and he regarded her as a role model because 
she was a female, somebody from within their own ranks, who wanted to become a 
minister of religion. The complainant's offices were in St Andrews Street in Durban 
while Sithole was based in Queen Street in Durban. During 1993 he can recall the 
complainant visiting him one afternoon. Later that afternoon he went back to the 
Deaconian centre and Dudu Ncobo then informed him that the complainant had 
accused him of attempted rape. Sithole said that he laughed because he thought it was 
a joke. Ncobo then told him that it was serious and a committee was set up to 
investigate. He confirmed that nothing came of that. In cross-examination it appeared 
that Sithole had met the complainant on a number of occasions since the alleged rape, 
even as late as last year. There were no bad feelings between them but the witness did 






Oupa Geoffrey Matlhabe is a pastor in the African Methodist Church with a parish 
located in Katlehong. He was the boarding master at the ministry where the 
complainant studied in 1995, the year in which he met her. The witness' 
responsibilities were to look after the welfare of the students including their sleeping 
facilities, health and general welfare. The students lived in hostels. Some hostels were 
on campus but others were outside. The complainant lived outside the campus in a 
hostel together with about eight students. Matsoko who testified earlier was also 
known to the witness. In 1995 the witness received a report from the complainant that 
Matsoko had raped her. The matter was investigated. The complainant was advised to 
lay a charge with the police. That was not done.  
 
The witness said that there was a rule that male students could not go to the rooms of 
female students. Everybody knew that when they arrived at the college. Matsoko 
breached that rule. He also in cross-examination said that he was not aware of 
anybody else accompanying Matsoko to the complainant's room. She did not mention 
anybody and Matsoko said he was alone. Matsoko was expelled on the day the 
allegation was made against him. That was done to set an example to other students. 
An allegation of rape was also made against Mahlabe himself. That was the incident 
where the complainant said she was impregnated. The witness said that he became 
aware of this allegationon 9 March 2006 round about 18:45. One of his fellow pastors 
asked him if he knew that a complaint of rape had been laid against the accused. 
When Mahlabe said that he did not know, the pastor showed him a newspaper and 
said that he, Mahlabe, was the boarding master at the college during 1995. He then 
read about the alleged rape levelled against him. He said that he was shocked and he 
went to the college to seek information about the complainant.  
 
The witness testified that before Easter in 1995 the complainant became ill. With the 
assistance of the staff at the college it was decided that it would be safer for the 
complainant to stay at his house instead of at the boarding house outside the campus. 
The witness also contacted Mbambo so that the complainant's mother could be 
informed about her illness and be asked to collect her at the college. The complainant 
stayed for one night with Mahlabe and his family in his house and the complainant's 
mother then arrived. The mother and the complainant remained for one night 
whereafter Mahlabe took them to board a taxi to go home. He denied that he had 
raped her. He denied that she had fainted while in his presence. He was also referred 
to the complainant's mother's evidence that the fetus looked like him. When that 
evidence was put to the witness he smiled and he gave the following answer:  
 
"My expression is not that I am laughing. I am not actually laughing. I pity the poor 
complainant. I think she is not well. She is sick, and she needs urgent attention, 
medical attention otherwise many families will be destroyed by her."  
 
 
He then stated that DNA tests could have been done on the fetus and on himself. 
Nothing like that was done and no complaint was laid against him. The witness was 
so upset that he even consulted medical doctors who confirmed that a five month old 
fetus could have no resemblance with the alleged father. In cross-examination the 






Three witnesses were called to state that though they had phoned the accused the 
evening of 2 November 2005 they did not ask to see him urgently and could not see 
him in Johannesburg at all. The first was Kumanas Majola who was in Durban at the 
time. She wanted some help from the accused. The second was Nosizwe Vuso. She 
was also in Durban that night. The third was Julaiga Mohammed an attorney for the 
accused in various matters. She has never spoken Zulu to the accused and she did not 
ask to see him urgently.  
 
Mr Modiyanewu Terrence Modise is a pastor in the African Methodist Church 
situated in Standerton. He also studied at the seminary where the complainant was a 
student. Modise completed his studies in 1995, the same year he met the complainant 
at the college. She was then in her first year. When he met the complainant he 
immediately fell in love with her. He is of the opinion that it was a mutual feeling and 
he said that they were thereafter inseparable. They had an intimate relationship though 
it appeared that it was not a sexual relationship in the sense that he had had 
penetrative sex with her. On an occasion when the other female students left for a 
week-end and the complainant was alone in the hostel the witness visited her. He said 
that they chatted, they hugged, they kissed and at a stage when he lowered his pants 
she suddenly jumped up and according to him became mad. Up to then, he said, it 
appeared as if they were acting like two lovers, they cuddled each other and the 
complainant was permissive. When she became so angry she took everything she 
could lay her hands on like pillows, blankets and pillow cases and threw them outside, 
according to him, with the intention of burning it.  
 
The witness said he felt very bad about this incident because he thought that he had 
done something wrong and that he had hurt the person whom he loved. The moment 
he could, he disappeared and he went back to the place where he stayed. The next 
morning he felt dreadful. He did not go for the morning prayer and only later saw the 
complainant. He apologised to her. She accepted the apology. They continued their 
relationship but the witness said he was very careful not to do anything to upset the 
complainant again. Apart from a passing remark by the dean of the college that the 
witness was apparently involved with the complainant he was informed by Reverend 
Mbambo that the complainant had alleged that he, the witness, had raped her. The 
witness denied ever having raped the complainant. He denied ever having had sexual 
intercourse with her at any stage whatsoever. 
 
In cross-examination the witness said that he was not aware of the fact that he was not 
entitled to visit a female in her room. He testified that a certain elder S E Modise was 
the boarding master at the time of this incident and that Mahlabe had taken over from 
Modise. Nothing more came out of the cross-examination. Mr Lungisa Henry Manzi 
is at present the chief of the emergency services of the Durban metro municipality. He 
knows the complainant very well. He met the complainant during 1998 when his flat 
mate, one Thulani Mpontshani brought her to their flat. On that occasion, which was a 
Sunday, they watched a soccer match and later that evening he accompanied the 
complainant and Thulani to the back exit of the block of flats. The witness thereafter 
returned to his room. The next Saturday between 08:00 and 09:00 the complainant 
used the intercom at the block of flats to contact the witness. Thulani overheard that 
the complainant wanted to come to the flat and as he was with another female in his 





The witness could not do that and she came to the flat and stayed there with the 
witness all day long. Thulani and his girl friend remained in his bedroom. Later that 
evening the witness walked the complainant back to her flat where she stayed with her 
mother. She then told her mother that she was going to stay the night with the They 
went to his bedroom. Apparently Thulani was aware of her presence and again 
remained in his bedroom. Later the witness took a bath and while he was in the bath 
the complainant entered, undressed, and got into the bath with him. They later went to 
his bedroom and remain naked. They had a discussion about Thulani and how the 
complainant met him and it then appeared that the complainant apparently had a 
problem with her own boy friend and told Thulani that she was frustrated with her 
boy friend, that she needed sexual intercourse and that she needed it immediately. 
Thulani then took her to his flat which was at that stage in a separate building. She 
also told the witness about an incident when Thulani apparently looked for a condom 
which he could not find and then started praying. The witness spent the night with the 
complainant in his bed, both of them naked, but he said that they did not have 
intercourse.  
 
The following morning he took her back to her mother. The witness saw the 
complainant on different occasions thereafter in the street and then she disappeared 
for a fairly long time. In the second half of the year 2000, while he was with his wife, 
he met the complainant again, took her telephone number on her invitation that he 
come and see her. He dropped his wife off at the airport and went to the University of 
Natal where the complainant was staying in a local hostel. She then told him about her 
HIV status. Later that afternoon the witness left. The witness was a policeman with 
the rank of senior superintendent when he met the complainant. During cross-
examination he was also asked to describe her which he did. He was aware of the 
complainant's surname. As will appear from the evidence of Thulani later herein there 
are a few discrepancies between this witness' evidence and that of Thulani. According 
to the witness they all sat on the floor to watch the soccer on the Sunday while 
Thulani said that they were sitting on the sofa. The witness said that he only 
accompanied Thulani and the complainant up to the back gate. Thulani initially said 
that the witness walked half way to the complainant's flat.  
 
According to the witness he and the complainant only left during the evening whereas 
Thulani said that he got a chance to make some food when the witness and the 
complainant left the flat some time during the day. The witness denied that the 
complainant does not know him or Thulani. He said that if she was present in court 
she would have immediately recognised him. Thulani Tetwake Mpontshani is the 
Thulani referred to earlier. He met the complainant during 1996. He saw her when she 
was wearing Swazi clothes and as he lived in Swaziland and attended school there, he 
greeted her in Isiswazi. They met on more than one occasion in Point Road where 
they visited the Wheels restaurant where they inter alia discussed a love affair. He 
took her to his flat on an occasion where he could not find a condom. As he was not 
used to making love to women without a condom he started praying. They had 
intercourse on that occasion. At a later stage the complainant spent an entire week-end 
with him in the flat where he was staying at that time. They had intercourse on more 
than one occasion during that week-end. At a stage during the week-end he realised 
that she was a little bit quiet and when he enquired about it he then heard that she had 






Over and above the contradictions with the evidence of Manzi the witness was also 
confused about the next visit by the complainant to the flat where he and Manzi was 
staying. He initially said it was the day after the Sunday and later changed it to a week 
later. Not much further transpired from the cross-examination. Dr Louise Olivier is a 
registered clinical and counseling psychologist. It is not necessary to refer to her 
curriculum vitae. It is an impressive curriculum vitae. Dr Olivier treats patients from 
different culture groups in South Africa and has patients from countries such as 
Botswana, Uganda and Tanzania. In her doctoral thesis she inter alia worked on the 
development of a psychometric test regarding the evaluation of sexual functions and 
adaptation of adults in South Africa. This test has found acceptance and is now used 
in South Africa. She has also done a research project on inter alia the trauma 
experienced by women including rape. In her report she referred to the mandate given 
to her. She also refers to the fact that a request was made to do a psychological 
assessment of the complainant which was refused. She said that a psychologist can be 
asked in the field of forensic psychology to do a full evaluation or be asked to give a 
specialised input in regard to the testimony given.  
 
Dr Olivier could not do a psychological assessment. She therefore had to listen to the 
evidence given by the complainant and to read the record which inter alia includes Dr 
Merle Friedman's report. Dr Olivier was critical of Dr Friedman's report. Dr Olivier 
made a clear distinction between a psychologist doing clinical work and a 
psychologist doing forensic work. As a forensic psychologist preparing a report for 
evidence in court a whole battery of psychometric tests are undertaken. Each specific 
test, so Dr Olivier testified, can assist in coming to conclusions. The allegations of the 
patient are also investigated over a period of time during lengthy consultations. 
Confirmation is also obtained from other witnesses, family and friends. A medical 
history is of importance. In the instant matter the complainant was apparently, while 
in exile, treated in a mental hospital. It is common cause between the state and the 
defence that the complainant is still receiving some sort of counseling or treatment.  
 
Dr Olivier was also critical of Dr Friedman's allegation that the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale 3 test is of no value. Dr Olivier says that the Wechsler test is very 
important because cognitive functioning is influenced by emotional problems. Dr 
Olivier was also critical about the two short consultations Dr Friedman had with the 
complainant and the apparent lack of enquiry into the complainant's sexual 
background. Dr Olivier says that it is of the utmost importance to find out everything 
about a complainant in order to make an assessment. The conclusion Dr Olivier came 
to was that because Dr Friedman did not investigate the complainant's position in 
detail she could not say that the complainant as a fact froze during the intercourse. Dr 
Olivier conceded that about 10% of all women freeze during a rape but one can only 
say that it is not malingering once one knows the results of the battery of 
psychometric tests and had gone into the detail referred to above.  
 
The finding of post traumatic stress disorder by Dr Friedman was also questioned. Dr 
Olivier said that it is so that a woman will suffer from post traumatic stress disorder 
after a rape but if one takes into account that there were various allegations of rape 
made by the complainant, which Dr Friedman did not investigate, it cannot be said 
that the intercourse between the accused and the complainant was the cause of the 





by Dr Friedman makes her report regarding post traumatic stress disorder of no value 
whatsoever. Dr Olivier was also referred to the so-called attacks suffered by the 
complainant. She said that that was highly relevant and should have been investigated 
in full. Reference to even a neurosurgeon or a neurologist would have been advisable.  
 
In cross-examination Dr Olivier tried to explain the difference between a clinical 
psychologist and a forensic psychologist or, put differently, a psychologist performing 
clinical work and a psychologist performing forensic work. This will become of 
importance later when I discuss the reference to the You magazine and advice Dr 
Olivier gave therein. Dr Olivier says that as a clinician the psychologist deals with the 
perception by the patient. The patient is then treated for the perception and to try and 
heal that person. In forensic work the perception as such is investigated in detail in 
order to find whether the perception represents the true factual situation. Therefore, 
she said, that when she gives advice in the You magazine she does it as a clinician and 
accepts the perception of the reader and deal therewith and refer the specific reader 
for expert assistance.  
 
Dr Friedman is a trauma specialist. Dr Olivier did not say that that means that her 
evidence is of no value to the court. What Dr Olivier did say was that the work of a 
trauma specialist is not that of a forensic psychologist. The evaluation by Dr Friedman 
as a trauma expert is not acceptable as a full forensic evaluation. It is also not in 
accordance with the ethical code of conduct of the professional body of psychologists. 
In cross-examination Dr Olivier was on more than one occasion invited to make a 
diagnosis. She refused on each and every occasion because she said she had not done 
a forensic investigation. She is not in possession of a full clinical history. Dr Olivier 
in conclusion in her report refers to possible reasons from a psychological perspective 
why a claimant would make a false allegation of rape. She describes it as follows: 
 
"It is the experience of the undersigned psychologist that a claimant would make a 
false allegation of rape because of the following psychological dynamics: 
• That the claimant genuinely believes that she has been raped but that the belief is not 
reality based. This occurs in cases where the claimant has an encapsulated delusion 
(in this case the claimant is in contact with reality in other aspects of her life), 
hallucinates, or has organic pathology, which can be accompanied by hallucinatory 
images. 
 
• That the claimant has serious personality or emotional pathology. Typical 
personality pathology would be the Borderline Personality Disorder, the Schizotypal 
Personality Disorder and the Antisocial Personality Disorder. In the latter case the 
person would accuse someone of rape for personal gain or vindictiveness. 
 
• That the claimant has experienced previous trauma and that due to this, the claimant 
then perceives any sexual behaviour as threatening. In this case the claimant can have 
consensual sex but after the fact project this as rape because of subconscious guilt 
feelings, resentment, anger and emotional turmoil. In this case the claimant can 






• That the claimant can simply make an allegation of rape because of negative 
transference (such as 'punishing' the accused for a perceived wrong). In this case the 
claimant is convinced that she is telling the truth. 
 
• That the claimant can simply make an allegation of rape because of a hidden agenda 
(such as getting revenge because of a perceived other wrong done to the claimant). 
The undersigned psychologist has been involved in cases where claimants make an 
allegation of rape just because the accused jilted the claimant for another lover. In this 
case the claimant knows that she is lying but does so purposefully." 
 
The defence closed its case after the evidence of Dr Olivier. It is unfortunate that it 
was necessary to summarise the evidence as long as I did. Because of misconceptions 
that had arisen as a result of selective reporting it was necessary to highlight certain 
material facts. That I had now done and I can now proceed with the final analysis. In 
this particular matter it is necessary to refer to the state's burden of proof and the way 
in which a court should approach the evidence where a court is faced with two 
conflicting, in some instances, mutually destructive versions. In S v Ntsele 1998(2) 
SACR 178 (SCA) the supreme court of appeal deals with the onus of proof on the 
state, the adequacy of proof and the trial court's evaluation of evidence. At 182b-f 
EKSTEEN JA says the following: 
 
"Die bewyslas wat in 'n strafsaak op die staat rus is om die skuld van die 
aangeklaagde bo redelike twyfel te bewys – nie bo elke sweempie van tywfel nie. In 
Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 op 373H – stel Denning R (soos hy 
toe was) dit soos volg: 
 
'It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof 
beyond a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful 
possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man 
as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the 
sentence 'of course it is possible, but not in the least probable', the case is proved 
beyond reasonable doubt.' 
 
Ons reg vereis insgelyks nie dat 'n hof slegs op absolute sekerheid sal handel nie, 
maar wel op geregverdigde en redelike oortuigings – niks meer en niks minder nie (S 
v Reddy and 0thers 1996 (2) SASV 1 (A) op 9d-e). Voorts, wanneer 'n hof met 
omstandigheidsgetuienis werk, soos in die onderhawige geval, moet die hof nie elke 
brokkie getuienis afsonderlik betrag om te besluit hoeveel gewig daaraan geheg moet 
word nie. Dit is die kumulatiewe indruk wat al die brokkies tesame het wat oorweeg 
moet word om te besluit of die aangeklaagde se skuld bo redelike twyfel bewys is (R v 
De Villiers 1944 AD 493 op 508-9)." The reference to S v Reddy and 0thers 1996(2) 
SACR 1 (A) reads as follows: 
 
"Lord Coleridge, in R v Dickman (Newcastle Summer Assizes, 1910 – referred to in 
Wills on Circumstantial Evidence 7th ed at 46 and 452-60), made the following 
observations concerning the proper approach to circumstantial evidence: 
 
'It is perfectly true that this is a case of circumstantial evidence and circumstantial 





proportion to the character, the variety, the cogency, the independence, one of 
another, of the circumstances. I think one might describe it as a network of facts 
around the accused man. That network may be a mere gossamer thread, as light and as 
unsubstantial as the air itself. It may vanish at a touch. It may be that, strong as it is in 
part, it leaves great gaps and rents through which the accused is entitled to pass in 
safety. It may be so close, so stringent, so coherent in its texture, that no efforts on the 
part of the accused can break through. It may come to nothing – on the other hand it 
may be absolutely convincing. ... The law does not demand that you should act upon 
certainties alone. ... In our lives, in our acts, in our thoughts we do not deal with 
certainties; we ought to act upon just and reasonable convictions founded upon just 
and reasonable grounds. ... The law asks for no more and the law demands no less.'" 
 
In S v Singh 1975 1 SA 227 (N) the court discussed the approach of a court where 
there is a conflict of fact. The learned judge says the following at p228F-H:  
 
"it would perhaps be wise to repeat once again how a court ought to approach a 
criminal case on fact where there is a conflict of fact between the evidence of the state 
witnesses and that of an accused. It is quite impermissible to approach such a case 
thus: because the court is satisfied as to the reliability and the credibility of the state 
witnesses that, therefore, the defence witnesses, including the accused, must be 
rejected. The proper approach in a case such as this is for the court to apply its mind 
not only to the merits and the demerits of the state and the defence witnesses but also 
to the probabilities of the case. It is only after so applying its mind that a court would 
be justified in reaching a conclusion as to whether the guilt of an accused has been 
established beyond all reasonable doubt." 
 
An extremely helpful summary also appears in the headnote of the judgment in S v 
Radebe 1991(2) SACR 166 (T) at 167j-168h. The summary reads thus: 
 
"A criminal court does not judge an accused's version in a vacuum as if only a charge-
sheet has been presented. The state case, taking account of its strengths and 
weaknesses, must be put into the scale together with the defence case and its strengths 
and weaknesses. It is perfectly correct that the state case cannot be determined first 
and if found acceptable regarded as decisive. The state case, if it is the only 
evidentiary material before the court, must in all cases be examined first in order to 
determine whether there is sufficient evidentiary material in respect of all the 
elements of the offence and whether there is not perhaps in any event a reasonable 
possible alternative hypothesis appearing therefrom. Precisely the same approach is 
applicable if the defence puts forward a version. Taking into account the state case, 
once again it must be established whether the defence case does not establish a 
reasonable alternative hypothesis. That a hypothesis does not have to be the strongest 
of the various possibilities (that is, the most probable) as that would amount to 
ignoring the degree and content of the state's onus.  
 
The state's case must also not be weighed up as an independent entity against the 
defence case as that is not how facts are to be evaluated. Merely because the state 
presents its case first does not mean that a criminal court has two separate cases which 
must be weighed up against one another on opposite sides of the scale. The 





and effectivity. The criminal court ultimately has a conglomerate of evidentiary 
material before it which is indicative of facts against or in favour of the innocence of 
the accused. Some exculpatory facts may appear from the state case whilst 
incriminating facts for example admissions made during cross-examination.  
 
The correct approach is that the criminal court must not be blinded by where the 
various components come from but rather attempt to arrange the facts, properly 
evaluated, particularly with regard to the burden of proof, in a mosaic in order to 
determine whether the alleged proof indeed goes beyond reasonable doubt or whether 
it falls short and thus falls within the area of a reasonable alternative hypothesis. In so 
doing, the criminal court does not weigh one 'case' against another but strives for a 
conclusion (whether the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt) during which process it is obliged, depending on the circumstances, to 
determine at the end of the case:  
 
(1) where the defence has not presented any evidence, whether the state, taking into 
account the onus, has presented a prima facie case which supports conclusively the 
state's proffered conclusion; (2) where the defence has presented evidence, whether 
the totality of the evidentiary material, taking into account the onus, supports the 
state's proffered conclusion. Where there is a direct dispute in respect of the facts 
essential for a conclusion of guilt it must not be approached: (a) by finding that the 
state's version is acceptable and that therefore the defence version must be rejected; 
(b) by weighing up the state case against the defence case as independent masses of 
evidence; or (c) by ignoring the state case and looking at the defence case in 
isolation." 
 
From the aforegoing it must at this stage already be clear that there is no onus on an 
accused to convince a court of any of the propositions advanced by him. It is for the 
state to prove the propositions false beyond reasonable doubt. See R v Difford 1937 
AD 370 at 373: 
 
"It is not disputed on behalf of the defence that in the absence of someexplanation the 
court would be entitled to convict the accused. It is not a question of throwing any 
onus on the accused, but in these circumstances it would be a conclusion which the 
court could draw if no explanation were given. It is equally clear that no onus rests on 
the accused to convince the court of the truth of any explanation he gives. If he gives 
an explanation, even if that explanation be improbable, the court is not entitled to 
convict unless it is satisfied, not only that the explanation is improbable, but that 
beyond any reasonable doubt it is false. If there is any reasonable possibility of his 
explanation being true, then he is entitled to his acquittal ..." 
 
All evidence requires a court to engage in inferential reasoning. Reference is herein 
before made to circumstantial evidence. The question is how should a court approach 
circumstantial evidence. In S v Mtsweni 1985 1 SA 590 at 593E-I it is emphasised that 
only proven facts can form the basis for legitimate inferences. Furthermore inferences 
can only be drawn if the logical dictates of R v Blom 1939 AD 188 at 202 are fully 






"In reasoning by inference there are two cardinal rules of logic which cannot be 
ignored: 
 
(1) The inference sought to be drawn must be consistent with all the proved facts. If it 
is not, the inference cannot be drawn. 
 
(2) The proved facts should be such that they exclude every reasonable inference from 
them save the one sought to be drawn. If they do not exclude other reasonable 
inferences, then there must be a doubt whether the inference sought to be drawn is 
correct." 
 
On more than one occasion hereinbefore I have referred to the question whether any 
evidence in respect of the complainant's sexual history and experience can and will be 
regarded as being relevant and admissible. I have also referred to the statement by 
SCHREINER JA in R v Matthews (supra) that relevance is "based upon a blend of 
logic and experience lying outside the law". It has also been said that facts are 
"relevant if from their existence inferences may properly be drawn as to the existence 
of the fact in issue". See R v Mpanza 1915 AD 348; S v Mavuso 1987 3 SA 499 (A). I 
have also referred to the fact that the question of relevancy is also dependent upon a 
consideration of all the facts put before court. 
 
The question of similar-fact evidence was also raised by the state during argument. In 
The South African Law of Evidence, Zeffertt et al at p251, the learned authors say the 
following about similar fact evidence: 
 
"The topic of similar-fact evidence, as it has been understood by our courts, involves 
a consideration of three of the matters that have already been discussed: 
 
(a) the requirement that evidence, if it is to be received, must be logically relevant and 
of sufficient probative force to warrant its reception despite any practical 
disadvantages that might be caused by admitting it;1 and (b) the rules of the English 
law, applicable to character evidence,2 that have been (c) applied to South Africa by 
statute. Similar-fact evidence, it will be seen, is only exceptionally admissible.3 It will 
be received, exceptionally, only if it is, first, sufficiently relevant to warrant its 
reception and, secondly, if it has a relevance other than one based solely upon 
character.4" 
 
I will later herein return to the question of relevancy and similar-fact evidence inthis 
particular case. Note can, however, already be taken at this stage of what is said in S v 
Wilmot 2002(2) SACR 145 at 157, paragraphs [36] and [37] where the court also dealt 
with a question concerning section 227 of the Act and similar-fact evidence: 
 
"[36] I am mindful of the dangers of a court having regard to what happened in 
subsequent cases in which a complainant was involved and the Pandora's box of 1 
collateral issues which could be opened by doing so. But there can be no absolute bar 
to doing so. It is obviously something which a court should only be prepared to take 
into account in circumstances where the alleged behaviour of the complainant in 





and similar kind and there is real anxiety in the court's mind as to whether the 
exclusion of those circumstances may not result in the perpetuation of a possible 
miscarriage of justice.  
 
Just as similar fact evidence is admissible against an accused only in narrowly 
circumscribed circumstances, so should 'similar fact' evidence of the proclivity of a 
complainant to give untrue evidence be admissible only in narrowly circumscribed 
circumstances. [37] Here we have the disturbing feature that in two other cases 
involving allegations of rape by the complainant her credibility has been found 
wanting. Once because she herself made flatly self-contradictory statements on oath 
as to whether she was raped and once because her evidence conflicted in material  
respects with that of a friend who also testified for the state. The complainant's 
evidence in that case was found by the magistrate to be unreliable. There may well be 
innocent explanations for the latter. It is conceivable that the friend's evidence was the 
unreliable evidence and not the complainant's or that, faced with the conflict, the 
magistrate did not know whose version was correct. One does not know. In the former 
case, it may well be that her initial allegation of rape is indeed true and that her 
retraction of this allegation was the result of influence being brought to bear upon her 
but the fact remains that, at best, she succumbed to the influence and committed 
perjury in retracting her allegation that she was raped." 
 
See ch 7.2 
See ch 8.3 
See at 260 et seq below, 4 
See at 256, 260 et seq below. 
 
In S v Jackson 1998(1) SACR 470 (SCA) the supreme court of appeal considered the 
so-called  cautionary rule in matters such as rape and found it to be irrational and 
outdated. The following remarks by OLIVIER JA at p476e-477d are of great 
importance to the matter under consideration: 
 
"In my view, the cautionary rule in sexual assault cases is based on an irrational and 
out-dated perception. It unjustly stereotypes complainants in sexual assault cases 
(overwhelmingly women) as particularly unreliable. In our system of law, the burden 
is on the state to prove the guilt of an doubt – no more and no less. The evidence in a 
particular case may call for a cautionary approach, but that is a far cry from the 
application of a general cautionary rule. In formulating this approach to the cautionary 
rule under discussion I respectfully endorse the guidance provided by the court of 
appeal in R v Makanjuola, R v Easton [1995] 3 All ER 730 (CA), a decision given 
after the legislative abrogation of the cautionary rule in England. Although the 
guidelines in that judgment were developed with a jury system in mind, the same 
approach, mutatis mutandis, is applicable to our law. At 732f-733a Lord Taylor CJ 
stated: 
 
'Given that the requirement of a corroboration direction is abrogated in the terms of s 
32(1), we have been invited to give guidance as to the circumstances in which, as a 
matter of discretion, a judge ought in summing up to a jury to urge caution in regard 
to a particular witness and the terms in which that should be done. The circumstances 





how a judge should deal with them. But it is clear that to carry on giving 
'discretionary' warnings generally and in the same terms as were previously obligatory 
would be contrary to the policy and purpose of the 1994 Act. Whether, as a matter of 
discretion, a judge should give any warning and if so its strength and terms must 
depend upon the content and manner of the witness's evidence, the circumstances of 
the case and the issues raised.  
 
The judge will often consider that no special warning is required at all. Where, 
however, the witness has been shown to be unreliable, he or she may consider it 
necessary to urge caution. In a more extreme case, if the witness is shown to have 
lied, to have made previous false complaints, or to bear the defendant some grudge, a 
stronger warning may be thought appropriate and the judge may suggest it would be 
wise to look for some supporting material before acting on the impugned witness's 
evidence. We stress that these observations are merely illustrative of some, not all, of 
the factors which judges may take into account in measuring where a witness stands 
in the scale of reliability and what response they should make at that level in their 
directions to the jury. We also stress that judges are not required to conform to any 
formula and this court would be slow to interfere with the exercise of discretion by a 
trial judge who has the advantage of assessing the manner of a witness's evidence as 
well as its content.'" 
 
With the foregoing in mind I have approached the facts and the legal position 
applicable thereto. Whenever the complainant could she referred to the accused 
calling her "my daughter" and to the fact that she regarded him as her father. That was 
denied by the accused. He said that he did not even call his own daughters "my 
daughter". It is clear that the complainant tried to persuade the father/daughter 
relationship with the accused. That was also a vital aspect of her freezing version and 
an attempt of discrediting the accused. The complainant was born on 17 September 
1974. She met the accused as a child of 5 years old during or about 1979. Her father 
died on 1 May 1985 when she was 10 years of age. During the period 1979 to 1985 
she had seen the accused on a few occasions. Not only was she a child at the time but 
both the accused and the complainant, with her parents, were in different places 
outside of South Africa.  
 
The complainant returned to South Africa with her mother during December 1990 
when she was 16 years of age. She can recall that she spoke to the accused again in 
1998 when she was 24 years old. It appears that for a long period, in fact 
approximately fourteen years, she had no contact with the accused. The complainant 
started working in Pretoria in 2001 when she was 27 years of age. In that period she 
saw the accused more often. She, however, left for the United Kingdom during 2002 
until October 2003. She was 29 years of age when she returned from the United 
Kingdom. During the period in the United Kingdom there was no contact between the 
complainant and the accused. 
 
The complainant also tried to show that she was a good friend of one of the accused's 
own daughters. The only daughter it could have been is Duduzile Zuma. It is not 
disputed that Duduzile was also in exile but when the complainant saw her in South 
Africa she did not recognise Duduzile. Strangely enough when Duduzile saw the 





irritated because she regarded her as a child of a comrade who again wanted money 
from her father. It is clear that Duduzile did not regard the complainant as a close 
family friend.  
 
The fact that the complainant called the accused malume and showed him respect 
does not prove that there was a father/daughter relationship between them. In court 
the complainant even referred to Kasrils as malume Ronnie. The term malume does 
not indicate that an older person is regarded as a father figure. Nomthandazo Msibi, a 
young lady of approximately the complainant's age and also a close friend of the 
complainant, denied that the accused had ever called the complainant "my daughter". 
She indicated that the complainant regarded the accused as her father but at the same 
time she said that she herself regarded him as her father. I will later refer to my 
impression of the various witnesses but in this specific aspect I was not impressed by 
Ms Msibi's evidence. I am not prepared to accept the complainant's evidence that 
there was a father/daughter relationship between her and the accused. 
 
The versions of the complainant and the accused as to what happened before and after 
the alleged rape are identical in many respects. I will first deal with some of the 
events. It is common cause that the complainant was upset about a child who was 
bitten by a snake in Swaziland. As a result thereof she contacted various people 
including the accused. It is common cause that she did not go to Swaziland but instead 
went to the accused's home that evening. It is in dispute as to whether the accused 
invited her to go there or whether she invited herself.  
 
It is common cause that the complainant stayed for the night. It is in dispute whether 
the accused invited her to stay over or whether the complainant indicated that she 
would be staying over. Duduzile Zuma supports the accused's evidence that there was 
talk that the complainant would leave with Kadusha but later decided not to do so. 
Though Duduzile Zuma was not privy to the discussion between the accused and the 
complainant as to the complainant leaving for home, the probabilities in the light of 
Duduzile's evidence favour the accused's version. Coupled with that is the statement 
that Duduzile overheard when the complainant said that she normally carries a panty 
and a toothbrush in her back pack. Other evidence by Duduzile, referred to above, is 
indicative of the fact that the complainant, according to her, wanted to discuss 
something with the accused on the night in question. 
 
It is common cause that when the accused and the complainant were alone when 
Duduzile took Kadusha home there was again talk about a boy friend and the 
accused's physical needs in spite of her HIV status. It is common cause that the 
accused had to do some work in his study. It is common cause that Duduzile returned 
back after having taken Kadusha home and it is common cause that at that stage the 
complainant was in the guest room and most probably having a shower. It must be 
accepted that Duduzile said goodnight to the accused before the complainant visited 
Duduzile in her room.  
 
It is common cause that the complainant wanted a book to read and that both the 
complainant and Duduzile went to the study where the accused was. It must be 
accepted as a fact that there was no need for Duduzile to say goodnight to her father a 





the complainant wanted to see the accused at the time. The accused said that during 
the conversation in his study the complainant told him to wake her up even if she was 
asleep. Mr Kemp argued that the reason for the complainant's visit to the study was to 
ensure that the accused would see her later that night. I think the submission is 
correct. It is clear that the accused did receive a telephone call when both the young 
ladies were in the study. On the probabilities it, however, is clear that in spite of the 
complainant's say-so nobody who phoned the accused that night wanted to come and 
see him. According to the complainant the accused made reference to her coming to 
his bedroom before she left the study at that time. On the accused's version she did 
visit him in his bedroom later that night. 
 
It is common cause that the accused visited the complainant in the guest-room at least 
once that night. According to the complainant the accused was merely there to say 
that he was attending to his visitors and would see her again later. On the accused's 
version there were no visitors to attend to and he invited the complainant on this 
occasion to his bedroom. When the complainant and the accused met again the 
alleged rape took place. According to the complainant it took place in the guest-room 
and according to the accused the consensual intercourse took place in his own 
bedroom. It must be remembered that whatever happened between the complainant 
and the accused happened in his own home.  
 
There was no need for the accused to say that consensual sex took place in his 
bedroom instead of in the guest-room. Obviously it would tend to make the 
complainant's case stronger if sex took place in the guest-room because if it took 
place in the main bedroom she must have gone there and it would be more difficult to 
prove rape. Similarly it would be better for the accused if his version is accepted that 
the complainant came to his bedroom instead of him having had sex with her in the 
guest-room. But, as I have already pointed out, nothing would have prevented the 
accused from saying that everything he said took place in the main bedroom in fact 
took place in the guest-room. I find it difficult to see what advantage the accused 
could gain by making his version more difficult by transferring what happened in the 
guest-room to the main bedroom. 
 
The state placed a completely different interpretation on the accused's visit to the 
guest-room. It was submitted by the state that the accused was implementing a plan 
all evening of 2 November 2005. He was making sexual overtures, referring to 
tucking in, massaging, etc. Eventually, according to the state, when the complainant 
did not submit to these sexual overtures the accused decided to rape her when she was 
asleep. I have difficulty in accepting that version. It would be foolish for any man 
with a police guard at hand and his own daughter not far away to surprise a sleeping 
woman and to start raping her not knowing whether she would shout the roof off. In 
fact the state submitted that when the complainant did not react the accused started 
talking to her to get some reaction from her. That would have been even more foolish 
for a rapist if he wanted to rape a sleeping woman now to wake her up to get her co-
operation to increase his sexual pleasure and at the same time not knowing whether 
she would scream for help. It is common cause that after intercourse had taken place 






According to the complainant this was the third visit to the guest-room and according 
to the accused the second visit. It is not necessary to refer again to the complainant's 
and the accused's different versions as to the alleged rape and what took place 
immediately thereafter. The state argued that the accused was aware of what he had 
done wrong and he therefore visited the complainant on this occasion in the guest-
room to do some damage control. Mr Kemp on the other hand argued that unlike what 
was normally expected the accused did not stay in bed with the complainant after their 
intercourse cuddling her and making small talk but instead got up to have a shower. 
Mr Kemp argued that both complainant and accused had realised that they had had 
intercourse without a condom and all the accused was doing was trying to clean 
himself as soon as possible. Mr Kempfurther argued that it is quite possible that the 
complainant took some exception to the accused's action and therefore left the main 
bedroom and went back to the guest-room. He argued that because the complainant 
unexpectedly left the main bedroom the accused went down to the guest-room. The 
discussion that took place in the guest-room, and which is fairly common cause, is not 
in line with rape that had just taken place. Only a foolish, over-confident rapist would 
have dared entering the room of his victim not knowing whether she is going to shout 
and scream or not. Instead the discussion that took place is not indicative of a rape 
shortly before.  
 
I will later deal in more detail with the complainant's version that she froze at the 
time. I will at that stage deal in more detail with the evidence of Dr Friedman and also 
the evidence of Dr Olivier. I will then also give my impressions of the complainant as 
a witness. The evidence of the complainant's mother does not really take the matter 
much further. It is clear that she was upset about the allegations of rape. It is common 
cause that the accused apologised to her. It was never said that he apologised because 
he raped the complainant. The accused said he apologised because the witness was 
upset about what had happened. It is clear that different people wanted to put a stop to 
the allegation of rape and any possible criminal trial. That in my mind is 
understandable. For a person in the position of the accused to make every attempt to 
stop the accusation from spreading further is logical. For a friend like Dr Mkize to do 
so is also understandable.  
 
I need not refer to the other people who also tried to do the same. The complainant's 
mother is an elderly lady. Her evidence was not in all respects coherent. I am not 
saying that she was lying to the court. In certain respects her memory was bad and 
perhaps conveniently so. I refer in this instance to the evidence of Pastor Mbambo. I 
was, however, not much impressed by the complainant's mother's evidence. The 
evidence of Nosipho Mgudlwa, also known as Pinkie, does support the complainant's 
version. She did find the complainant subdued and not her giggling self. The 
complainant did say that she was raped and that she cried. In the same vein the 
evidence of Nomthandazo Msibi, also known as Kimi, supports the evidence of the 
complainant, in particular her evidence that she was dismissive, abrupt and talkative. 
The fact that she was unsettled and restless and that she said that she did not want to 
see the accused again is supportive of the state's case. The witness could not, 
however, contribute much about what actually had happened on the night in question. 
The same holds true for Kimi's evidence. I prefer to deal with Taioe's and Linda's 
evidence somewhat later. As appears from the aforegoing the accused denied the 






Before dealing with the evidence of Dr Friedman and Dr 0livier and the evidence that 
followed on the successful application by the defence in terms of section 227 of the 
Act the following should be emphasised. Prior to the rape and in the preceding two 
months, the complainant had sent 54 sms messages to the accused. It appears that a 
change in the tone of the sms messages has also taken place in that they ended off 
with "love, hugs and kisses". It appears as if the complainant was seeking to make 
regular contact with the accused. In the accused's house the complainant walked 
around in a kanga with no underwear which prompted Duduzile Zuma to say that she 
was inappropriately dressed. Sexually charged conversations took place between her 
and the accused. It is common cause that the accused and the complainant arranged 
that he would come and see her in her room sometime during the evening. The 
complainant did not object to this. She did not object when he came to her room. She 
also did not object when he said that he would come later again. The complainant who 
is an experienced person in life did not find these arrangements strange at the time or 
recognised any of the sexually charged remarks. After the alleged rape she was very 
quick to recognise those indicators. 
 
As far as the rape itself is concerned there are a few very strange and odd features. 
The complainant is not in any way threatened or physically injured. Her clothes are 
not damaged in any manner. At no stage did the accused resort to physical violence or 
any threat. The accused knew that he was in danger of contracting HIV if he had to 
forcefully have sexual intercourse with the complainant because an abrasion or 
scratch inflicted on him during the sexual encounter may be responsible for HIV 
infection. The complainant was at least a reasonably fair match physically for the 
accused, being 31 years old herself and weighing 85kg compared with the accused 
who was at the time 63 years old and weighing 90kg. A very odd feature is that the 
alleged rape took place within ten metres of a uniformed policeman with the accused's 
grown up daughter not far away. As stated I will later deal with Dr Friedman's 
evidence but it appears to be very odd that from the time the complainant assisted in 
rolling onto her back and having her clothes removed, she did not utter a single “no” 
throughout her vagina being touched and at least  ten minutes of intercourse. At no 
stage was there any call for help which was immediately available. During the "rape" 
the accused uttered words of endearment to the complainant, not a single one whereof 
has the connotation of dominance or abuse. 
 
After the "rape" the complainant was in a position to immediately phone the world 
and to tell them about it but she instead decided to report to her close friends in terms 
indicating that no rape had taken place. The complainant was also in a position to 
leave the house immediately but she preferred to stay there for the rest of the night 
and not even locking the door. The next morning she wandered around in the house 
for at least one and a half hour. She took food from the fridge, she showered and 
made phone calls from the house's landline before leaving for work. If one looks at 
the allegations about rape and attempted rape in the complainant's past she was clearly 
not slow to report such incidents and to resist, save on the one occasion that she said 
she was unconscious.  
 
As a teenager the complainant was treated in a mental hospital and she was suffering 
from hallucinations. It appears that she is at present still receiving psychological 





psychological evaluation from an expert psychologist engaged by the defence where it 
could have revealed sexual pathology giving rise to false rape allegations. According 
to both Drs Friedman and Olivier victims of rape normally wash themselves as soon 
as possible and they suffer from depression. The complainant did not wash 
immediately and she does not suffer from depression. The accused's question 
regarding him ejaculating in her is indicative of the fact that he was prepared to 
withdraw the moment the complainant wanted him to. I have referred at some length 
to the application in terms of section 227 of the Act and the cross-examination and 
evidence that followed. In argument Mr Kemp submitted that irrespective of an order 
in terms of section 227 of the Act the defence would have been entitled to at least 
cross-examine the complainant on certain aspects of her evidence. He further 
submitted that ex abudante the application was couched in wide terms for the 
complainant's protection. Mr Kemp is correct. I, however, do not find it necessary to 
discuss the detail of the argument as an order was granted. Mr Kemp further 
submitted that now that the evidence is before court the credibility and effect thereof 
should be considered and not so much its relevance. He did not say that even 
irrelevant evidence should be considered. I am satisfied that he is correct. Where 
necessary I will still consider the question of relevancy. In her memoirs (the intended 
book) reference is made by the complainant to two instances of rape when she was 5 
years of age. That must have been in 1979. A clear reference to rape was made.  
 
During cross-examination the complainant said that in one instance it was not rape but 
only "an experience with a penis". In the other instance she was raped. Mr Kemp did 
not investigate that further and I think correctly so. Nothing much turns on this save 
for the fact that the word "rape" was used when no rape took place. The incidents with 
Godfrey and Charles must have taken place during 1987 and 1988. The complainant 
said that both Godfrey and Charles were convicted and sentenced for the rape. The 
evidence of Ntswaki Nigxashe makes it clear that Godfrey and Charles did not rape 
the complainant. The evidence concerning Godfrey and Charles was led, not to reflect 
on the complainant's bad sexual history or sexual experiences, but merely to indicate 
that she was prone, at a young age already, to make allegations of rape when no rape 
took place. Sigxashe referred to the person known as Mashaya who later turned out to 
be Mbuso Ncube. Reference is made to Mashaya in the memoirs where it is alleged 
that he attempted to rape her. 
 
Mashaya (Mbuso Ncube) testified. He denied any attempted rape. He said he was in 
love with the complainant. He also confirmed the problem between the complainant 
and Godfrey's girl friend. Again we have an allegation of rape (an attempt in this 
instance) which is refuted. In her evidence the complainant denied that she ever had 
penetrative sex with Mashaya. He denied that and said that they had had penetrative 
sex on more than one occasion in his car and once in his house. In her denial of 
penetrative sex with Mashaya the complainant was vacillating from a denial to lack of 
memory to “perhaps”. Most unsatisfactory evidence. The evidence was not tendered 
for any other purpose than to indicate that the complainant is prone to make false 
allegations of rape.  
 
The evidence of Mashaya concerning intercourse that in fact took place was led to 
show that the complainant was lying when she tried, unpersuasively so, to prove that 





with different other allegations of rape too. In 1994 the accused alleged that Nestor 
had raped her. That was disproved by the evidence of Mbambo. In 1994 the 
complainant accused Sandile Sithole of attempted rape. Sithole testified. He denied 
having attempted to rape the complainant. There is no reason why Sithole's denial 
should not be accepted. In 1995 the complainant was a student at the RR Wright 
theological seminary in Vereeniging, also known as the Wilberforce Institute (1908). 
At the seminary a number of incidents occurred leading to certain accusations made 
by the complainant. The witness Matsoko at a stage proposed love to the complainant. 
She refused his advances and he left. The next day he was accused of having raped 
the complainant. Matsoko was expelled from the seminary. Matsoko denied having 
raped the complainant. Modise testified that in 1995 at the seminary he was madly in 
love with the complainant, that they had a relationship and that they were inseparable. 
When he wanted to make love to her, he said she went mad. Nothing really happened 
between them. Later he heard that according to the complainant he had raped her. Still 
at the seminary in 1995 the complainant fell ill and Mahlabe, the boarding master, 
helped her only to be accused some time later that he had raped her and that he was 
the father of the child she aborted.  
 
Mahlabe was also aware of the allegation against Matsoko and was co-responsible 
that he was expelled from the seminary. Later in 1995 after the complainant had left 
the seminary and could not produce a matric certificate, she accused Mbambo of rape 
and when she was confronted about the allegation by Mbambo in front of members of 
the church the complainant referred to the church as a dirty church and left. The 
evidence of and regarding Sithole, Nestor, Matsoko, Modise, Mahlabe and Mbambo 
was not led to show that the complainant was of loose morals. The evidence was led 
to show that the complainant was inclined to falsely accuse men of having raped or 
attempted to rape her. 
 
The complainant's answer to the allegations by or concerning Sithole, Nestor, 
Matsoko, Modise, Mahlabe and Mbambo was either a blank denial or that she did not 
know the specific individual. It cannot be said that all these witnesses conspired 
against the complainant. There was not even an attempt to suggest that the witnesses 
were part of a conspiracy. In view of Duduzile Ncobo's evidence such an attempt 
would not have succeeded. I have no hesitation in accepting the evidence of Mashaya, 
Sithole, Matsoko, Modise, Mahlabe and Mbambo. The evidence of Duduzile Ncobo 
was in particular convincing. The evidence of Manzi and Mpontshani was also 
summarised earlier herein. I seriously considered whether the evidence of these two 
witnesses was relevant or not. I eventually concluded that the evidence was relevant. 
As far as Manzi is concerned, it appears to be relevant in that the complainant 
explained to him how she met Mpontshani and what she told him at the time. I have 
referred to the fact that she, according to her, told Mpontshani in no uncertain terms 
that she wanted to have sexual intercourse and that she wanted it immediately. It 
appears that she is a woman who is not scared to tell men of her sexual needs.  
 
The complainant's attitude is further illustrated in the evidence of Manzi when he said 
that while he was having a bath the complainant came into the bathroom, undressed 
and got into the bath with him. It was not strange to her to be naked with a man whom 
she had met only a week before. When Manzi again met the complainant two years 





which took place five years earlier. That can only refer to the alleged rape by 
Mahlabe. I have no reason not to accept the evidence of Manzi. Mpontshani met the 
complainant in 1996. They had sex on various occasions. The witness confirmed 
Manzi's evidence in broad detail namely that Manzi met the complainant in 1998 and 
that the complainant again visited the place where he and Manzi stayed. I am aware of 
some differences between the evidence of Manzi and Mpontshani. I have referred 
thereto earlier and I need not repeat it again.  
 
Although Mpontshani's memory failed him in some respects, his evidence has a clear 
ring of truth. The evidence of Commissioner Taioe and Superintendent Linda is said 
to be inadmissible as it relates to information obtained from the accused 
unconstitutionally. I have hereinbefore dealt with the question of a follow up meeting, 
the fact that the accused was warned on 10 November 2005 when the warning 
statement was obtained from him and that it is alleged that that warning was still 
applicable on 15 November 2005. I have also referred to the fact that according to 
both policemen the accused's attorney was at all times present and that there was 
therefore no reason to warn him again. At the time Commissioner Taioe saw the 
accused on 10 and 15 November 2005 he had not only read the complainant's 
statement but he had consulted with her as well. He must have known what the 
complainant's version was.  
 
On 15 November 2005 he was aware of the fact that the accused had denied having 
raped the complainant and had stated in his warning statement that he and the 
complainant had conversed "and shared in each other's company privately" and 
further stated in paragraph 14 thereof "much later that evening at approximately 11:30 
she retired to the room prepared for her where she spent the night". In spite of that he 
wants me to believe that he nonchalantly asked the accused to point to him where the 
alleged crime scene is and that the accused then in an unguarded moment pointed out 
the guest-room. That is in any event not borne out by the photographer's description 
of what was pointed out. For the same reason I am not prepared to accept that the 
commissioner asked the further two questions, one in the guest-room and one in the 
main bedroom. The commissioner had great difficulty in explaining why the questions 
had to be asked in the way he said he had asked them. Surprisingly the commissioner 
regarded the answer as very important but did not refer thereto in his statement. This 
statement by the commissioner shows the lie in his evidence. At the time he could not 
have regarded the accused's alleged answer as of any importance whatsoever.  
 
Supertintendent Linda had to defend the commissioner bravely and referred to the 
cool manner in which the commissioner had asked the questions. In order to convince 
me that he was correct in his evidence Superintendent Linda had to rely on his youth 
and therefore his good memory. I am not in the least impressed by this piece of 
evidence by the commissioner and the superintendent. On the probabilities the 
accused would not have answered as stated by them. I therefore cannot accept the 
version of the two policemen in this respect. The overall probabilities in the matter 
also militate against their versions. Even if the admissibility of the two policemen’s 
evidence is to be approached from a constitutional point of view I am satisfied that it 






It would have been the easiest thing for the commissioner to have warned the accused 
again which he is expected to do whenever he puts questions to or interviews a 
suspect. If one looks at the contents of the accused’s warning statement and what the 
commissioner must have known of the matter at the so-called follow up meeting, his 
alleged questions were nothing less than a trap for the accused. There was therefore, 
in my judgment, a clear breach of the accused’s constitutional rights. 
 
Earlier herein I stated that I would again refer to the evidence of the two experts, Dr 
Friedman and Dr Olivier. From the summary of their evidence the differences in their 
approach should be clear. I do not want to deal with their evidence in any detail again. 
In my judgment it is clear that Dr Friedman came to a conclusion without having 
made full enquiries from the complainant, that she did not obtain all detail from her 
and furthermore did not make use of available psychometric tests. I agree with the 
evidence given by Dr Olivier that I cannot rely on the evidence of Dr Friedman to 
conclude that the complainant did freeze at the stage when intercourse took place on 2 
November 2005. From the aforegoing it should be clear that I find that consensual sex 
took place between the complainant and the accused in the main bedroom. It is 
therefore not necessary for me to deal with the question of the absence of mens rea 
which was again raised by Mr Kemp. It may be asked why the complainant who is 
inclined to lesbianism would have had consensual sex with the accused. The answer 
lies in the complainant's history. The complainant regards herself as being bisexual 
but inclined to lesbianism. She was prepared to have penetrative sex with men on 
various occasions but also as late as 1996, 1997 and 1998 according to the evidence of 
Mpontshani. According to the complainant herself she had sex with a male in July 
2004. The question can also be asked why would the complainant allege that she was 
raped by the accused when it was in fact consensual sex that took place. Why would a 
woman in her position go through all the trauma in terms of the trial and publicity 
when she was not really raped. It is in this respect that the reference to previous false 
rape allegations become of the utmost importance.  
 
This case is in my judgment a good illustration why pressure groups and individuals 
should not jump to conclusions and express criticism before having heard all the 
evidence. At the time when I allowed the complainant to be cross-examined on her 
sexual history and evidence to be led in that respect I was fully aware of what was 
contained in Hulley's affidavit. I realised that there was at least a possibility that at the 
end of the case it could be said that a false accusation of rape was made against the 
accused. Instead of waiting some people stated categorically that rape victims will as 
a result of this case be hesitant to report an incident of rape because of the treatment 
the complainant received, apparently also by the court. Much was also said about the 
protection the proposed new Sexual Offences Act will afford to rape complainants. I 
have referred to that Act and if it is necessary for the defence of an accused the same 
process will have to be followed in the future. In many respects this is a unique case 
with unique features. Instead of scaring off unfortunate rape victims it should have 
been pointed out and emphasised that unfortunate victims of rape will be treated 
differently because they are different from the complainant in this matter. 
 
A further question that can be asked is why will the complainant deny that she knows 
any of the men who alleged that she had falsely accused them of rape or attempted 





in the past because then it will be found out that she has done it again. The evidence 
of Duduzile Ncobo and Mahlabe should not be forgotton. Both these witnesses in all 
earnesty said that the complainant is a sick person who needs help. A vital question is 
why would the complainant shout "rape" when she was a willing participant in sexual 
intercourse? I have referred to the statement of Ncube and of Mahlabe. I have also 
earlier herein referred to what Dr 0livier advanced as possible reasons why a 
complainant would make a false allegation of rape. It is quite clear that the 
complainant has experienced previous trauma and it is quite possible that she 
perceives any sexual behaviour as threatening. It is quite possible that after 
intercourse had taken place there was the feeling of guilt, resentment, anger and 
emotional turmoil. 
 
This trial was unfortunate in many respects. It had a damaging effect on both the 
complainant and the accused. In my view both of them are to be blamed for the fact 
that it affected them. The accused should not have had sexual intercourse with a 
person so many years younger than himself and furthermore being the child of an old 
comrade and a woman plus minus his age. The complainant said that in spite of her 
own attitude that she would not have unprotected sex, it still remains the choice of a 
person to have unprotected sex. In my judgment that is exactly what she and the 
accused did that night of 2 November 2005. Having heard the evidence of Prof 
Martins it is inexcusable that the accused did so. It is totally unacceptable that a man 
should have unprotected sex with any person other than his regular partner and 
definitely not with a person who to his knowledge is HIV positive. I do not even want 
to comment on the effect of a shower after having had unprotected sex. Had Rudyard 
Kipling known of this case at the time he wrote his poem "If" he might have added 
the following: "And if you can control your body and your sexual urges, then you are 
a man my son."From the aforegoing it is clear that the probabilities show that the 
complainant's evidence cannot be accepted. She is a strong person well in control of 
herself knowing what she wants. She is definitely not that meek, mild and submissive 
person she was made out to be. 
 
On the evidence as a whole it is clear that the accused's version should be believed 
and accepted. The accused's evidence was also clear and convincing in spite of media 
efforts to discredit him. At least one cannot say that the accused's evidence is not 
reasonably possibly true. The state applied that the court order, exhibit “B”, be further 
amended to protect the complainant’s identity and that the kanga be handed back to 
her. I am prepared to do so. I therefore make the following orders: 
 
1. The order of court, exhibit “B”, is amended by adding the following at the end 
thereof: “The complainant’s name and photograph may not be published without her 
and the Director for Public Prosecutions for the Witwatersrand Local Division’s 
written permission.” 
 
2. The kanga, exhibit “1”, may be handed back to the complainant. In my judgment 
the state has not proved the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is 
found not guilty and is discharged. 
 
W J VAN DER MERWE 





FOR THE STATE: ADV C DE BEER, H J BROODRYK SC, W NGABELA 
INSTRUCTED BY: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, JHB 
FOR THE ACCUSED: ADV K J KEMP SC, J BRAUNS SC, T MBONGWA 
INSTRUCTED BY: BRIAN HULLEY & ASSOCIATES, DURBAN 
 
 
 
